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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Amy Billingsley 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
March 2019 
Title: Humorwork, Feminist Philosophy, and Unstable Politics 
 
This dissertation examines humor as a situated practice of reappropriation and 
transformation undertaken by a subject within a social world. I bring together insights 
from humor studies, philosophy of humor, and feminist philosophy (especially feminist 
continental philosophy) to introduce the concept of humorwork as an unstable political 
practice of reappropriating and transforming existing images, speech, and situations. I 
argue that humorwork is an unstable politics because the practice of reappropriation and 
transformation often exceeds the intentions of the subject practicing humor, taking on a 
continued life beyond the humorist’s intentions. By focusing on the practice of humor, 
the subject who produces it, their social and political world, the affects circulated through 
political humor, and the politics of popular and scholarly discourse about humor, I push 
against a reductive, depoliticized concept of humor and the trivializing gesture of “it’s 
just a joke.” Instead, I argue that humorists are responsible and connected to (if not 
always blameable) for the social and political life of their humorwork, despite the 
unstable and unpredictable uptake of humor against a humorist’s intentions. 
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LAUGHING AT MY EXPENSE: 
PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS ON UNSTABLE HUMORWORK 
 
 
Humor and Humorlessness among Women and Snake People 
 In a November 1973 issue of Ms. Magazine, the cover boasted pop art of a man 
talking to a woman about humor and feminism. The man, exhibiting a pose of aggression 
or stern lecturing while facing away from the magazine reader’s point of view, remarks to 
a woman in the style of a joke, “Q. DO YOU KNOW THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
HAS NO SENSE OF HUMOR?” The woman completes the joke with her face plainly in 
view of the onlooker, her hair blue and her facial expression displaying a matter-of-fact 
calm, “A. NO...BUT HUM A FEW BARS AND I’LL FAKE IT!” The cover directly 
responds to charges by men that the women’s movement and the women who participate 
in it lack humor through the interruption of his loaded question by a woman’s joke, her 
actual practice of humor cutting through the insinuation that she lacks a sense of it. The 
format of the man’s speech is shifted against him, his loaded “do you know” responded to 
by the woman as if the man had asked about some tune she is unfamiliar with rather than 
an attempt to force her to defend the women’s movement from his charge of 
humorlessness.  In this way, the woman’s joking response cuts through the assumption of 
her humorlessness by using humor against the man’s speech, both shifting the terms he 
2 
 
has set up for the discussion and bringing an actual instance of women’s political humor 
to the center of a discussion that attempted to bracket it out. 
The Ms. cover joke refers to an essay in the November 1973 issue of Ms. written 
by feminist professor of psychology Naomi Weisstein titled “Why We Aren’t Laughing 
Any More.” Weisstein discusses the association between the women’s movement and 
humorlessness in a context where women are expected to constantly show good humor 
and pleasant laughter towards men in advertisements and in everyday life.1 Weisstein 
concludes that the problem of “humorlessness” among women and the women’s 
movement is not the inability to practice humor but a failure to enact a specific style of 
humor expected of women by men, in the mode of being pleasant and charming for men.2 
In contrast to the expectation by men and patriarchal society that women’s humor 
be pleasing to men, Weisstein calls for a humor practiced among women and for women 
to push against a shared condition of powerlessness. Weisstein admires humor when it is 
used by marginalized groups for survival and resistance. She writes,  
...people do laugh at their own pain. The important difference is that if they are 
really to find it funny, they have to have made the joke. Humor here, too, has a 
political use, but its function is reversed: it is a weapon or technique of survival 
used by the oppressed. It is the powerless fighting back.3 
 
Weisstein’s concern is thus not the overblown and loaded question, “Are women funny?” 
or “Is the women’s movement humorless?” but rather the possibility that humor could be 
                                               
1 Naomi Weisstein, "Why We Aren't Laughing Any More." Ms. Magazine, November 
1973, 51. 
 
2 Weisstein, 89. 
 




used on the side of the women’s movement and on the side of women despite its 
continued use against women, even when practiced by many women among men.  
Weisstein’s acknowledgment that humor has often been used against women, 
alongside her call for a women’s tradition of political humor, brings her to a complicated 
consideration of humor’s ambivalence towards women. She laments that she knows of no 
comparable consistent tradition of women practicing a survival or revolutionary humor 
among each other like she finds in other oppressed groups such as her grandparents’ 
Eastern European Jewish tradition. She writes, “...there may be traditions of women’s 
humor in different social classes, ethnic groups, cultures, historical periods. But if such 
traditions existed or exist now, I have been denied them. I remember no redemptive or 
fighting humor about my condition.”4 Weisstein traces her personal inexperience with a 
women’s “redemptive or fighting humor” with the frequent dispersal of women among 
men and under the control of men at the expense of forming a women’s culture and 
tradition. Under these conditions of isolation and subjection, humor becomes a practice 
that is usually not on women’s side. Weisstein emphasizes,  
An independent, mocking humor is too active for the objectified role we were 
meant to fill. Yes, we had an obligation to laugh endlessly at men’s jokes, 
whether or not they were funny, insulting, crude, unpleasant, stupid; yes, we were 
supposed to laugh at what others thought we were; yes, we were supposed to be 
witty and pleasing - all that is part of personal charm. But to be able to mock the 
requirement that we be all these things is quite a different thing.5 
 
Though Weisstein is interested in a humor that is on the side of women as part of the 
women’s movement, she is also wary of a history in which humor has been used as part 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
 




of the relentless techniques of oppression holding women in subjugation to men. 
Weisstein asks, “How can you trust humor when it’s used as a weapon against you?”6 
She answers, hopefully, “We must reclaim our history, our rights to self-expression and 
collective enjoyment. We must create our own humor. The propitiating laughter, the 
charming smiles are over. This time, when we laugh, things are going to be funny.”7 
 Weisstein’s essay emphasizes a hope for a humor on the side of the women’s 
movement in a context where humor has often been used against women. The ambivalent 
relationship between women, the women’s movement, and humor has persisted for 
decades since the November 1973 Ms. article. In January 2007 essayist Christopher 
Hitchens wrote a polemic for Vanity Fair on the subject of “Why Women Aren’t Funny,” 
reframing his question a few paragraphs into the essay as, “Why are men, taken on 
average and as a whole, funnier than women?” Citing a Stanford University School of 
Medicine study in which men and women were presented with 70 black-and-white 
cartoons chosen by the researchers as a test of different sexed responses to humor, 
Hitchens interprets, “Slower to get it, more pleased when they do, and swift to locate the 
unfunny—for this we need the Stanford University School of Medicine?” But his main 
focus is not on the reception of humor by women, but rather on its production: “And 
remember, this is women when confronted with humor. Is it any wonder that they are 
backward in generating it?”8 
                                               
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Ibid., 90. 
 





When considering the production of humor, Hitchens attributes his theory that 
men are more aligned with humor than women, a claim he primarily supports through 
anecdotes, to a fundamental difference between men and women. To that end, Hitchens 
believes that women who produce humor tend to derive it from a source other than being 
women. In his own words,  
Most [funny women comedians], though, when you come to review the situation, 
are hefty or dykey or Jewish, or some combo of the three. When Roseanne stands 
up and tells biker jokes and invites people who don’t dig her shtick to suck her 
dick—know what I am saying? And the Sapphic faction may have its own reasons 
for wanting what I want—the sweet surrender of female laughter. While Jewish 
humor, boiling as it is with angst and self-deprecation, is almost masculine by 
definition.9 
 
The problem with women as a group for Hitchens is that fundamental sex differences 
direct women away from the practice of humor. Whereas men are directed towards the 
serious irreconcilable disparities and anguishes of life, women, according to Hitchens, are 
too focused on hopes and pleasantries. Hitchens writes,  
Humor is part of the armor-plate with which to resist what is already farcical 
enough. (Perhaps not by coincidence, battered as they are by motherfucking 
nature, men tend to refer to life itself as a bitch.) Whereas women, bless their 
tender hearts, would prefer that life be fair, and even sweet, rather than the sordid 
mess it actually is.10 
 
Hitchens thus appeals to a fundamental sexed difference between men and women to 
explain why he should find the dynamic of humorful men and humorless women so 
inescapable: women sacrifice a clear-eyed, objective, heavy outlook towards the world 







and its inevitable suffering and inequality for a fanciful yearning for finding a fairness 
and sweetness through a self-deception, a curse of “their tender hearts.”11 
This emphasis on a masculine, humorful embrace of ugly reality in contrast to a 
feminine humorlessness that aims for the delusion of fairness persists in 2010 discussions 
about whether humor is on the side of the “millennial” generation. In a September 2015 
essay for The Atlantic titled “That’s Not Funny! Today’s College Students Can’t Seem to 
Take a Joke” journalist Caitlin Flanagan traces the epidemic of humorlessness among 
millennials to a socially conscious over-sensitivity that fails to understand humor. 
Specifically, the problem is kindness. Flanagan writes,  
The students’ determination to avoid booking any acts that might conceivably 
hurt the feelings of a classmate was in its way quite admirable. They seemed 
wholly animated by kindness and by an open-mindedness to the many varieties of 
the human experience. But the flip side of this sensitivity is the savagery with 
which reputations and even academic careers can be destroyed by a single 
comment—perhaps thoughtless, perhaps misinterpreted, perhaps (God help you) 
intended as a joke—that violates the values of the herd.12 
 
This over-sensitive herd mentality of kindness, Flanagan continues, is at odds with the 
more serious moments that comedy is capable of. Watching a now-sensitized comedian 
perform for a humorless millennial college audience, Flanagan misses the absence of 
heavier, darker humor. She explains,  
Those jokes include observations about power and sex and even rape—and each, 
in its complicated way, addresses certain ugly and possibly immutable truths. But 
they are jokes, not lessons from the gender-studies classroom. Their first objective 
is to be funny, not to service any philosophical ideal. They go where comedy 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Caitlin Flanagan. “That’s Not Funny!: Today’s College Students Can’t Seem to Take a  





always wants to go, to the darkness, and they sucker-punch you with a laugh 
when you don’t think you should laugh.13 
 
The question of women’s allegiance or discord with humor, stretching from individual 
women to the women’s movement and the gender studies classroom, continues to inform 
discussions of who has abandoned humor and who has recruited it to their side.  
 As Weisstein notes in her Ms. essay, the split between men on the side of humor 
and women against humor is not set in stone, regardless of whatever anecdotes Hitchens 
can throw at women. A 2018 piece in The New Yorker by humor writer and stand-up 
comedian Ginny Hogan echoes Hitchens’ essay with the headline “Women Just Aren’t 
Funny” just before tearing apart his circumstantial anecdotal style through humorous 
satire.14 The popular women’s and feminist satire site Reductress will be adapted to late-
night television for Comedy Central airing 2018 or 2019.15 Comedian Michelle Wolf 
received mass media attention for her humor targeting the Trump administration at the 
2018 White House Correspondents Dinner, resulting in her public condemnation by the 
President and members of his cabinet for going too far.16 Even the humorless millennials 
have somehow taken up humor against the articles written about their failure as a 
                                               
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Ginny Hogan, “Women Just Aren’t Funny,” The New Yorker, March 2018, 
https://www.newyorker.com/humor/daily-shouts/women-just-arent-funny/.  
 
15 Devon Maloney, “Perfect Women’s Satire Site Reductress is Getting a Comedy 




16 Julia Manchester. “White House Press On Defensive After Michelle Wolf Torches 





generation. In 2015, in response to a cottage industry of disingenuous articles lamenting 
the faults of the millennial generation, coder Eric Bailey created a Web browser 
extension that, when downloaded, changes the word “Millennial” into “Snake People.” 
Bailey was inspired by the frequency with which thinkpieces characterize an entire 
generation as “this weird, dehumanized, alien phenomenon,” using the label “Snake 
People” to transform anti-Millennial essays into humor against their own intentions.17 
Humor’s sides are not as well defined as some essayists such as Hitchens and Flanagan 
insist. 
 The humor of replacing “millennials” with “Snake People” also went beyond its 
creator’s and users’ intentions. In addition to changing Millennials to Snake People, the 
web extension replaced commonly used phrases in articles about Millennials to fit the 
absurd Snake People theme. For example, it changed the name of the 2011 movement 
Occupy Wall Street to the “Great Ape-Snake War” and the Great Recession to the “Time 
of Shedding and Cold Rocks.” In a March 2018 essay published by the New York Times, 
a mistake made it to print due to an editor who used the extension. The essay, titled, 
“President Trump’s Exaggerated and Misleading Claims on Trade,” now contained a 
printed sentence reading, “America’s trade deficit narrowed dramatically during the Time 
of Shedding and Cold Rocks.” New York Times editor Justin Bank admitted he was at 
fault, suggesting to his followers on Twitter, “Pro tip: Disable your ‘Millennials to Snake 
People’ extension when copying and pasting.” When asked to comment about his 
                                               
17 David Scharfenberg, “Innovation of the Week: Millennials to Snake People,” The 






creation finding its way into the New York Times several years later, Bailey responded 
mirthfully, “Computers were a mistake.”18 Whether said to be on the side of women or 
men, or one generation or another, humor maintains an element of instability that can 
lead to unintended results. 
 These discussions about humorous groups in contrast to humorless groups are 
discussions about the social and political dynamics of humor as it relates to gender and 
power. Though the phrase “it’s just a joke” or “lighten up” are often deployed by 
individuals to excuse a given joke from the charge of harm, or to paint another individual 
or group as oversensitive, this phrase is deployed in a larger context where some social 
and political groups are associated more with an affinity for humor, and others are 
depicted as humorless or even dangerous to the continuation of humor as a human 
practice. The larger social and political backdrop of humor I am interested in focusing on 
in this dissertation is not only the different practices of humor by enfranchised and 
disenfranchised groups, but also political discussions about who is humorful and who is 
humorless.  
 Beyond this, I am also interested in the ways in which humor fails to totally lie 
upon the side of individuals and groups who practice it, regardless of whether they are 
seen to have more of an affinity for its practice. For this reason, I focus on the subject of 
unstable politics, through which humor can be practiced with social and political aims 
and effects, but also frequently thwart the intentions and expectations of people and 
                                               
18 Rhett Jones, “New York Times Issues Correction After Editor Fails to Turn Off 





groups who take it up. Considering the instability of humor as a political practice not only 
is necessary to understand the many ways its thwarts expectations and results in 
continued humorous practice, but also for centering a mode of potential feminist practice 
that takes up this instability. As an unstable politics, I argue that humor is a practice that 
enables a distinct evasion of speaking on the terms set by oppressive systems to instead 
remake them, carrying the risk that this instability will be used against the subject who 
takes it on as a practice. I thus am hopeful that a discussion of humor as a feminist 
political practice will lead to more discussions about the potential and risks for indirect, 
tricky, and playful feminist political practices.  
 
With Laughter on My Side 
Before diving more into the discussion of humor as an unstable political practice, 
it is useful to draw out the relationship between humor and instability. For an 
introduction to this, I turn to Søren Kierkegaard as a philosopher who has sometimes 
been given the title of “funniest philosopher” while simultaneously directing readers to 
the ambiguities of laughter of humor. Thomas C. Oden, editor of The Humor of 
Kierkegaard, writes, “Who might reasonably be nominated as the funniest philosopher of 
all time?...I provisionally declare Søren Abaye Kierkegaard (despite his enduring 
stereotype as the melancholy, despairing Dane) as, among philosophers, the most 
amusing.”19 Despite this affinity between Kierkegaard and humor, he often emphasizes 
humor’s ambivalence in relation to human life. In Either/Or’s first section Kierkegaard 
                                               
19 Thomas C. Oden, introduction to The Humor of Kierkegaard: An Anthology, ed. 




writes from the pseudonym-character of A, named by Kierkegaard’s other pseudonym-
character Victor Eremita from the book’s Preface. Eremita associates A’s writings with 
“a multiplicity of approaches to an esthetic view of life,” associating his soul with a “wild 
unruliness” that differs from the second half of the book’s writings from pseudonym-
character B (also named by Eremita).20 This multiplicity of aesthetic existential positions 
does not clearly hang together as an elaborated theory of laughter, with Eremita 
suggesting that no coherent presentation of A’s esthetic extremes are possible. 
Regardless, A presents two intriguing aphorisms on laughter and its potential instabilities. 
In A’s opening section “Diapsalmata,” a word that harkens to both Psalms and 
repetition, A describes a crowd laughing in response to a clown, 
In a theater, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to tell the 
audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them again, and they 
became still more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be 
destroyed - amid the universal hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a 
joke.21 
 
This apocalyptic vision of laughter emphasizes one potential instability of humor and its 
subject. The clown, often taken to embody the comic but also its synthesis with the tragic 
as the tragicomic (consider the abundance of the sad clown), is so associated with a 
comic situation and reception that the fire around the audience is interpreted as but a joke. 
In this context, it is the situation of the clown vis-a-vis joke-telling that leads to 
misinterpretation, as his words of warning are rendered ineffective and instead interpreted 
in the less straightforward and direct mode of the joke.  
                                               
20 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part 1, ed. and trans. Howard v. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 13-14. 
 




This misinterpretation, occurring at the site of clown and audience, is then 
extended to the “wits and wags,” the tellers of jokes and humorists, who threaten to end 
the world by losing sight of a world-view beyond their comic position and practice. A, 
resonating laughter with the tragicomic through its associations with weeping22 and with 
revenge as a response to rage and contempt,23 has a tendency to laugh at the world around 
him. In one passage, A suggests that he has been unable to stop laughing upon learning 
what “the meaning of life” means to his society.24 A’s laughing response to society, 
reflecting critiques found in Kierkegaard’s other books such as The Present Age, has the 
potential for not only world-ending jest but also serves as social critique. But though A, 
who is quite a wit and a wag, acknowledges the potential risk of engaging with the world 
as a joke, he soon finds himself in a characteristic mode of personal despair about the 
results of laughter:  
Laugh at the stupidities of the world, and you will regret it; weep over them, and 
you will also regret it. Laugh at the stupidities of the world or weep over them, 
you will regret it either way. Whether you laugh at the stupidities of the world or 
you weep over them, you will regret it either way.25 
 
There is a lingering matter of A’s earlier association between laughter and weeping and 
here the setup of a diverging choice between the two, but taking seriously Emerita’s 
claim that the esthetic position need not hang together coherently when articulating itself, 
laughter takes up a mode of not only the specter of world-ending misinterpretation 
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through jest, but also personal regret. Here the comic is not only a site for laughing-at or 
scorn, but also the unstable situation of misinterpretation and negative results inclusive of 
both the personal and the larger world. 
 In another passage on the gods’ laughter, A takes this potential instability of 
laughter and the comic in a more positive (but nonetheless tricky) direction by describing 
his wish for laughter to always be on his side. A writes, 
Something marvelous has happened to me. I was transported to the seventh 
heaven. There sat all the gods assembled. As a special dispensation, I was granted 
the favor of making a wish. "What do you want," asked Mercury. "Do you want 
youth, or beauty, or power, or a long life, or the most beautiful girl, or anyone of 
the other glorious things we have in the treasure chest? Choose-but only one 
thing." For a moment I was bewildered; then I addressed the gods, saying: My 
esteemed contemporaries, I choose one thing - that I may always have the 
laughter on my side. Not one of the gods said a word; instead, all of them began 
to laugh. From that I concluded that my wish was granted and decided that the 
gods knew how to express themselves with good taste, for it would indeed have 
been inappropriate to reply solemnly: It is granted to you.26 
 
Here, A has shifted from laughter’s power ending the world to a “dispensation” and wish 
for laughter’s allegiance that he is to receive from the most exalted regions of heaven. 
Instead of simply having his wish confirmed through direct acknowledgment, the gods 
respond to A’s request with laughter.  
A has concluded that his wish was successfully granted, and interprets the 
laughing response as a fitting affirmation, but there is a lingering ambiguity in the 
passage.27 If A has previously associated laughter with scorn, revenge, derision, and a 
refusal to take situations (such as a fire in a movie theater) as straightforward, A’s 
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conclusion that the gods granted his wish is potentially erroneous, since it is unclear what 
the gods’ laughter entails. Certainly, the gods could be affirming A through the laughter 
he so desires to be on his side, but the gods could also be laughing at the person who 
requests laughter be on his side in a way that denies his request for laughter, or the gods 
may be acknowledging the uncertainty of laughter’s allegiance. Perhaps the only laughter 
that is on A’s side is the laugh that meets him with scorn rather than the laugh he directs 
at his society. 
What it means for laughter to be on A’s side is also ambiguous, given that 
Kierkegaard’s text in general places A in a limited esthetic situation, and Kierkegaard 
associates A’s relationship with laughter as a relationship with contradiction. In his notes, 
Kierkegaard states that A assumes a “total break with actuality” through his “mental 
depression and its dominance over actuality.”28 In his notes on the gods’ laughter 
passage, Kierkegaard writes, 
“The last διαψ. [diaps.] tells us how a life such as this has found its satisfactory 
expression in laughter. He pays his debt to actuality by means of laughter, and 
now everything takes place within this contradiction. His enthusiasm is too 
intense, his sympathy too deep, his love too burning, his heart too warm to be able 
to express himself in any other way than by contradiction.”29 
 
For A, if he truly was granted laughter on his side, laughter does not necessarily serve 
“on his side” in any sense of control or alliance, but rather results from the situation of his 
continuing subjective break with actuality. In this vein, A’s laughter marks his navigation 
                                               






of his space of continuing subjective contradiction, not a clear tool for him to wield for 
some sense of resolution or absolution.  
In this vein, it is fitting to link Kierkegaard’s passage of gods’ laughter, which is 
the final passage in the Diapsalmata, with the first passage, as Kierkegaard’s notes insist 
“The first διαψ is really the task of the entire work, which is not resolved until the last 
words of the sermon.”30 In the opening passage, A likens the poet’s work to the 
production of sweet music through a suffering that is missed and misunderstood by the 
public who enjoys the poetry.31 Because poetry is such a torture and a conduit for 
misunderstanding, A concludes, “...I would rather be a swineherd out on Amager and be 
understood by swine than be a poet and be misunderstood by people.”32 If we connect the 
last passage with the first, as Kierkegaard suggests, one potential resolution to poetry’s 
misunderstood pain that has been found by A is his turn to laughter. But seen through the 
clown passage, laughter is no less likely to be misinterpreted, and A continues to navigate 
a situation of contradiction as laughter lingers only ambiguously “on his side”. 
Kierkegaard’s passages on laughter indicate that the site of humor is a site of 
ambiguity and surprise, even when associated with the laughter of the gods or the role of 
the clown. When humor seems to be on your side, the laughter still may be at your 
expense, as with the ambiguous laughter of the gods. Additionally, a humorous position 
and practice may result in unintended or even dangerous results, as with the 
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misunderstanding between the clown, the audience, and the fire that likely consumed 
them. The allegiance of humor is thus never fully granted, or at least never granted 
without the risk of backfiring, as it is always capable of unanticipated results. 
Considering this instability of humor provides a challenge to discussions about the usage 
of humor for oppression and amelioration. If humor is only ever ambiguously on 
anyone’s side, then it is important to consider how humor might take on a political life 
that exceeds an association between humorfulness, humorlessness, and empowered or 
disempowered social groups. In this dissertation I will both consider and push against 
accounts that reduce humor to a calculable practice in the context of its social and 
political practice, arguing instead that humor is an unstable politics that requires a 
consideration of the social, political, emotional, and embodied dynamics that contribute 
to the practice of humor both through subjects and beyond their intentions. Humor is thus 
a practice that carries a specific power of indirect engagement, but also a continued risk 
of backfire and unexpected results.  
 
Reflections on Laughing Time Away and Going Viral 
Over the course of writing this dissertation, I too have attempted to inhabit the 
space of the clown and see what happens when I take up laughter “on my side.” In this 
dissertation I will often focus on the space where theory informs concrete examples, and 
concrete examples inform theory to explain key nuances of humorwork such as the 
techniques and significance of its practice, its relationship to a power-laden social world, 
and its potential unruliness and ways of bending back against the humor-making subject. 
I am also writing from a place of hands-on experience with humorwork informed by the 
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many ways I have personally and politically attempted to create humor to share with 
specific online communities and especially the mass social media platform Twitter. I thus 
find it helpful in this moment to reflect upon my own practice of humor, and consider 
what I have learned over the course of three years of attempting to practice as a more 
public humorist beyond just living as a funny person day-by-day. 
I use the phrase humorwork, introduced in Chapter V, to center humor as a 
practice tied to subjects who inhabit a social and political world. Whereas mainstream 
approaches in humor studies focus on humor as a depoliticized linguistic structure, I 
instead use humorwork to emphasize that humor in many social and political contexts 
cannot be separated from the relationship between a subject and the political world in 
which they live. I also use humorwork to take up insights from humor studies scholars 
who focus on the operations of humor to consider how people practice humor politically 
rather than focusing on laughter as a locus of resistance. Through this focus, I am 
interested in considering humorwork as a way that people practice humor to indirectly 
reappropriate and transform words, phrases, images, and situations for political ends. 
Though I emphasize in Chapter VI that humorwork can be practiced for both the aims of 
furthering oppression and seeking amelioration for marginalized groups, I conclude in 
Chapter VII that the practice of humor, even though tied to a subject, also can take on a 
life beyond their expectations and intentions. I thus introduce humorwork as a 
complicated field of practice commonly used in political life that aims to indirectly 
transform political speech, images, and situations from multiple vantage points, while 
also maintaining the instability that this work can go awry.  
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 Many of my insights into humorwork have occurred first-hand through practice. 
Since summer 2015 I have not only conducted literature reviews, planned arguments, 
revised those arguments, and shared them for others through presentations. I have also 
attempted to hone my own craft of humor, see if I could improve my ability to make 
jokes, and consider the meaning and risks of sharing my humor through direct humor 
practice. To that end, the simplest way to practice humor in a social context without 
spending too many of the hours I needed for writing, teaching, and (admittedly too much) 
academic service was to create my own humorous Twitter account. As a social media 
platform, Twitter is considered to be a form of “microblogging,” meaning that rather than 
writing out longer essays like those found in blogging and online thinkpieces, the 
platform is instead constrained to mostly humorous text and jokes, humorous images and 
memes, and humorous interactions with others. Specifically, Twitter has a 280 character 
limit (when I started it was 140) with the ability to “thread” posts (called “tweets”) 
together into connected statements, resulting in a platform that favors pithiness over 
absolute clarity and comprehensiveness. Though on the negative end this may encourage 
Twitter to often be a more shallow platform conductive to shouting and 
misunderstandings, the character limit also makes it especially interesting for considering 
the constrained craft of humor as it is signal-boosted to large audiences, shared or ignored 
based on this uptake, and frequently misunderstood or reappropriated through humorous 
possibilities. 
 I began my account by simply choosing a niche that I thought would be a good fit 
for “writing what I know,” so to speak, through the medium of humor. I chose to write 
jokes from the standpoint of being a trans academic, hoping to be relatable to both 
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academics, people interested in theory beyond the academy, and trans people. When I 
started my account, I adopted the anonymous handle Trans Lady Academic and the tag 
@transtheory, already hinting at a humorous juxtaposition between the history of theory 
happening about and beyond the access of trans people, in contrast to my humor style 
which sometimes dips into complicated theory references but mostly stays at the level of 
mundane experience. Since then, I have deanonymized my account and taken up the tag 
@amyrmarv, and though the online space is still distinct from my in-person personality 
and comportments towards others, it has added an interesting dynamic where who I am 
becomes more involved in different uptakes and interactions with my humor. Practicing 
humor has indicated to me that it is important to pay attention not only to the process and 
skill through which I make it. It is also crucial to consider the social world within which I 
practice humor, its uptake by potential situated interlocutors, and my continued 
involvement with the life of a joke as an embodied, emotional subject. This is one of the 
main points my dissertation will make, namely that attempts to depoliticize, desituate, 
and reduce humor from its social and political context fail to account for the complexity 
of humor as a practice. 
 My experience with practicing humor, as emphasized by Kierkegaard, frequently 
yields unclear results including receptions of my humor by others that I did not initially 
anticipate. Sometimes I have made a joke and someone connected with it, but because 
they interpreted the joke in a way that I did not anticipate and may not even understand. 
In this way, the construction and ongoing life of a joke that I have shared is not some 
rigid calculable process that starts with the creation of a joke and ends with sharing it, but 
rather an ongoing situation that may thwart my intentions and expectations. As I have 
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moved more towards both practicing humor on Twitter and expressing more serious and 
often professional thoughts, I have also had to deal with the complications of sometimes 
having my non-humorous expressions interpreted as humor, and sometimes my humor 
interpreted as more straightforward non-humorous expressions. This is another key 
emphasis in my dissertation. In addition to situating humor in its social and political 
context, it is also necessary to consider the ways in which the practice of humor is often 
unstable, resulting in misinterpretations, jokes that backfire, and results that were not 
anticipated by the person who made the humor.  Though humor often carries on a life 
beyond the subject who initially produced it, it also remains connected with its creator, 
sometimes even twisting into a creation they no longer recognize or understand. 
 These instabilities of practicing humor were a key part of my experience with 
making and sharing a viral meme on May 7, 2018. Rather than create a whole new 
framework for my joke, I instead took up a template I had occasionally seen several 
people base their jokes on. In this case it was a reappropriation of an image of a man in a 
lab coat and glasses gesturing towards a yellow butterfly and asking, “Is this a pigeon?” 
taken from the Japanese anime television series The Brave Fighter of Sun Fighbird from 
the 1990s. The image had circulated across the Internet for over a decade, but reached 
peak popularity in May 2018 in a specific form focusing on misrecognition. Focusing on 
the funny misrecognition of a butterfly as a pigeon, heightened by the man’s appearance 
as an expert through his lab coat, people on the Internet started labeling the man, the 
object he is referring to, and the mistaken identification.33  
                                               
33 Jacob Shamslan, “The 'Is This a Pigeon?' Meme is Super Relatable for People Who 
Have No Idea What They're Doing,” Insider, May 7, 2018, 
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One example of this was one iteration of the meme labeling the scientist “Me,” 
the butterfly he is gesturing towards as “refreshing Twitter every two minutes in an 
hour,” and his misrecognition as “Is this working on my book.”34 Another by poet J. 
Jennifer Espinoza takes a more existential approach labeling the mistaken man as “my 
body,” the butterfly gestured to as “any slightly uncomfortable physical sensation,” and 
the misrecognition as “Is this death.”35 The meme has also taken the form of emphasizing 
a political misrecognition, as seen in a version labeling the man as “straights” (referring 
to straight people), the misrecognized object as “being asked not to use slurs,” and the 
misrecognition as “Is this oppression?.”36 In addition to self-referential humor, the meme 
template has thus also fostered a deeper focus on the difficulty of being a body in space, 
and matters of political privilege and resulting misunderstanding, indicating the potential 
communication through the meme that retains its humor but is also not simply reducible 
to “just a joke.” 
While teaching my Transgender Studies course, I was interested in discussing the 
subject of backlash with students, and found the meme to be a fun way to address some 
of the reactions to trans lives that we encountered in the ballooned-up fears of news 




34 Catapult, Twitter post, May 2, 2018, 9:08 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/CatapultStory/status/991711108284071938/. 
 
35 J. Jennifer Espinoza, Twitter post, May 1, 2018, 11:11 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/sadqueer4life/status/991379614147559424/. 
  




personality Tucker Carlson,37 the outcries of media personality Alex Jones38 and 
academic personality Jordan Peterson,39 and the reverence for science over politics 
emphasized by Alice Dreger.40 In response I tried my hand at my own butterfly 
misrecognition joke, labeling the man as “cis [non-trans] society,” the misunderstood 
object as “trans people having a backbone about anything at all,” and the misrecognition 
as “Is this destroying my free speech?” My audience on Twitter is primarily trans people 
and their allies, so this was mostly intended as a shared source of humor for them and for 
my class based on the topic we were discussing. Despite studying humor myself, the 
uptake of a humorous post on the Internet is heavily contingent based on time of day, day 
of the week, who happens to be around, and what the mood of the day is in various 
circles, so I tend to think some jokes I make have the elements to go “viral,” but it is 
never a sure thing, at least from my platform of a mere few-thousand. Though I have 
passed 1000 likes (a unit of Internet community approval) on Twitter posts before, this 
particular butterfly meme iteration that I made took off beyond my expectations (though 
by no means even close to the high numbers some posts get), currently sitting at around 
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13k likes and 4.1k shares, including a life beyond my initial posting (such as screenshots 
shared on other social media communities) that I cannot fully track. 
Resonating with a lot of people both in my direct following audience and their 
circles caused the meme to be increasingly shared beyond these circles, entering a sphere 
of reception that I did not expect and for whom the meme was not immediately prepared 
to meet through shared understanding. Already, I had taken an approach that would 
minimize potential misunderstandings or disingenuous engagements with my critical 
humorous emphasis on a common pattern of reaction to trans people trying to find a place 
in public (and private) life. For example, I made sure to label the man of misrecognition 
as “cis society” rather than “cis people” to avoid the objection that I was making an 
overgeneralization that unfairly included too many individuals.41 Though I understood 
myself to be operating in the realm of humor, I was also aware that I was also engaging 
critically with the world in a way that is susceptible to challenge and even harassment if I 
attract too much attention, although I was luckily not brought into the latter situation in 
this specific case. 
Reactions to my viral humor, though largely positive, also brought some negative 
responses. Usually I ignore these, especially when they are unclear or miss my point, but 
since this was my first time going properly (if modestly) viral I wanted to see what would 
happen if I engaged and responded. Some of these I met with humor. For example, when 
one person said the image should be flipped, by which they meant that trans people are 
always quick to jump on a free speech defense of anything, I responded by taking up the 
                                               





ambiguity of “flipping the image” and used an Internet browser photo editing program to 
invert the image and reverse it as if seen in a mirror rather than coherently switching the 
meme’s labels as requested. I was also asked to defend my “argument,” attempting to 
strip my meme from a more indirect humorous realm of approximation and exaggeration 
and hyperbole and play, instead attempting to engage with my modest meme as if I had 
fully argued my case through a set of premises. Despite the situation from which I made 
my humor and the shared understanding I drew from for my audience, my humor was 
taken up and engaged with in ways that did not match my intentions or expectations. 
The instability of my meme’s life was not necessarily tied to negative 
interpretations, but also more neutral or positive reactions from others. The UK website 
Pink News wrote an entire piece on my meme, initially celebrating its contribution but 
also making sure to pair it with trans-skeptical conversations in the UK that I did not have 
in mind when I made my piece of humor. The title already began this distortion, 
describing my work with the headline, “This viral meme explains exactly what it’s like to 
be transgender and proud.” Though this headline is positioning itself as supportive, it 
mischaracterizes my humor, which is not focused on the subject of pride, let alone 
explaining exactly what that is like. Though I am briefly quoted (and was not quoted at 
all when the article was initially posted), the article also frames my humor as in reaction 
to studies showing trans people have the brains of the gender they “identify as” (I am 
vocally against these sorts of brain-sex theories), the Genderquake series in the UK 
(which I have not been able to watch yet as of writing this dissertation), gender critical or 
anti-trans radical feminist thinkers and activists in the UK (who I was not thinking of 
when making the meme), and Australian academic Sheila Jeffreys (who I was not 
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responding to at all).42 The original situation of my humor gets elided as a different media 
context and a different international location takes up my humor as positive but different 
from specific focus on appeals to free speech as a form of reductive backlash in class. In 
the context of the news beat and reporters attempting to find viral humor to write about, 
even under the positive (but distorting) lens of mainstream LGBT news media, I again 
find myself and my humor misrecognized, my whole experience of going viral refracted 
in the prism of a butterfly misrecognition meme.  
Despite the frequent misrecognition and misinterpretation of my humorwork, it is 
difficult for me to separate myself from the ongoing life of the joke, as if it was a self-
contained object that no longer has anything to do with me after I released it into the 
world. I found myself constantly perplexed, uncomfortable, and hesitant about the uptake 
of my humor, and frustrated with people who did not understand my intentions, all the 
while unable to shake my connection to the ways in which interpretations and 
interactions went awry. Through practicing humor I was thus also caught up in the life of 
my humor beyond me, with my emotions heavily invested in my confrontation with 
uptakes of my humor that I did not understand or agree with. 
Beyond Kierkegaard, but attuned to his insights on the difficulty of having humor 
on one’s side, this is the complex and unstable situation from which I understand 
practicing humor. First, humor is a way through which I engage with the world and 
others rather than distance myself, addressing current events in my own life and beyond 
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through a practice of reappropriating and transforming images and phrases, moving 
through the possibilities of language and images beyond direct interpretation. Second, I 
practice humor not only through a series of calculable processes upon language and 
images, but also within a broader social context including the world I live in with others 
and the social and political histories and present informing this world. Third, my use of 
humor brings me into a situation of instability in relation to the ongoing life of the joke, 
which I remain in contact with despite all manner of different interpretations, 
misunderstandings, and misrecognitions against my intentions. If humor is ever on my 
side, it is not on my side in the sense of ownership or victory, but rather through bringing 
me into this situation of humorous uncertainty. 
 
In on the Joke: Situating Humor 
 Despite these insights from my everyday offline and online practice of humor, 
considerations of the subject, as I detail in this dissertation, are often quick to distance 
humor as a practice from the social and political world within which it is created and 
shared among situated subjects. In more popular discussions of humor, it is often 
distanced from engagement with the world through the insistence that it operates as “just 
a joke” or “just intended to be funny” or “not serious.” More scholarly discussions of 
humor often focus on it in relation to the specific mechanics, processes, and techniques of 
how humor operates at the expense of situating it within the subjects who produce it and 
who are situated in a specific location in relation to power. These narrowed lenses 
through which to understand humor often bracket out the more situated practice of humor 
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in relation to the world, making it difficult to center a social and political understanding 
of humor. 
In this dissertation, I argue for a feminist understanding of humor as a situated 
practice of reappropriation and transformation undertaken by a subject within a social 
world. When related to politics, as it often is, humor takes the distinct form of an unstable 
politics because indirect methods of transforming existing images, speech, and situations 
also open practices of humor up to interpretations and effects outside the scope of its 
intentions. I distinguish my feminist social and political philosophy of humor from other 
feminist approaches that focus on laughter by instead focusing on practice. To that end, I 
refer to the situated, unstable practice of humor as humorwork. This feminist 
understanding of humorwork is not only helpful by considering feminist humor as an 
important social and political practice, but also by directly countering attempts to 
depoliticize humor and excuse its role in buttressing the everyday life of counter-
ameliorative power. By focusing on the process of humor, the subject who produces it, 
their social and political world, the affects circulated through political humor, and the 
politics of popular and scholarly discourse around humor, I hope to push against a 
reductive understanding of humor, the trivializing gesture of “it’s just a joke,” and 
towards an approach that continues to hold subjects responsible and connected to (if not 
always blameable) for the social and political life of their humorwork, despite its many 
instabilities in uptake and continued transformation. 
Chapters II and III engage with contemporary developments in humor studies and 
philosophy of humor to argue that they have bracketed out or reduced social and political 
concerns about humor, arguing instead for a more complex theory of the political effects 
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humor in public. In Chapter II, “The Balderdash of the Other Woman: Exiling Feminist 
Philosophy from Jest,” I begin by focusing on contemporary interdisciplinary humor 
studies. I argue that despite the wide range of approaches that humor studies offers, the 
field primarily focuses on the mechanics of humor or the ineffectiveness of humor upon 
the world with the results of bracketing out social and political considerations of humor. 
In Chapter III, “Laughing and Not Being Normative: Humor as a Social and Political 
Restriction of Public Space,” I focus more specifically on the history of philosophical 
approaches to humor and the attempt to divide theories of humor into different and often 
competing categories. I argue the focus on incongruity, initially proposed by philosophers 
and then taken up as a primary explanation of humor by both philosophers and the wider 
field of humor studies, has bracketed out theories of social and political humor with the 
effect of philosophers proposing a limited, depoliticized individualist ethics of humor. In 
contrast, I argue for an updated theory of social and political humor as a potential 
restriction of public space. This approach focuses on the role of humor and laughter in 
silencing and shutting down appeals by marginalized people to existence in public space 
through the humorous circulation of dominant norms. 
Chapter IV and Chapter V focus specifically on updating feminist theories of 
laughter to encompass a more specific focus on humor in practice, which I call 
humorwork. In Chapter IV, “From Laughter to Practice: An Argument for a Concrete 
Feminist Philosophy of Humor,” I bring together the rich process-focused approach of 
humor studies with the political focus on humor in feminist theories of laughter to argue 
for a feminist theory focused on specific, concrete practices of humor. I articulate this 
theory further in Chapter V, “Medusa’s War Machine: Kristeva, Wittig, and Humorwork 
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in Feminist Practice,” describing humorwork as a practice through which existing words, 
phrases, images, and situations can have their elements reappropriated and transformed, 
representing an indirect engagement. I argue that humorwork encompasses a range of 
potential activities with different effects upon its subject, ranging from political to banal 
and bizarre or absurdist.  
Chapters VI and VII work towards complicating the ways in which humor can be 
taken up and the instabilities latent in humorwork as a political practice. In Chapter VI, 
“Humor as Counterameliorative Practice,” focuses on both the practice of humorwork as 
it is used for oppressive rather than feminist aims and the affective life of humor in 
political circulation. In contrast to more individual and stereotype-focused theories of 
racist humor, I argue for a more complicated emphasis on racist humorwork as it 
circulates negative affects stuck to bodies in a racist social world. The practice of racist 
(and more broadly counterameliorative) humorwork thus both draws from ongoing 
racism in society but also the affective life of this racism. This indicates that humorwork 
is not necessarily a feminist act, but also that even antifeminist and racist practices of 
humorwork still operate in an engaged, social and political world in which affects are 
circulated.  
Chapter VII, “Humorwork as Unstable Politics,” goes beyond the complicated 
reality that humor can be used for many political ends by emphasizing that attempts to 
practice political humorwork often go awry and against intentions when taken up and 
circulated by others. Humor is thus not only a site of calculation, but also a complex 
situation, in which an embodied subject who creates humor is continuously tied to the 
often unstable life of their work. I conclude that humorwork represents an unstable 
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politics that can be taken up for feminist aims of amelioration even as it engages more 
indirectly than direct debate or action, and remains unstable in relation to its reception 
and potential humorous transformation in circulation by others. 
By focusing on humor, I am interested more broadly in an approach to feminist 
social and political philosophy that center the potential instabilities, misunderstandings, 
and unseen transformations possible in feminist activism and political life more broadly. 
Humorwork is a field of practice that depends upon the many open, indirect avenues of 
engagement in political life when they are taken up and recast, and it is important to 
consider the possibilities and effects of more indirect, unstable forms of politics for a 
comprehensive understanding of power, oppression, and resistance. I am also hoping for 
a refined understanding and appreciation for the position of the feminist humorist, who I 
return to in the Conclusion, who is capable of a complex, tricky, and often unstable 
engagement with a world shaped by patriarchy through a refusal to engage directly on the 
terms of the world projected by dominant social norms. By doing this, I also hope this 
dissertation makes my own experience practicing humor as a feminist philosopher more 
intelligible and compelling. Having humor “on my side,” as indicated by my experience 
going viral, is rife with instability in outcome and effects but also allows me an expanded 









THE BALDERDASH OF THE OTHER WOMAN: 
EXILING CONTINENTAL FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY FROM JEST 
 
 
Author Meets Comics: Interventions of a Humorless Feminist Millennial 
In a 2014 special titled “I'm Sorry You Feel That Way,” comedian Bill Burr, 
maintaining an affinity with the prickly pod inhabiting his surname, focuses his ire on the 
humorless masses. Specifically, the Burr attempts to provide a warning against hastily 
shutting down “offensive” jokes by instead discussing the technical merits of the joke. 
The specific joke he considers was a single sentence written by a waitress on a bar’s 
chalkboard, proclaiming, “We like our beer the way we like our violence: domestic.” 
Burr defends the joke by emphasizing its successful linguistic construction, insisting, 
“That’s a great fuckin’ joke. There is zero fat on that. You need every word of that joke. 
You take one word out, it doesn’t work. Perfect joke.” He then suggests that it is absurd 
for the waitress and manager of the bar to be fired over the joke, since it cannot cause 
someone to engage in social violence.43 Burr’s defense of the domestic violence joke 
suggests that humor should be analyzed in relation to its technical merits rather than any 
(questionably) attributed social effects. 
Perhaps it is appropriate that during an oncoming chill of humorlessness the word 
“Burr” would appear in the intervals between chattering teeth and shuddering lips, but 
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Burr is not the only comedian who has prophesized the end times of humor. On a recent 
radio show Jerry Seinfeld explained why he, like fellow comedians Chris Rock and Larry 
the Cable Guy, has ceased performing for colleges. Seinfeld asserts that students are not 
only too politically correct, but are also hurting comedy by deploying politically correct 
words they do not understand, explaining, “They just want to use these words: ‘That’s 
racist;’ ‘That’s sexist;’ ‘That’s prejudice. They don’t know what the hell they’re talking 
about.”44 Seinfeld reports that even his own daughter has succumbed to millennial 
obsessions with inane politically-correct speech , recounting, “My wife says to her, 
‘Well, you know, in the next couple years, I think maybe you’re going to want to be 
hanging around the city more on the weekends, so you can see boys. You know what my 
daughter says? She says, ‘That’s sexist.’” In contrast to the unmeasured speech of 
politically-correct millennials, Seinfeld emphasizes his measured, skillful focus on the 
craft of humor. “I talk about the subjects I talk about because for some reason I can make 
them funny. The ones I can’t make funny, you don’t hear.”45 In this context, it could be 
that jokes have no time for the space taken up by political correctness. When asked about 
his humorous put-downs of women during recent presidential primary debates, Donald 
Trump responded, “I've been challenged by so many people. I frankly don't have time for 
political correctness. And to be honest with you, the country doesn't have time 
either….We don't win anymore. We lose to China. We lose to Mexico….We lose to 
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everybody."46 Disdain for humorless millennials thus stretches into the realm of politics, 
or at least what serves as such during the 2015-2016 election cycle. 
Burr, Seinfeld, and Trump find another potential ally in a September 2015 
Atlantic article titled “That’s Not Funny!: Today’s College Can’t Seem to Take a Joke.” 
Looking at the recruiting process for comedians on college campuses, the article 
speculates that college revolutions in the 1960s gave rise to a generation of “social-justice 
warriors” who reject free speech in the name of a “culture war” that must eliminate 
language to maintain stability.47 The article laments that jokes which “include 
observations about power and sex and even rape” and present “certain ugly and possibly 
immutable truths” can no longer find shelter among college millennials who desire a 
“less cruel” world that does not favor the powerful. Now that college campuses have 
become pristine millennial bastions that privilege “the ideological bandwagon” and stifle 
“questioning the platform’s core ideals,” Flanagan laments that free comedy can only 
find expression among racist frat bros rather than their proper station among the free play 
of ideas. Flanagan concludes, 
But they are jokes, not lessons from the gender-studies classroom. Their first 
objective is to be funny, not to service any philosophical ideal. They go where 
comedy always wants to go, to the darkness, and they sucker-punch you with a 
laugh when you don’t think you should laugh… Drive those ideas underground, 
especially the dark ones, and they fester.48 
                                               










Flanagan thus adds to Burr’s frustration that “Everybody’s getting in trouble because of 
these god damn groups” that call out jokes,49 arguing that once millennial (and perhaps 
feminist) sanctimoniousness has driven humor out of its proper playful place of free 
speech, it finds shelter in the University’s id as incarnated in frat houses. Perhaps by 
seizing the means of joke production, humorless millennials thus foster the seeds of their 
own destruction once the broletariat decides to rise up and proliferate the comedy of the 
commons.  
 Beneath many of these concerns are also fears about the relationship between 
humor and feminism. Feminists are likely among the “god damn groups” that nettle Burr 
so much by calling out domestic violence jokes, and the critiques offered by Seinfeld’s 
daughter could very well be influenced by feminism since she challenges assumptions 
that tether her life to boys. Feminism has indeed often been casted as the epitome of 
humorlessness,50 let alone claims by such public figures as Christopher Hitchens that 
women have less of an affinity for humor than men.51 
In contrast, Anca Parvulescu identifies a rich link between feminism and 
laughter,52 noting that continental feminist philosophy in particular has often engaged 
with the subject of laughter,53 and concluding that the 20th century could be called “the 
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laughing feminist century.”54 Celebrated feminist texts such as Helene Cixous’ “The 
Laugh of the Medusa”55 and Julia Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language56 have 
stressed relationships between gender, laughter, jokes, humor, subjectivity, and social 
norms. Additionally, Judith Butler in Gender Trouble famously turned to parody as an 
example of subversive feminist practice,57 Monique Wittig’s novel Les Guérillères 
frequently features the women laughing,58 and A Question of Silence directed by Marleen 
Gorris centers on a group of women who defiantly laugh in the face of the law.59 In the 
21st century this tradition has continued, with Parvulescu’s genealogy of laughter in 
Laughter: Notes on a Passion, José Esteban Muñoz’s writings on practices of terrorist 
drag through disidentifications,60 and Cynthia Willett’s work on comedy as an alternative 
to the destructive logic and hubris of American imperialism.61 
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In contrast to Burr, each of these continental feminist projects emphasize that 
practices of humor cannot be severed from their relationship to gendered networks of 
norms and their relationships to power and subjectivity. Some poststructuralist writers 
such as Didier Eribon focus specifically on the dialectic between heterosexist norms and 
subjectivity by stressing that subjects are formed within a power-laden linguistic network 
which is called forth by humorous caricatures of gay people in painful ways.62 Other 
writers in continental feminist philosophy frame humor as a way through which subjects 
can subversively challenge norms, as found in the work of Irigaray,63 Kristeva,64 and 
Cixous.65 Because humor and laughter are rich phenomena that necessitate an intricate 
consideration of relationships between social norms, language, embodiment, power, 
gender, race, and subjectivity, it is not surprising that continental feminist philosophy has 
taken these subjects up as a rich source of scholarship. In my own experience as a 
continental feminist philosopher, it is a rewardingly tricky subject demanding a level of 
intricacy and care that often pushes me to the edge of my abilities as a writer and thinker. 
But we cannot claim that continental feminist philosophy is the only area of study 
to have enjoyed a laughing twentieth century. During this time, and especially moving 
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forward from the 1970s, there has also been a growing body of academic work which is 
now more centralized under the heading of Humor Studies. There are no self-standing 
academic departments called Humor Studies to save this author should she not be one of 
the chosen ones to join the faculty of any philosophy departments, but participation in 
humor studies as an interdisciplinary endeavor has drastically increased during the latter 
half of the twentieth century, including participation by philosophers, computer scientists, 
linguists, cognitive scientists, and scholars in the social sciences. The International 
Society for Humor Studies, founded in 1988, serves as the central organization for humor 
scholars. However, though the Society has held 27 annual conferences as of 2016,66 and 
published over 500 articles and book reviews in their journal HUMOR,67 none of these 
articles focus on the work of Butler, Irigaray, Cixous, or Kristeva.68 
In this chapter, I want to make clear that feminist continental philosophy, despite 
already engaging in topics such as laughter and humor, is an outsider to prominent 
methodologies in humor studies due to its unique emphasis on relationships between 
power structures, norms, subjectivity, and social effects of language. Or, to put it more 
bluntly, I will suggest that feminist continental philosophy is a strange, oddball position 
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to take up in relation to approaches of humor theory that are close to being canonized in 
humor studies (assuming they are not already fully enshrined). While this might seem 
fully acceptable to feminist continental philosophers, since it just means that both areas of 
study could occur separately, I argue that the exile of continental feminist philosophy 
from mainstream theories of jest also entails a refusal to center the complicated social 
effects of humorous language in favor of privileging the abstract craft of humor and 
humorous wordplay. This movement thus risks sanctioning arguments such as Burr’s, in 
which the social effects of a sexist joke are dismissed as absurd in comparison to an 
admiration of the joke’s construction.  
I begin this argument by explaining why the influential prejudiced norm theory 
based on empirical humor research is not sufficient for commitments in continental 
feminist philosophy to the relationship between language, situation, subjectivity, and 
power. Next, I will describe Victor Raskin’s and Salvatore Attardo’s influential theories 
of humor and their bracketing of relationships between humor, power, and subjectivity, 
following this with Christie Davies’ related explicit separation of humor from power and 
restriction of humor pluralism. I end by suggesting that feminist continental philosophy’s 
estranged position betrays a larger movement away from centering humor’s social 
effects, which is a story I will elaborate upon in Chapter III. 
 
Empirical Considerations: Why Isn’t the Author in a Lab Coat? 
        While the author would certainly make full use of a laboratory and a team of 
scientists if this was supplied, it is necessary to acknowledge that the question of humor’s 
social and political effects can be considered through empirical studies, and the 
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Humanities tends to get the overwrought end of Occam’s razor compared to STEM or 
even Sociology research. Hence, a consideration of empirical research is necessary to 
show that feminist continental philosophy has something here to offer through its 
methodological commitments that is not already covered by existing empirical studies. 
Looking at empirical discussions of humor’s social effects through frameworks of 
studying the relationship between humor and prejudice, or in terms of “harmless humor” 
versus “aggressive humor” throws a useful wrench into straightforward assertions that 
humor has social effects. In the Encyclopedia of Humor Studies, Megan Strain associates 
harmless humor with jokes such as puns that promote amusement, positive interactions 
with others, and may defuse otherwise tense situations. Harmless humor has been shown 
to improve relationships with others and allow people to cope with otherwise difficult 
circumstances.69 Generally, this insight seems to accord with my approach, as I doubt 
most feminist poststructuralists would argue that all jokes carry harmful social effects. 
For example, consider: 
        Q: What do you call a pile of kittens? 
        A: A meowntain.70 
I thus concur that it seems heuristically useful to separate jokes about adorable kittens 
from jokes that invoke racism or sexism. 
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       Aggressive humor, which Strain characterizes as “much more straightforward in 
terms of its meaning,”71 is defined by its use “to ridicule or mock a target, which is most 
often a person or a group.”72 Strain considers specific studies conducted psychologists 
Leslie Janes and James Olsen, that suggest practices of aggressive humor can cause 
witnesses to conform to social norms due to fears of failure or rejection, restricting 
themselves from actions that may make them stand out and also get targeted by negative 
humor.73 Because witnessing aggressive humor results in individuals modifying their 
behavior, aggressive humor can thus be linked to social effects of conformity.74 
Aggressive humor can also serve as an agent against conformity and stereotypes, as seen 
in satirical shows such as The Daily Show and Key and Peele which use humor to shatter 
entrenched social norms and media messages, though Strain concludes that aggressive 
humor is more commonly used against disenfranchised groups to perpetuate "negative 
attitudes or the expression of prejudice.”75 
 However, Strain also identifies studies indicating that exposure to aggressive 
humor only uniquely influences people already high in prejudice towards a particular 
group.76 This is explained in more detail in the Encyclopedia of Humor Studies entry on 
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“Humor and Prejudice,” in which Thomas Ford emphasizes that disparagement humor 
seems more likely to enable certain preexisting prejudices to be released rather than 
creating new prejudices.77 That is, if I hear a joke targeting people who consider pizza in 
the Pacific Northwest to be the best iteration of pizza, the joke is only more likely to 
escalate prejudice against such people if I already harbor a prejudice against these poor, 
misguided souls. Ford’s encyclopedia article is primarily influenced by Ford’s and Mark 
A. Ferguson’s “Social Consequences of Disparagement Humor: A Prejudiced Norm 
Theory” in 2004, which is of particular note because it overviews research on 
disparagement humor from the 1970s to the mid-aughts and introduces a prejudiced norm 
theory that has been taken up by a large range of contemporary empirical studies on 
disparagement humor, and has been cited around 63 times.78 Ford and Ferguson are 
critical of earlier studies in the 90’s that found disparagement to have social effects such 
as enhancing stereotypes because “they both lack nonhumorous control conditions that 
are necessary to make conclusions about the unique effects of humor above and beyond 
mere disparagement.”79 That is to say, the studies were not set up in a way to highlight 
that disparagement humor qua humorousness can cause social effects distinct from any 
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other social messages. For example, the studies left little recourse to say that a sexist joke 
does anything unique in comparison to a sexist image or song when reinforcing 
stereotypes. 
 In contrast, Ford and Ferguson point to empirical studies that result in a more 
nuanced perspective on particular social effects of particular jokes when they control for 
the specific effects of humorous forms of disparagement. The authors emphasize that 
these studies suggest that disparagement humor only causes changes in behavior among 
subjects who are already hostile against a specific group. Otherwise, previous studies 
show “no evidence that exposure to disparagement humor uniquely affects stable, internal 
knowledge structures, such as stereotypes and attitudes toward the targeted group.”80 
 In this context Ford and Ferguson introduce a prejudiced norm theory of humor, 
explaining,  
Our theory delineates the psychological processes that mediate the effects of 
disparagement humor on tolerance of discrimination; it also specifies variables 
that potentially moderate those effects. The theory addresses the case in which a 
person finds him or herself in a social context in which he or she is an intended 
recipient of disparagement humor.81 
 
The prejudiced norm theory emphasizes that the “levity” offered by humor is actually the 
projection of a localized norm insisting disparaging statements or actions need not be 
taken seriously or criticized as serious statements.82 However, those already high in 
prejudice are more likely to disregard the localization of this norm to a humorous context, 
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and interpret its suspension of criticism as a social sanction for their prejudiced beliefs.83 
Ford and Ferguson stress this is the reasons for humor’s particular power over the 
prejudiced. 
 Viewed from the perspective of prejudiced norm theory, Burr’s shift to 
considering the humorous mechanisms located in the restaurant domestic abuse joke and 
ignoring the joke’s social effects appears more defensible. Burr emphasizes that jokes 
about domestic abuse are not going to cause any man to attack his partner any more than 
simply seeing an anti-domestic violence billboard on the road is likely to stop him if he 
has already been pushed towards such violence, and for this reason punishing a domestic 
violence joke in the space of a bar is ridiculous.84 Prejudiced norm theory would likely 
suggest, meditating on empirical data, that those people most affected by a domestic 
violence joke will already be those highly disposed towards domestic violence anyway. 
From this, we might conclude that it is prejudice and a propensity towards sexist violence 
that must be targeted rather than the humor. Hence, the humorless feminist millennials 
fail to serve anyone by campaigning against mere jests – they are only jokes, after all! 
Perhaps at this moment we could grab a pint, shrug off questionable bar slogans, and 
breathe a sigh of relief. 
 However, these may not be the effects we are looking for. The studies that Ford 
and Ferguson have in mind primarily involve exposing a group of people to 
disparagement humor stimuli and then observing their effects. For example, men 
                                               






recorded to be high in hostile sexism were uniquely affected by disparagement humor, as 
after exposure in a controlled environment to a series of sexist jokes they felt less guilt 
and shame when imagining themselves engaged in sexist behaviors.85 This is certainly a 
useful, empirical, and testable approach of interest to scientists and humor theorists, as it 
offers key considerations for theorizing humor’s social operations. 
 However, this approach to humor’s social effects is also limited. First, it mainly 
singles out a subject and their relationship with norms in a straightforward causal 
relationship rather than considering how subjects and situations have already been 
constituted by norms or may be more deeply and subtly affected by them. Ford and 
Ferguson back up their theory, which they primarily describe as a causal account, by 
drawing from studies that expose participants to sexist humor and then rate their 
tolerance of a subsequent sexist scene.86 This is an important and intriguing way of 
gauging humor’s social effects but restricts the analysis to a controlled study of 
individual participant responses to stimuli.  Perhaps understood from the restricted 
standpoint of cause and effect, we could be permissive of the bar’s domestic violence 
joke since it is only likely to influence those who have a higher propensity to engage in 
domestic violence anyway, even though one could still be hesitant to admit of any joke 
that could potentially be part of this domestic violence loop should be avoided. 
However, one intervention from a continental feminist stance would also likely 
peer behind the scenes and consider how the creation of the joke in the bar has already 
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been an effect of the relationship between language, norms, and spaces. What are the 
dynamics of a space that calls for this particular joke, stating, “We like our beer the way 
we like our violence: domestic?”87 How has language already been socially arranged such 
that this joke can be written in chalk in space, and what norms have called for domestic 
beer to be linked with domestic violence in this way? Likely, the shared word “domestic” 
permitted a link to be made between domestic beer and domestic violence. But domestic 
also calls forth an array of possible phrases: domestic work, domestic policy, domestic 
partnership, domestic terrorism, domestic tranquility. Why should the bar’s beer be in 
allegiance with domestic violence but not domestic terrorism or domestic labor? There is 
something about the joke and its relationship to the norms of space that permitted some 
words instead of others, indicating a deeper link between humor and social norms than 
straightforward, individual cause and effect. And this is the kind of missing emphasis 
that, as I suggested in the Introduction, would be demanded by the methodologies of 
continental feminist philosophers such as Irigaray, Kristeva, and Butler. 
Ford does emphasize that humor is influenced by social norms and causes 
localized suspensions of these norms,88 so the problem is not that the prejudiced norm 
theory avoids discussing the social aspects of humor altogether. The individual in 
empirical laboratory studies is very much embedded within society when suspending 
criticism in the face of a joke. Additionally, Ford and Ferguson mention that certain 
phrases are more likely to be objected to than others based on their extremity,89 which 
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likely rules out “domestic terrorism” as an easy source of humor in my question above. 
But the studies themselves do not delve into the effects of humor vis-à-vis the 
construction of spaces via power-laden social norms and the ways in which norms have 
already played a part in the constitution of subjects as they arrive to whatever scene, bar 
or not. That is, there is something deeper to be said beyond empirical studies of how so-
and-so felt after exposure to such-and-such joke in a very limited timeframe about the 
ways in which humor practices are deployed and deeply affect us based on our 
embeddedness and constitution within a power-laden social world. And from Chapter IV 
onwards, I will show how feminist continental philosophy encourages such a deeper 
engagement with humor’s social effects. 
Additionally, when Ford and Ferguson refer to the “targets” of disparaging 
humor, what they have in mind is specifically someone who is told the disparaging joke 
and not specifically someone who is the target (intentionally or unintentionally) of such a 
joke. Hence, Strain’s emphasis on the ways people targeted by hostile humor modify 
their behaviors,90 as discussed in Leslie Janes’ and James Olson’s 2000 empirical studies 
on “Jeer Pressure,” is a significant aspect of humor’s social effects left out by Ford’s and 
Ferguson’s prejudiced norm theory. Janes’ and Olson’s analysis is useful for considering 
humor’s effects of silencing and constraining both speech and actions by those targeted,91 
and hence contribute to the necessity of delving into humor, norms, and the construction 
of spaces. When comparing domestic beer to domestic violence, how might this restrict 
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the range of speech and action in the bar, especially by patrons who have experienced it 
firsthand? And how does this link to continental feminist concerns with subjectivation, 
that is, the ways in which language and norms constitute who we are even as we 
participate in them and rework them? The prejudiced norm theory is silent on this. 
 Finally, though the prejudiced norm theory emphasizes particular aspects of how 
humor works by emphasizing humor’s ability to project a space where criticisms are 
uniquely suspended and by tying the practice of humor to identity and social norms, 
contemporary humor theory has largely distanced prejudice and power from humor’s 
essential operations. As will be explained in the rest of this chapter, core essentialist 
approaches to humor such as those found in Victor Raskin’s script semantic theory and 
Raskin’s and Salvatore Attardo’s general theory of verbal humor has staved off a 
consideration of humor’s relationship to power, prejudice, social norms, and subjectivity, 
instead calling for an investigation of idealized subjects who navigate a purified linguistic 
network shorn from any power-laden social context. 
 For these reasons, I will not investigate humor’s social effects through the lens of 
empirical social sciences or psychology, and instead will endeavor to provide a feminist 
philosophical account of humor’s social effects that ties humor’s operations to 
subjectivation, social norms, and language. Because this will involve critiquing the arc of 
humor studies theorizing over time and its movement away from incorporating social 
effects as a key part of understanding how humor works, I will primarily be operating at 
the register of theory rather than provided the kind of straightforward synthesis of 
empirical works on humor’s social effects that could be augmented with a laboratory. 
Though I will soon show that feminist continental philosophy is largely unwelcome in 
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mainstream humor theory, it will also serve as the primary way through which I deepen 
considerations of humor’s social effects from Chapter IV onwards as we move far 
beyond the constraints of the prejudiced norm theory into deeper considerations of 
power, language, and subjectivity. 
 
Social Scripts without Social Effects 
 While Ford’s and Ferguson’s prejudiced norm theory has been enshrined as the 
key approach to disparaging humor in the Encyclopedia of Humor Studies, it is not a 
forerunning theory in contemporary humor studies on the topic of humor’s core 
characteristics and operations. Ford and Ferguson look at a history of empirical studies 
primarily concerned with the relationship between humor and social effects.92 
Contemporary humor theory that deals with the question of how humor works, in 
contrast, has arisen within a context that prioritizes linguistic structures over both social 
structures and subjectivity. Such approaches have been largely shaped by linguist Victor 
Raskin’s Semantic Mechanisms of Humor, published in 1985. In a 2004 retrospective 
piece, sociologist Christie Davies highlights the book’s groundbreaking and essential 
contributions to humor studies research, placing Raskin among “the masters of other 
disciplines such as Emil [sic] Durkheim, John Maynard Keynes, or Mary Douglas.”93 In 
the book, Raskin proposes a semantic scripts theory of verbal humor that attempts to 
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model a native speaker’s competence with humor recognition.94 Raskin’s approach is 
classified as an essentialist approach to humor, since it is concerned with the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that makes a text a joke instead of some other linguistic form.95 
The semantic scripts theory proposes that humor results from specific interactions 
between two components of language: semantic scripts and combinatorial rules. Semantic 
scripts consist of “a large chunk of information” which “surround[s]” a particular word or 
“is evoked by it.”96 These semantic scripts are also a “cognitive structure” which a native 
speaker internalizes, ultimately representing aspects of the speaker’s surrounding world.97 
And each script is made of a series of words (“lexical nodes”) which are connected 
through “semantic links” representing the speaker’s internalization of a meaningful link 
between these nodes. Thus sets up the machinery of a purely linguistic mind in its 
ordinary operation. Raskin’s subject is composed of internalized semantic scripts and 
linguistic rules, and this subject’s engagement with language occurs primarily as a 
semantic assembly line for processing information. 
Raskin argues that a text meets the necessary conditions to be a joke if it is both 
"compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts" and if these two scripts are 
"opposite."98 These conflicting scripts often contain a "trigger" consisting of some 
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ambiguity or contradiction that shifts the interpretation provided by an initial script to a 
conflicting one,99 juxtaposing opposing scripts to create an “unreal” or “incompatible” 
situation.100 While combinatorial rules would ordinarily attempt to fix this situation in 
“bona-fide communication,” the behavior of play101 permits the suspension of these rules 
and a recognition of the joke’s “non-bona-fide” mood and its goal not to “convey 
information” but to cause laughter.102 In this way, the semantic theory of humor explains 
jokes as an interaction between incongruous linguistic scripts in the service of play and 
laughter. 
In this context, it is useful to consider Salvatore Attardo’s evaluation of the 
semantic script theory of humor (SSTH) as a “necessary idealization.”103 Attardo writes, 
The SSTH models the humorous competence of an idealized speaker/hearer 
subject who is unaffected by racial or gender biases, undisturbed by scatological 
obscene or disgusting materials, not subject to boredom, and, most importantly, 
has never “heard it before” when presented with a joke.104 
 
Raskin does emphasize the contextual features of language, but he does this to stave off 
theories of linguistics that consider the meaning of each sentence in isolation105 rather 
than to embed language into the context of a social world laden with norms and power.  
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 Additionally, Raskin does discuss sexual and ethnic humor in the form of 
“mythological scripts,” which deploy deprecatory or disparaging scripts that trade on 
inaccurate stereotypes or assumptions, and hence are mythological due to their failure to 
accurately represent a speaker’s world.106 While this can open up Raskin’s semantic 
script theory of humor to a consideration of disparaging or aggressive humor, it does not 
fundamentally incorporate such humor into its theory of humor’s operations in the way 
that Ford and Ferguson’s prejudice norm theory does when it emphasizes humor’s ability 
to suspend social criticism. Instead, humor related to problematic social norms involves 
simply a different kind of script which is fed into a similar machinery of the linguistic 
subject as would any other script in any other joke text. Furthermore, the framework of 
mythological scripts in combination with Raskin’s description of humor as non-bona-fide 
may shorn joke content from stereotypes altogether, as Davies suggests the framework 
offers a path for humor studies away from tying jokes to their social weight).107 Because 
of its idealized, linguistic subject, Raskin’s approach is unable to conceive of the sort of 
subject who has been shaped by and lives within a world of deeply entrenched social 
norms, and hence cannot grant the kinds of humor they would engage in and be engaged 
by their full social dimensions. This subject of humor is thus highly incompatible with 
approaches to language in feminist continental philosophy, which frequently trouble the 
sovereignty of linguistic propositions,108 bring to light the complex relationship between 
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language and subjectivation within power-laden linguistic networks,109 and emphasize 
relationships between sex and differential access to discourse.110 
Raskin’s linguistic subject is also the subject who has continued on in the 
expanded general verbal theory of humor (GTVH), developed by Raskin and Attardo in 
1991111 to augment script-based semantics by emphasizing such additional knowledge 
resources for humor as language verbalization, narrative strategy, target, situation, and 
logical mechanism.112 While Attardo’s and Raskin’s GTVH is developed from Raskin’s 
semantic script theory of humor, and the authors emphasize that it shares an essentialist 
approach by focusing on precisely what humor is, both authors also stress that the newer 
GTVH is comparatively “less linguistics-based” than Raskin’s and better accommodates 
interdisciplinary contributions.113 The GTVH thus might initially seem promising for a 
feminist perspective on humor that requires an account of subjectivity situated within 
power structures. This hopefulness is further augmented by the GTVH’s addition of a 
target knowledge resource emphasizing that humor may have a target or “butt” which is 
assailed by stereotypes or mythical scripts, or which serve as broader “ideological 
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targets” without a clear constituency.114 Could the move from the SSTH to the GTVH 
provide a BFF for power-conscious feminist theories of humor?  
Unfortunately, feminists are left with a BRB at best, or most likely a TTYL or 
even a GTFO for the more radically inclined.115 Though the general theory of verbal 
humor includes targets as a key element for jokes, all of the knowledge resources are 
placed into a hierarchy which emphasizes the role of script opposition as most primary 
when present, logical mechanisms as second-most primary, and target as the fourth-
highest knowledge resource of humor out of six when it is present in a particular joke.116 
While providing a more complex, malleable, and general formula for understanding 
humor, the general theory of verbal humor thus continues to prioritize script oppositions 
and an expanded version of combinatorial rules as the primary forces driving humor. 
Additionally, the “target” knowledge resource is just this – an emphasis on the targets of 
humor rather than an analysis of deeper relationships of power. Our attention is not even 
drawn to the social situation of joke-tellers who target others, which is at least pointed to 
by Ford and Ferguson’s prejudiced norm theory. Feminist post-structuralism could thus 
conceivably be integrated into the general theoretical matrix of the general theory of 
verbal humor, but only as a plug-in or extension is installed into a core, defining 
architecture. The GTVH continues to center an idealized approach, which privileges 
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studying the essential components of humor competence rather than humor’s relationship 
with power. Even the situation knowledge resource focuses on the situation of humor as a 
series of “props” which occur within the text rather than any sort of broader social 
situatedness that shapes the elements of a humorous text. In his 2001 book Humorous 
Texts Attardo even comments that the situation knowledge resource, consisting of what 
the joke is about, has been the subject of “virtually no research.” He speculates that this 
knowledge resource would involve a series of lists mentioned in a text rather than 
connections to larger social networks, let alone subjects and subjectivity.117 Given the 
general theory of verbal humor’s purified, positivistic methodology, I could see and enjoy 
a cyborg fusion of feminist poststructuralism and mainstream humor theory, but adopting 
the GTVH’s framework without serious revision and caution would force a feminist post-
structuralist approach into a derivative position. 
 
Christie Davies and the Balderdash of “the Other” 
 Furthermore, opening the general theory of verbal humor to interdisciplinary 
engagements does not entail the sort of pluralism that would permit a feminist post-
structuralist collaboration or intervention. In their 1991 article, Raskin and Attardo 
suggest a number of ways in which various disciplines can specifically contribute to the 
general theory of verbal humor’s development, including linguistics, philosophy, 
anthropology, psychology, mathematics, sociology, rhetoric, political science, history, 
literary studies, folklore, and computer science.118 In this context, Raskin and Attardo do 
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mention linking humor to a “circulation of power” as a potential contribution to the 
general theory of verbal humor that falls specifically under developing the target 
resource, bestowing this task upon political science specifically.119 One could suggest 
that here feminist poststructuralism can perhaps worm its way in as an area of study that 
can contribute towards elaborating gendered circulations of power in humor. 
But 10 years later it is not a political scientist but sociologist Christie Davies120 
who is mentioned in Attardo’s Humorous Texts as a key contributor to the “target” 
knowledge resource.121 Just because an author powerfully crafts an analysis of humor and 
its relation to society does not mean that this will emphasize humor’s power-laden 
qualities. In contrast, Davies does all he can to emphasize that imbuing humor with the 
power to effect social change is a false position. In his earlier book Jokes and their 
Relation to Society, Davies considers differences between jokes about stupidity and jokes 
about canniness in ethnic humor. Stupidity jokes, Davies concludes, involves a practice 
of one community laughing at the distorted practices of a periphery group located in 
proximity to them.122 Davies associates canny jokes, in contrast, with a more subversive 
practice of comically undermining the capitalist ethos of “thrift, self-control, and rational 




120 Sadly, Christie Davies passed away while this dissertation was being written, but his 
work has remained influential for discussing the cultural and social life of humor. Though 
I take a critical stance towards his work in this chapter, I am grateful to have read his 
work and to have met him in person. 
 
121 Attardo, Humorous Texts, 24. 
 
122 Christie Davies, Jokes and their Relations to Society (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 




calculation.”123 While both arcs of Davies’ analysis seem like they could enable a link 
between humor, norms, and social effects, Davies explicitly sever these connections. 
Stupidity jokes are not a practice of hatred or alienation by one group against another, but 
instead a non-hostile means through which societies define who they are based on their 
location to other societies,124 ultimately “laughing at themselves as seen in a distorted 
mirror.”125 Davies also stresses that even humor targeting political regimes, such as those 
made by citizens of the Soviet Union against their government, generally have no 
influence on subverting or undermining existing political orders.126 Hence in this earlier 
work Davies already emphasizes skepticism towards strong associations between humor 
and social effects.  
In Jokes and Targets, Davies carries this skepticism further by specifying that 
jokes accomplish very little. Davies explicitly writes, “Jokes have no consequences for 
society as a whole,”127 and asserts that “It is a foolish sentimental myth that an entire 
oppressive political order could be brought down by humor.”128 Davies also states that 
jokes accomplish nothing morally, and can neither cause harm or amelioration in a 
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society.129 Consequently, Davies believes that attempts to link jokes causally with a 
reinforcement of social orders is “meaningless,” and he concludes that jokes are merely a 
“thermometer” that express the status of culture rather than a “thermostat” which could 
adjust society in some pragmatic way.130 Davies is correct that humor is unlikely to bring 
down an entire social order by itself, but his position also throws the notion that humor 
can have any deep, lasting social effects into doubt. If this leaves you unconvinced that 
Davies’ approach poses a particular problem for feminist continental philosophy, at one 
point he suggests that a theory referring to the creation of groups as “an exotic ‘other’” is 
merely invoking gobbledygook in contrast to his more grounded approach to ethnic 
humor.131 If Davies considers a discussion of exoticization and othering to be 
methodological gobbledygook, this suggests that he would find such approaches to 
language, norms, sex, and subjectivity as Irigaray’s, Kristeva’s, or Butler’s  to be 
problematically baffling. 
Davies’ move towards distancing humor from power runs into problems when he 
turns his analysis to the social meaning of blonde jokes in Jokes and Targets. In the book, 
Davies broadens his “center-periphery” approach to ‘stupidity’ ethnic humor into a 
“mind-over-matter model,”132 in which people are considered stupid if their work or life 
is associated with materiality or working upon the earth as opposed to occupations or 
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ways of life that are assumed to involve more thought.133 Davies uses this 
characterization to create a history of blonde jokes, which he asserts migrated to the UK 
as jokes about women from Essex and took on a class dimension by considering their 
association with material, working-class occupations.134 In addition to this class 
dimension, Davies notes that blonde jokes are also based on physical attractiveness135 and 
the “universal desirability of blondes,” which brings into play sexual scripts 
specifically.136 In this context, blonde jokes do not only represent the element of social 
class through the associations between blonde women and stupidity, but also bring 
stupidity into play because blonde women are associated with the material in the form of 
an unthinking use of their body for sex.137 
Here Davies does not at all link his analysis to feminist research that might further 
explain the relationship between blonde jokes and power, instead preferring to carry over 
a center-periphery model of ethnic humor that he had already decoupled from hostility 
and alienation. Note that he mentions sexual scripts and sex in relation to blonde jokes, 
but does not mention sexism, let alone patriarchy. Davies does not acknowledge the role 
of sexism at all, and does not think that these jokes have much of an effect on society.  
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Perhaps he would admit to a friendly feminist augmentation of his work that 
allows us to further consider blonde jokes as a thermometer for existing sexism, but not a 
thermostat that affects societal sexism in any way. But Davies’ side-remarks about humor 
methodologies suggest that even bringing in a Beauvoirian description of women as the 
Other138 in this context could be a threatening amount of “gobbledygook,” let alone what 
he might see as Irigaray’s “gobbledygook” of the other woman, Wittig’s Trojan 
nonsense, Kristeva’s revolution in rubbish language, or Butler’s bafflegabs that matter. 
But such accounts, rescued from external dismissal, could do much for enriching an 
account of blonde jokes by including subjects that Davies does not discuss, such as the 
relationship between blonde jokes and sexist power, the effects of blonde jokes on 
subjects called out by their use, and the sexist norms enabling such jokes to achieve 
circulation beyond an account such as Davies’ that distances materiality and embodiment 
from gendered power relationships. 
Interestingly, Davies comes closest to theorizing the relationship between humor 
and power when discussing humor that targets gay men. Davies links jokes about gay 
men to a prejudicial association between “homosexuality” and bestiality,139 or to an 
obsession with masculine dominance that links penetration, domination, and becoming 
like women.140 Davies even states that such jokes cannot be understood apart from 
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disapproval of same-sex attraction,141 and stresses that the distinction between penetrator 
and penetrated reflects “patterns of social domination.”142 Davies also explicitly ties 
anxieties about male passivity143 and views of “homosexuality” as an abomination144 to 
these jokes, and discusses masculinity as both compulsory and a privilege in society.145 In 
this context, Davies even restores subversive gay humor with some of its teeth, noting 
that camp and “outrageous effeminate humor or the humor of drag queens” contest 
hegemonic masculinity among both straight and gay men.146 Davies would still likely fall 
back on his metaphor that humor is a thermometer rather than a thermostat, but here the 
thermometer is most strongly linked to the power behind the scenes that determine the 
climate than we find with Davies’ discussion of blonde jokes without sexism. 
Eribon’s poststructuralist account of humor provides a powerful counter and 
complement to Davies’ discussion of jokes targeting gay men. Eribon is interested in the 
relationship between discourse and power, which brings him to an explicit consideration 
of humor in the context of insult. Eribon points out that gay people “live in a world of 
insults,” and these insults preexist them in a way that invests insult with the 
“constitutive…power of language.”147 Eribon identifies insults as performative in that 
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they can allow the insulter to attain power over their target and also is able to 
performatively assign a place for gay people even before they are conscious of having 
such a place.148 Insult thus involves an intricate interplay between language, power, and 
performativity that gives it a prominent role in constituting what the gay self means for 
both oneself and society.149 
 In this context, Eribon asserts that humorous caricatures are able to draw from this 
constituting power of insult, as well as “the mental schemas that produce laughter at the 
sight of gay people,” in order to serve as a “group portrait” of gay people as “monstrous 
or ridiculous.”150 These caricatures can thus be considered image-based analogues to 
Freud’s description of the joke “as a sort of outlet for hostile impulses.”151 The function 
of laughter in the caricature also encourages a gay person who is in hiding to laugh at the 
figure presented in the effort of distancing, though this only means that they are engaging 
in self-ridicule.152 In this way, the caricature also blocks solidarity and encourages 
shame.153 Eribon’s description provides a useful account of how laughter specifically can 
enact a “symbolic violence”154 upon a social group through the relationship between 
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power, discourse, and performativity. But he also suggests a means of amelioration from 
caricatures through solidarity,155 and hence resistance. Eribon’s poststructuralist account 
thus critically centers the social effects of humor, revealing a complex thermostat after 
all. 
 Of course, Raskin’s and Attardo’s approaches to humor are not the only ones, and 
humor is a diverse and often eclectic field. Attending the 2015 International Humor 
Studies Society Conference in Oakland, for example, permitted me to attend a panel 
consisting of Pixar employees, take part in a panel stressing the relationship between 
humor and embodied cognition by drawing from work in cognitive science, and receive 
comments from New Yorker cartoon editor Robert Mankoff, who also presented later.  
 In light of this diverse field, it is unsurprising that formidable critiques have been 
formulated against the general theory of verbal humor. One of the most promising 
critiques is provided by Graeme Ritchie, a computer scientist and friendly critic of both 
Raskin’s script-based theories of humor and Raskin’s and Attardo’s general theory of 
verbal humor. However, Ritchie’s favored solution maintains a family resemblance with 
the general theory of verbal humor by emphasizing abstract language over social effects, 
since he turns to computer programs as the primary route through which to understand 
how humor works. For example, he turns to the Joke Analysis and Production Engine 
(JAPE) which was designed to create humorous puns based on programmed “properties 
and relationships.”156 One joke created by JAPE was:  
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What kind of murderer has fibre?  
A cereal killer.157 
This has been analyzed as: 
 “There is a compound noun phrase (serial killer) such that its first word has a 
homophone (cereal). Substituting the homophone into the phrase (cereal killer) 
produces a phrase which can be used as the answer to a question which asks for 
something which shares the semantic properties of the original phrase (serial 
killer) and the homophone (cereal).”158 
This account is abstracted in the form of a "schema," consisting of "a network of 
constraints between words, parts of words, phrases, and lexical entries.159" The schema 
provides direction for the program to substitute appropriate homonyms, which is cross-
referenced with a dictionary search to locate appropriate words.160 In this way, JAPE is 
able to work with a “library of routines” to create puns.161 Ritchie’s alternative account 
thus represents an approach that is perhaps even more incompatible with feminist 
continental philosophy, as social norms, subjectivity, and power find no place in this 
particular iteration of computer programming. Even Davies probably is probably more 
tolerable of theories that discuss the Other than a machine that can only receive the 













feedback of binary code. In later chapters we will refer to feminist approaches to humor 
that lie on the periphery of humor studies, but the point here is that it is unlikely feminist 
continental philosophy will ever find its way to the center without seriously losing itself. 
 
Bill Burr’s Buried Argument 
 Recall that Burr deemphasized the social and political aspects of the domestic 
violence bar joke to instead admire the joke’s elegant structure. Burr’s analysis of the 
domestic violence joke thus seems to share with leading theoretical approaches in humor 
studies an affinity for turning away from the social and political dimensions of humor to 
study idealized and mechanical humor construction rather than power relationships. This 
does not mean that contemporary humor studies lacks valuable insights on its own terms, 
and we will return to the possibilities offered by Delia Chiaro’s, Janet Bing’s, and Joanne 
Scheibman’s work on humor theory as a bridge between humor theory and feminist 
poststructuralism that can provide more exciting avenues for collaboration. What this 
chapter does explicitly articulate is that leading theoretical approaches in humor studies 
place feminist poststructuralism in a necessarily “Other” position in relation to the rest of 
humor research, always at risk of being dismissed as “gobbledygook.” But consciously 
knowing that feminist poststructuralism is a stranger to mainstream humor research can 
also be powerfully twisted into the insight that feminist poststructuralism can provide a 
viewpoint on humor which transforms our particular understanding of humor practices. 
In the later chapters, I will endeavor to construct these insights in their strongest form by 
emphasizing the unique abilities of feminist continental philosophy to acknowledge the 
social and political ambivalence of humor in its most unstable practices. 
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 But for now, this chapter has merely alienated feminist continental philosophy 
from the more stabilized path of contemporary humor studies to call attention to a dire 
need for explicitly considering where we want to go from here. To review, we have 
alienated feminist continental philosophy from not only empirical research on humor’s 
social effects, but also contemporary theories of humor from the vantage points of 
linguistics, “pluralism,” sociology, and computer science. But this alienation is quite 
useful, as it also stresses that feminist continental philosophy cannot easily venture on the 
path away from humor’s social effects like much of contemporary humor studies’ core 
theories of how humor works.  
I suggest that as feminists we require a theory of social and political humor that 
will consciously shake contemporary humor theories to their core by centering a 
consideration of social norms, subjectivation, power, and social situatedness in relation to 
humor. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, linking humor, power, and hierarchy 
in philosophical considerations of humor stretches back to canonical Western 
philosophers such as Plato, Hobbes, and Rousseau, and also to philosophers taken up in 
continental traditions of philosophy such as Bergson. I justify this next step by looking at 
how theories of humor and power have become boxed into a limited category, preventing 
contemporary works in the philosophy of humor from achieving the feminist goals I have 
just laid out in this paragraph. However, far from signaling the necessity of returning to 
older philosophies of humor, I will emphasize that they simply will not do anymore 
because of the rigid model of humor and power as entrenchment that they set forth. Here, 
in the gap left by both old and contemporary philosophies of humor, we will explore the 
topography of existing feminist theories of humor and work through them to craft a 
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feminist poststructuralist philosophy of humor that can stand strong in its exiled position 
outside (but nonetheless attentive to) contemporary humor research. To avoid the 
laughing feminist twentieth century from becoming the self-contained or drowned 
twenty-first, it will be useful to look at theories of humor and power from the history of 
philosophy that have been successfully boxed-in and thrown into a dusty corner. 





































LAUGHING AND NOT BEING NORMATIVE: 
HUMOR AS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESTRICTION OF PUBLIC SPACE 
 
 
Rousseau, Rape, and Humor Restricting Space 
To recap, in the previous chapter, I began by looking at the open and undecided 
question of humor’s social effects in popular media. While there are helpful empirical 
studies of humor’s social effects, I have emphasized that these fail to look behind the 
scenes at the social norms that humor deploys vis-a-vis relationships between language, 
power, and hierarchy. Dominant theories in humor studies such as the general theory of 
verbal humor frequently bracket out humor’s social effects in an effort to understand how 
precisely humor works, treating these two considerations as if they are distinct pursuits. 
Finally, humor’s social effects are directly denied by Davies’ theory of disparagement 
humor, which I challenged through recourse to Eribon’s discussion of caricature, 
interpellation, and subjectivation. The aim of the previous chapter was thus to show that 
the problem of humor’s social effects has not been given the attention it deserves in 
humor theory, and I suggested that a continental feminist approach will be more fruitful 
for addressing complex interplays of humor and power.  
 This chapter argues, contra a contemporary (and boring) centering of individual 
ethics in the philosophy of humor, that the social and political features of humor as 
practiced in public space should be centered rather than cast aside. In short, what we 
require is a social and political philosophy of humor. Whereas the purpose of 
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contemporary humor ethics so far has been to point out the ways that humor’s practice by 
individuals can be unethical, I argue instead for a feminist social and political philosophy 
of humor and laughter that situates the operations and effects of laughter within the 
context of larger relationships with systematic inequality, cultural norms, and their effects 
on people’s lives and deaths. Though I will be working my way through the shortcomings 
of existing feminist approaches to laughter, it is my contention in this chapter and moving 
onwards that feminist poststructuralism will be a robust toolkit (later, I will escalate the 
bland “robust” with Monique Wittig’s more exciting “war machine”) through which this 
may be accomplished.  
 Earlier theories of humor and laughter, for example, not only mention the use of 
laughter to signify superiority in relationship to others, but also the powerful role of 
laughter in public space through its specific mechanisms and their effects. Consider, for 
example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s philosophy of humor and laughter, which is not 
discussed in most overviews of humor theory. In Emile’s sections explaining the ideal 
‘education’ of women, Rousseau employs tactics designed to silence women and girls in 
public and private space. For example, he asserts that women are completely dependent 
on men and their judgments162 that girls must be acclimated to constraint because their 
life will necessarily involve being "enslaved" to a specific etiquette and "the wills of 
others,"163 and that women can create neither "works of genius"164 nor engage in 
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science.165 In this way, Rousseau constructs a framework within which women and girls 
are unable to speak outside of the judgments, wills, and discourses of men. Mary 
Wollstonecraft summarizes these views, writing,  
Rousseau declares that a woman should never, for a moment, feel herself 
independent, that she should be governed by fear to exercise her natural cunning, 
and made a coquettish slave in order to render her a more alluring object of desire, 
a sweeter companion to man, whenever he chooses to relax himself.166 
 
Wollstonecraft here recognizes that Rousseau's ideal world is one in which women have 
no aims outside of serving men, nullifying their other possibilities in public and private 
space.  
 Within his general project of denying women space, Rousseau attempts to nullify 
women’s self-claims and experiences by suggesting that rape is logically impossible. 
After associating men with reason and women with modesty, Rousseau asserts that 
"[n]ature and reason” go against the act of rape because rape involves men attacking their 
"companion" and threatening fatherhood.167 He also asserts that women can defend 
themselves and suggests that when a woman is raped it must have been permitted, 
writing, "For the attacker to be victorious, the one who is attacked must permit or arrange 
it…"168 This causes him to suggest that "[t]he freest and sweetest of all acts," meaning 
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penis-in-vagina sex, "does not admit of real violence,"169 resulting in a denial of rape. 
Rape thus becomes an action that is “logically incoherent” in Rousseau’s framework.170 
This denial leads Rousseau to write,  
“If fewer acts of rape are cited in our day, this is surely not because men are more 
temperate but because they are less credulous, and such a complaint, which 
previously would have persuaded simple peoples, in our days would succeed only 
in attracting the laughter of mockers. It is more advantageous to keep quiet.”171 
 
Rousseau believes he has shown that men, who are reasonable, do not rape women and 
hence any reports by women that they have been raped are not credible to the extent that 
they should be targeted by laughter and mockery. In this case, laughter serves as a means 
of restricting women’s claims both in and about public and private space.   
This relationship between the “laughter of mockers” and women’s ability to 
inhabit space is clarified when looking at Rousseau’s discussion of laughter earlier in 
Emile. He writes, 
All children are afraid of masks. I begin by showing Emile a mask with a pleasant 
face. Next someone in his presence puts this mask over his face. I start to laugh; 
everybody laughs; and the child laughs like the others. Little by little I accustom 
him to less pleasant masks and finally to hideous faces. If I have arranged my 
gradation well, far from being frightened by the last mask, he will laugh at it as at 
the first. After that I no longer fear that he can be frightened by masks.”172 
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Rousseau also indicates that laughter can be similarly used to ease fears of the dark.173 In 
these sections, Rousseau is acknowledging that laughter is both a way to deny the ability 
of entities outside of oneself to cause an effect on its own terms against one’s wishes 
(beholding a frightful mask and being confronted with fear), and a way to change the 
terms of that presentation such that the response to the object can be controlled 
(beholding a frightful mask and not experiencing it as a confrontation after laughing at 
it). This imbues laughter with not only an ethics of individual relationships between 
human and mask, or man and woman, but also results in a relationship of power-over. 
Rousseau’s suggested response to rape follows a similar pattern: it is prescribed that 
women who say they have been raped should not be listened to on their own terms, such 
that instead (like the mask) women have any intentions outside of what men want to hear 
trivialized through laughter. Here laughter is designed as the ultimate seal upon the voice 
and space of women who were raped: any argument or evidence against Rousseau's 
denial of rape becomes not worth being engaged on its terms, and hence is trivialized 
through the practice of laughter.  
Combined with Rousseau’s other suggestions about curtailing women’s ability to 
inhabit public and private space, the “laughter of mockers” that Rousseau describes is 
thus a powerful regulative tool used to restrict the ability of women and girls to speak and 
inhabit space on their own terms. In this context, humor is not only an example of 
Rousseau’s failure to consider laughter’s (refusing to consider that it is right to listen to 
                                               




women) but also an example of laughter that is political, effecting a restriction of women 
in public space. 
 The relationship between humor and public space is a live topic past Rousseau 
and the nineteenth century and into our current era of edgy comedians. In 2012 comedian 
Daniel Tosh was credited with telling a rape joke and then responding to a woman 
“heckler” at his show with, “Wouldn’t it be funny if that girl got raped by like, 5 guys 
right now? Like right now? What if a bunch of guys just raped her…”174 The following 
year, featured among the media exposing a gang rape cover-up for football players in 
Steubenville was a video showing a group of students laughing about the rape and 
making jokes that the girl was “deader than Obi Wan Kenobi after Darth Vader cut his 
head off,” and laughing while saying, “Is she gonna feel it? She’s dead!”175 As bell hooks 
argues in response to Eddie Murphy’s 1987 comedy special Raw, humor and laughter can 
also present black women’s bodies as threatening to black men’s autonomy, to the extent 
that “women’s personhood must be erased,” seeking to silence black women in relation to 
black men while simultaneously doubling back and objectifying the black men telling the 
jokes.176 
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 Though each of these cases, ranging from Rousseau to contemporary deployments 
of disparaging laughter and humor about rape, invoke relationships in public (and 
private) space, I will argue in this chapter that contemporary philosophy of humor often 
turns away from the social and political effects of humor in favor of individualist ethics. 
In contrast to this, I emphasize that humor has an important role to play in the politics of 
public space, using transphobic laughter and humor as an example. To establish this, after 
a brief reflection on the term “humor,” I begin by emphasizing the preference for a humor 
ethics over a social and political philosophy of humor in three leading approaches to the 
philosophy of humor by Noël Carrol, John Morreall, and the tag-team of Matthew 
Hurley, Daniel Dennett, and Reginald Adams. I then trace this practice to a preference for 
grouping theories of humor into categories and discounting those that center power and 
hierarchy under the name of aggressive, disparagement, or superiority theories. I 
conclude by discussing misogyny and transmisogyny through Kate Manne, Talia 
Bettcher, Viviane Namaste, and Sara Ahmed to center a social and political approach to 
humor and laughter that also considers cultural emotions. This work indicates that more 
work is required for a social and political feminist philosophy for the practice of humor, 
and what I will describe as humorwork. 
 
Constellations, Crazy Quilts, and Cluster You-Know-Whats 
Before discussing the history of humor in philosophy, it is necessary to address 
the fact that many of the authors do not use the term ‘humor,’ especially since it was not 
until the late seventeenth century that terms such as “humor” and “amusement” were 
74 
 
given their current sense of funniness or a disposition to laughter.177 Furthermore, as 
philosophers of humor John Morreall and John Lippitt note, even the term “humor” itself 
has often been used in ways which refer to varying phenomena.178 Morreall, Lippitt, and 
many other scholars engaging in cross-disciplinary research (including the journal 
HUMOR) thus often use the term “humor” in the “broadest sense”179 or as a “general 
umbrella term” to refer to “what is perceived, thought of, or experienced, as funny or 
amusing.”180 In this chapter and onward, I will be referring to humor in this umbrella 
sense, although I will specify when I am referring to a particular author’s non-general use 
of the term. 
It is also important to not hastily subsume “laughter” under the category of 
‘humor,’ since laughter can be triggered without being identified as humorous, as is the 
case with certain instances of neurological damage, neurodegenerative diseases, and 
seizures.181 However, though many of the philosophers below refer to laughter rather than 
humor, Morreall stresses that these theories can still be relevantly referred to under the 
“new” and “culturally variable” terms of humor and amusement  because these terms 
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involve a crucially similar investigation of “the inclination to laugh.”182 Hence, the 
contemporary usage of “humor” as a general term is not perfect, and must be employed 
with caution, but it is a useful working model for a pluralist study of humor that works 
against a tradition of various cordoned-off perspectives developing their own theories of 
humor without surveying the field. An optimist might thus refer to humor studies as 
involving a ‘constellation’ of terms, while it is probably more accurate to refer to the field 
as a ‘crazy-quilt.’ Throughout this chapter and others, I will thus embrace this 
conceptually broad and sometimes historically idiosyncratic approach to the field of 
“humor.” 
 
Power in a Box: Why a Social and Political Philosophy of Humor is Obsolete 
Before proposing a renewed social and political theory of humor, I will trace the 
history through which philosophy has depoliticized the study of humor, and its 
relationship with the consolidation of humor studies. During the consolidation of humor 
studies, humor scholars (in our now clarified broad sense of the term humor) noticed over 
time that approaches to studying humor could be categorized under different approaches 
or definitions based on different characterizations of humor. While previous philosophers 
and theorists of humor, including Aristotle, Schopenhauer, and Freud, grouped humor 
into various kinds, other philosophers set out to group existing theories of humor into 
categories to better organize and respond to the large range of approaches to humor as a 
subject of study. Clarifying the taxonomy of not only humor but also approaches to 
humor theory has been helpful for evaluating different theories of humor that before the 
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consolidation of humor studies were formed without the consideration of other competing 
or comparable humor theories. 
For example, within the same decade that Freud and Bergson published their 
accounts of humor, James Sully considered several categories of laughter that carry over 
to contemporary accounts such as a focus on disparagement (Sully refers to it as 
“degradation”) and a contrasting theory of incongruity.183 However, it isn’t until the mid-
20th century that philosopher D. H. Monro in Argument of Laughter provided the 
overarching taxonomy that would set the categories for much of humor studies and 
especially works on the philosophy of humor. Monro himself writes, “There is no lack of 
books on humour. But as a rule each writer contents himself with developing a theory of 
his own. The result is that there is no single book which can be recommended to the 
reader who wants a general survey of all the theories.”184 Monro’s book attempts to 
change this trend by categorizing various humor theories. Though Monro’s category of 
“ambivalence” has since been collapsed into “incongruity” within humor studies at large, 
his other three categories of superiority, incongruity, and release have continued to be 
influential. Since this division, other philosophers and theorists have acknowledged or 
built upon similar divisions among humor theories, including prominent humor linguist 
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Victor Raskin,185 philosopher Noël Carroll,186 and the especially influential humor 
philosopher John Morreall.187 
Because of this categorization work, theorists of humor are now more likely to 
situate their approaches in relation to other existing approaches to humor, both 
emphasizing the extent to which their theories are influenced by one or more approaches, 
and to what extent these approaches are prioritized or developed. If we consider the 
weight given to each category among contemporary humor scholars, however, the 
superiority theory maintains only a questionable hold as a priority for humor theories. 
Looking at the 2014 field-standard-setting tome Encyclopedia of Humor Studies, edited 
by influential linguist Salvatore Attardo and containing 335 articles by recognized 
scholars on their areas of humor expertise, there are entries for various categories of 
humor including “Incongruity and Resolution,” “Release Theories of Humor,” and the 
post-Monro frequent favorite of “Play and Humor,” with no superiority or disparagement 
theory to be found. The only prominent place where superiority theory is permitted to 
make a cameo is in Morreall’s entry on “Philosophy of Humor,” where it is mostly 
relegated to a past historical perspective that has been refuted.188  
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Morreall also acknowledges that some categories of humor lost considerable 
influence during the taxonomic process, focusing specifically the relief theory of humor 
losing uptake by contemporary theorists due to its focus on emotions and complex 
psychic processes. Though an association between humor and simpler physical and 
psychological forms of release have persisted, few theories now prioritize relief as 
humor’s core element in comparison to incongruity.189 While I focus on superiority 
theory in this chapter, I will also later discuss the connection between power and 
emotions in social and political humor, so it is it is important to now note Morreall’s 
hastiness to dispel emotions from relevancy to humor in contrast to its intellectual 
character.190 
The ghost of superiority theory does make its way into entries such as 
“Aggressive and Harmless Humor,” which as I argued in the previous chapter takes a 
non-systemic individualist approach to such uses of humor, but superiority theory itself 
has lost its mark upon the field. Why should a category of humor often taken to include 
influential contributors as Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, and Bergson fall into such disregard? 
As I will argue below, the centrality of humor’s politics and social relationships of power 
to superiority theories of humor was gradually placed into the box of “superiority 
theory,” considered as an obsolete category to understand the core operations of humor. 
While other theories such as incongruity took center stage, the inseparability of power 
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from superiority theories of humor caused these theories to lose influence during humor’s 
categorization and subsequent consolidation as humor studies and philosophy of humor. 
 Following the categorization of humor theories, philosophers of humor have often 
divided humor theories into general categories to emphasize each theory’s inability to 
stand as the sole or primary explanation of humor, with each category failing to integrate 
some critical feature of how humor operates when considered in isolation. Morreall, for 
example, critiques superiority theory for its inability to explain all instances of humor,191 
along with incongruity theory for failing to explain all instances of laughter (though he 
notes it may cover all humor).192 He also critiques relief or release theories for depending 
on overly complex models of the psyche193 Carroll likewise critiques superiority theories 
for failing to set up superiority as a necessary condition of all or most humor,194 
incongruity theories for providing a necessary but not always sufficient condition of 
humor,195 and release theories for being overly complex.196 The third in this triad of 
professionally influential contemporary humor philosophers, a unit consisting of a three 
people, is the work of Hurley, Dennett, and Adams in Inside Jokes. Hurley, Dennett, and 
Adams run through humor theorists to argue that superiority theories fail to explain 
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humor’s mechanism and evolutionary justification,197 emphasize that incongruity theories 
(though promising) lack explanatory power for why particular instances of incongruity or 
frame-shifting are funny,198 and argue release theories fail to account for jokes without 
emotionally charged subject matter.199 These contemporary humor philosophers thus 
envision humor as a multidimensional phenomenon that earlier theorists thought they 
could explain through limited (and limiting) attempts to capture its essence without 
considering the work of other humor theorists.  
From this failure, Morreall, Carroll, and Hurley et al. seek to build a better theory 
that will include the strongest insights on humor while discarding the weaker ones.200 
However, just like the bracketing of systematic social and political concerns from general 
theories of humor studies that I discussed in the previous chapter, the focus of humor 
philosophers on the necessary features of humor has displaced the earlier focus on power 
and hierarchy found in earlier superiority theories to the periphery of humor theory. 
Because superiority theories of humor have been dismissed for failing to account for the 
necessary features of humor’s operations as distinguished from social arrangements, their 
concern with power and hierarchy also risks getting dismissed to the periphery of humor 
theory. This also risks leaving social and political philosophies of humor behind if humor 
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theories continue to focus on the mechanics and necessary/sufficient conditions of humor 
at the expense of centering humor’s social and political importance.  
What I am arguing here is not for a naive return to superiority theory in the vein 
of Rousseau or Hobbes or Plato, but instead an updated theory of humor that takes into 
account its distinct operations as humor while also centering its relationship to power. For 
example, I do not dispute that the superiority theories of old may fall laughably short 
when explaining much nonsense humor and jokes that do not seem to exclusively depend 
on social and political work, such as: 
Did you hear about the business that runs on clouds?  
One could say that it’s seeking the accumulus of capital!201 
In this case, it seems reasonable to follow philosophers such as Carroll who might 
suggest that it trades on the comic amusement of juxtaposing business, clouds, cumulus, 
and accumulation rather than an assertion of superiority or disparagement.202 However, 
there is more at stake in the categorization of humor and the prioritization of its 
depoliticized operations than retiring some of the dustier theories to the attic so they stop 
taking up undue space in comprehensive analyses or encyclopedias on the subject. When 
humor theorists depoliticize humor or treat its politics as secondary, they lose grasp of 
humor’s distinct social and political practices, including its relationship with inequality 
and power. 
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 In the previous chapter, in addition to opposing my “feminist balderdash” with 
Christie Davies’ assertion that humor is apolitical, I discussed influential contemporary 
theories such as Raskin’s and Attardo’s that deemphasize the relationships between social 
hierarchies and jest. It may thus be tempting to blame the linguists for contemporary 
disassociations between humor and power, but I am now building on my argument from 
the previous chapter to propose that philosophers are equally accountable for 
depoliticizing humor in favor of prioritizing the operations of incongruity theory.  
Considered as a matter of the history of philosophy, the relationship between 
philosophy and the depoliticization of humor is old. In Critique of Judgement Immanuel 
Kant, often characterized as among the originators of incongruity theory,203 suggests that 
jest effects a situation in which the understanding is thwarted and relaxes from its 
expectations, resulting in a bodily “slackening” and a “vibration of our organs” that both 
balances and promotes health in the body. Laughter, similarly, involves the dissipation of 
an expectation caused by absurdity into nothing, encouraging the production of "an 
equilibrium of the vital forces” in the body.204 
If laughter involves a bodily dissipation of expectation and absurdity into 
“nothing,” this risks casting laughter as a momentary release that does not having any 
lasting epistemological effects, let alone social effects. In this context, Kant’s 
specification that laughter is triggered by a dissipation of expectation marks him as one of 
the earliest incongruity theorists of humor, since he classifies humor as an incongruity 
                                               
203 Morreall, Comic Relief, 10; Hurley, Dennett, and Adams, 47. 
 





between an expectation of the understanding and the material of the jest.205 Kant’s focus 
on humor’s ability to dissipate expectations has also led him to be associated with relief 
theories of humor, which stress humor as a form of relief from tension.206 Kant thus put 
forth an influential theory of humor that, in contrast to older superiority theories, focuses 
on the dissipation of humor’s content rather than its effects or relationship to social 
hierarchies. 
 Following this Kantian trend, contemporary works in philosophy of language 
have also led to an association between humor and non-effect. For example, H. P. Grice’s 
discussion of his cooperative principle in “Logic and Conversation,” consisting of 
quantity, quality, relation, and manner in speech,207 has influenced much of contemporary 
humor studies. Humor theorists of language have worked to more explicitly tie Grice’s 
framework to humorous language, distinguishing between language’s usual bona-fide 
course208 and contrasting this with a non-bona-fide practice of speech as humor (in which 
the usual straightforward, economic, and cooperative mode of language is transgressed). 
In this framework, non-bona-fide humorous speech also involves the dissipation of 
language’s goal to convey information, as it now aims for play and laughter.209 Hence, 
while Grice himself does not consider the question of whether or not humor is a device 
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for carrying effects or whether humor can be connected to social hierarchy, distinctions in 
humor studies between bona-fide speech as a way to carry information and non-bona-fide 
as a noneffective, humorous mode of speech has casted Grice’s philosophy of language in 
the service of a socially noneffective theory of humor.  
 Whereas superiority and disparagement theories as a group have been categorized 
as obsolete due to their inability to provide necessary conditions of humor, Kant’s 
engagement in socially non-effective incongruity theory and Grice’s influence on non-
bona-fide humor have helped shape humor studies as an interdisciplinary area of 
research. In philosophy, John Morreall, Noël Carroll, and Hurley et al. have accepted 
incongruity theory as the most compelling contemporary approach to humor.210 In wider 
humor studies, Raskin’s and Attardo’s general theory of verbal humor provides a 
linguistic spin on incongruity theory through an emphasis on oppositions in script-based 
semantics.211 This marks a significant movement away from superiority or disparagement 
theories, which may have an enshrined place in the recorded history of humor theory, but 
only as a now-obsolete stage towards depoliticized incongruities. The history of the 
depoliticization and the noneffectiveness of humor in humor studies thus serves as an 
important influence for its contemporary consolidation, marking the moment where 
humor studies “grew up” from idiosyncratic theories that were not in conversation with 
each other into a lively taxonomy favoring humor’s operations but no longer centering its 
social relationships. 
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The Result: Contemporary Humor Ethics without Politics 
The depoliticization of humor theories has resulted in contemporary philosophies 
of humor failing to account for humor’s social and political power, causing them to 
instead prioritize an individualistic ethics of unwarranted disengagement or individual 
intentions that cannot account for humor’s continued relationship with inequality and 
public space. In this section I look at Morreall’s, Carroll’s, and Hurley et al. specifically, 
as their prioritization of incongruity theory fails to account for humor’s social and 
political effects. 
First, Morreall’s project of building a better philosophy of humor causes his ethics 
of humor to focus on disengagement rather than its political effects. Pulling together a 
range of humor theories but prioritizing incongruity theories, Morreall asserts that humor 
consists of cognitive shifts that disengage people from “conceptual and practical 
concerns.”212 Because Morreall attributes this interplay of expectation and changing 
perceptions to the intellect and rationality, he argues that humor is not emotional because 
it disengages us from a situation rather than encouraging emotional involvement.213 
Morreall also argues that humor is not performative, since jokes “suspend the guidelines 
of pragmatics” and use words for the sake of intellectual pleasure and entertainment 
rather than causing actions or beliefs.214 Morreall’s approach to humor thus reflects the 
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preference for characterizing humor as primarily disengagement and incongruity (in the 
mode of cognitive/intellectual shifts) over a more involved relationship with power. 
This emphasis on humor as intellectual non-engagement influences Morreall’s 
turn toward humor ethics at the expense of humor politics. After labeling much of the 
literature on the maliciousness of racist and sexist jokes as “naïve,”215 and dismissing 
examples of humor as racist or sexist,216 Morreall instead refers to his theory of humor as 
disengagement to suggest that the ethics of humor is related to humor’s potential for 
promoting irresponsibility,217 desensitization,218 and temporarily removing harmful 
stereotypes from moral scrutiny.219 Morreall does acknowledge social hierarchies in the 
context of stereotypes, as he finds it objectionable for people with social power to 
perpetuate harmful stereotypes through jokes about the less powerful.220 However, this 
remains secondary to his focus on humor as an act of distancing, and for his theory 
humor primarily errs when used to insensitively disengage from the real harmful effects 
of existing stereotypes. 
Returning to the passage from Rousseau on the “laughter of mockers” from the 
beginning of this chapter, Morreall’s position would hold that laughter targeted at women 
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to silence their stories is unethical because it intellectually distances an amused person 
from a woman’s reports of rape. This intellectual distancing reflects the worst aspects of 
humor’s “anesthesia of the heart,”221 a phrase Morreall borrows from Bergson to 
emphasize humor’s potential for unethical distancing.222 However, this approach to 
humor ethics also fails to acknowledge the potential of humor and laughter to not only sit 
back and allow existing stereotypes to function, but also work within a larger network of 
power and hierarchical relationships that the practice of humor can perpetuate or even 
produce in novel ways. That is to say that centering humor as a practice of distancing and 
disengagement misses its productive deployment in a social world of unequal power 
relations, charging Rousseau with a mere insensitivity when his proposed laughter would 
actively uphold misogyny. 
Feminists have often emphasized that interactions between men and women are 
both produced and productive of larger inequalities in society, ranging from economic 
relationships223 to sexual harassment224 and rape culture.225 Initially, Morreall’s grasp of 
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laughter and humor seems to parallel Rousseau’s as the former refers to distancing and 
the latter refers to a boy overcoming his fears of a mask. However, Rousseau’s distinct 
emphasis on education involves the boy engaging with the situation of laughter by 
actively bolstering himself over the mask rather than using laughter to promote an 
existing stereotype. After all, the initial situation prior to the laughter risks being one of 
fear, and Rousseau intends to escalate the boy beyond this moment. Rousseau’s 
superiority theory thus distinctly suggests that laughter is engaged with a situation rather 
than merely intellectually disengaged, and hence his shift towards laughter and rape is 
productive of power relations rather than merely acquiescing to existing norms.  
Though an appeal to existing sexist norms is certainly part of Rousseau’s 
emphasis on laughter against claims of rape, laughter is also related to his active 
production of rape (and specifically women’s naming of it) as a contradiction, and the use 
of laughter is among a constellation of practices attempting to enshrine a denial of 
women’s voices into the fabric of social reality. In this context, Moira Gatens asserts that 
Rousseau’s Emile strives to deny women from any “entry into civic life” which remains 
the province of men.226 Laughter in this instance is thus not merely an act of unethical 
distancing between individuals that falls back on existing stereotypes, but also a 
reinforcement of the social and political power that men hold over women in a patriarchal 
society (both ours and in Rousseau’s framework of society). Morreall’s ethics of humor 
this misses a crucial link between humor, laughter, and the engaged reinforcement of 
patriarchy. 
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Carroll’s ethics of humor, like Morreall’s, emphasizes incongruity, but also fails 
to account for the social and political effects of humor by focusing too heavily on the 
humorist’s intentions at the expense of considering humor’s larger relationship with 
power. Carroll distinguishes himself from Morreall’s intellectual distancing approach to 
humor by instead asserting that humor (or his preferred term of “comic amusement” via 
perceived incongruity) is emotional227 in additional to engaging cognition.228 When 
discussing the ethics of humor, Carroll also acknowledges that humor can enforce 
problematic social norms229 and asserts that the context and intentions of a joke can make 
it moral or immoral.230 Carroll’s approach may thus seem initially more promising for a 
social and political consideration of humor than Morreall’s, since his emphasis on 
incongruity does not exclude a larger social context of power relations beyond the play of 
stereotypes. 
However, Carroll’s theory of humor loses its potential for a social and political 
account when he tethers humor’s correct interpretation to the humorist’s intentions. 
Morreall stresses that humor allows people “to entertain emotions towards fictional 
beings that we would not mobilize for their comparable real-world counterparts,”231 
which means that humor can entertain hypothetical situations that should not be 
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interpreted directly, giving joke tellers the benefit of a doubt when they seem to be 
making ethically dubious claims. Carroll seeks to maintain a “moderate moralism” 
towards humor which simultaneously acknowledges that intentionally vilifying humor 
and humor that promotes harmful stereotypes or indifference can be immoral,232 while 
also calling for caution because any given joke may be more sophisticated in its target 
than it initially seems.233 In this context, Carroll suggests that jokes which seem to play 
into harmful societal norms should not be straightforwardly interpreted as such if there 
are other non-offensive possibilities for their interpretation.234 This emphasis on the 
fictional, suspended aspects of humor combined with a suggestion to seek alternative 
intentions of seemingly unethical or harmful humor results in an appeal to the humorist’s 
intentions beyond straight-forward interpretations. 
Carroll’s focus on the intentions of individual joke-tellers falls short of a social 
and political analysis of humor when he specifically considers a rape joke as his example. 
He references the following joke formulation: 
M (a well-known female celebrity, widely rumored to be sexually hyperactive)  
visits a hockey team. When she emerges, she complains she has been gang raped; 
to which the narrator responds, “Wishful thinking.”235 
 
While Carroll does acknowledge that at first glance this joke seems to play into sexist 
assumptions, he suggests that because this laughter of mockers can be plausibly 
                                               
232 Ibid., 111. 
 
233 Ibid., 116. 
 
234 Ibid., 94. 
 




interpreted as centered around the “hypocrisy” of a woman who is attempting to cover up 
her hypersexuality by lying about gang rape236 we should cease any potential indignation 
and instead figure out the intended target of ridicule. To do otherwise would restrict the 
joke to an interpretation as sexist, which Carroll stresses would be only one intention 
among many possible intentions.237 Carroll thus asks us to center the teller of the rape 
joke, who may have intended to reference rape in the service of a more important insight 
about hypocrisy and suddenly finds himself beset by “hasty” accusations of sexism. 
 Momentarily suspending my rage that Carroll and his editors would see fit to refer 
to a joke about a woman lying about rape as unrelated to sexism and sexist assumptions, 
Carroll’s example indicates a total failure to adequately account for social and political 
concerns due to his restriction of humor ethics to fictional suspension, ambiguous 
interpretations, and individual intentions. Carroll’s ethics of humor prioritizes 
charitability towards the individual joke teller’s intentions, but any theory of social 
hierarchy (I have feminism and patriarchy in mind here) does not require intent to 
establish a reference or reinforcement of inequality and oppressive norms. In fact, 
feminist philosophers such as Carole Pateman238 and philosophers of race such as Charles 
Mills239 have argued that an appeal to supposedly benevolent intentions and to well-
                                               




238 See Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 
93-94. 
 





meaning ignorance can perpetuate systems of racism and sexism. The rape joke teller can 
reinforce social norms and hierarchies regardless of their individual understanding or 
intentions for the joke, and may even be deploying a self-deluding sleight of hand by 
asserting otherwise. Carroll’s individualist ethics, like Morreall’s, is thus unable to 
conceive of humor’s more complicated relationships with social structures of power, let 
alone patriarchy.  
Finally, the humor ethics of Hurley, Dennett, and Adams initially seems to 
accommodate for a social and political philosophy of humor more than Morreall and 
Carroll, but they too ultimately lose sight of humor’s power by emphasizing that humor’s 
social use is only tertiary to humor’s central purpose as an evolutionary reward for 
cognitive debugging. The trio suggests that humor is an “AI-complete problem,” meaning 
that humor can only be understood if we can make “an artificial agent that really 
thinks.”240 Understanding humor in its robustness is thus a project of capturing a person 
with a potent theory of mind. Hurley et al., like Morreall and Carroll, linger on 
incongruity theory and distinctly attempt to shift from Raskin’s and Attardo’s script- or 
frame-reliant theory of humor by pointing towards a less cumbersome model of “just-in-
time spreading activation.”241 Finding their way in between Morreall’s intellectual humor 
and Carroll’s attribution of humor to emotion, Hurley et al. link humor with the feeling of 
mirth,242 and argue that this emotion can serve as a rational motivation for human 
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survival and reproduction, constitutive of an “epistemic emotion.”243 In this context, 
Hurley et al. attempt to provide an evolutionary rationale for humor, arguing that humor 
is a practice of “debugging” our delusive false assumptions through the reward of 
mirthful pleasure upon discovering a mistake.244 Hurley et al. thus provide a theory that 
not only builds upon humor studies in key ways, but also suggests why we might have 
humor to begin with. 
In this context, the philosophical triad articulates explicit feminist considerations. 
Turning to the question of why gender differences exist in relation to humor, Hurley et al. 
assert that disparities between humor production in men and women are ultimately 
socially influenced.245 Men have effected a situation in which they are seen as more 
capable via wit in contrast to women as subservient “appreciators of men’s wit,” and 
Hurley et al. consider this all the more reason “to applaud the women who brave the 
stand-up stage, despite this social force.”246 The team thus seems willing to embrace a 
feminist expansion of who is permitted to tell jokes. 
 Despite this brief feminist message, the trio is less impressive when (briefly) 
theorizing humor’s relationship to power and hierarchy. They assert that humor is indeed 
deployed to point out another’s deficiencies to cast “the humorist and the addressed 
audience” as superior, harkening back to the claims of superiority and disparagement 
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theories.247 However, this use of humor is “not its original or even secondary purpose,”248 
and hence not central in comparison to an embodied mind’s evolutionary enjoyment of 
debugging its own mistakes. Similarly, when considering humor’s deployment as a social 
corrective, Hurley et al. emphasize that it mostly serves to “point our mistakes” in what 
amounts to a gentle encouragement that others revise their behaviors.249 In focusing on 
humor as an AI-complete problem, their approach has effectively been to build a purpose 
for humor from the ground up for an embodied individual who is only secondarily a 
creature brought up into a social and hierarchical world. 
Hurley et al.’s attempts at a social and political philosophy is thus only an 
afterthought to their typical focus on variations of incongruity theory, and is at best 
skeletal and gestural. In contrast, I am interested in a social and political philosophy of 
humor that centers the power and hierarchical relationships of our social world first, and 
takes this seriously as a core (and not merely secondary or tertiary) lens of approach to 
the subject. Rousseau’s laughter of mockers may indeed be attempting to “correct” 
women’s self-assertions and recruit others to laugh along as well, but this occurs in a 
complicated relationship with norms and patriarchy that cannot be adequately explicated 
when the politics of humor is displaced to the backburner of the analysis. Likewise, if 
considered as a social corrective, Rousseau’s scenario plugs into larger systematic forces 
and more precise operations of social power than a simple gentle encouragement. Hurley 
                                               








et al.’s account is thus only adequate for a reader satisfied by the faintest gestures to a 
person’s wider social world. 
For these reasons, I am unsatisfied with contemporary comprehensive 
philosophies of humor that have formed alongside the consolidation of humor studies and 
its taxonomies. In keeping with the general state of the field, they tend to prioritize the 
legacy of non-effective humor linked with the history of depoliticized incongruity 
theories at the expense of centering the relationship between humor and power. 
 
When Power was Free to Laugh: Revisiting Superiority Theory 
 What, then, does it look like when theories of humor center power and social 
relationships? In this section I look at the humor theories grouped under “superiority” and 
“disparagement” as important historical examples that are nonetheless limited for a 
contemporary feminist social and political philosophy of humor. The reason why I find 
this useful is that in contrast to contemporary humor philosophy, the theories grouped 
under the rubric of disparagement of superiority theory centered power. Morreall traces 
superiority theory back to Plato’s Philebus250 due to Socrates’ discussion of laughter as a 
device through which people can level down “the ridiculous,” those inferior and viceful 
others who prop themselves up through imagined wealth, beauty, or superiority.251 
Morreall lists Aristotle as a similarly superiority-focused philosopher of humor252 due to 
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his emphasis on comedy involving “an imitation of men worse than average” on account 
of their “ludicrous” ugliness.253 While this approach falls prey to the cluster of critiques 
that would lump in Plato’s and Aristotle’s insights with the broader failure to identify the 
proper necessary conditions of humor, Aristotle shares with Plato the characterization of 
comedy and laughter as targeted at inferior persons, and hence an emphasis on the 
relationship between humor, power, and social order. In this view it is not only that I 
laugh to simply disparage you or cast myself as superior, but also because you turn 
against the order of things in ways I find positively laughable. Why should you have that 
crooked smile, those awkward gestures, and insipid goals? It is all very ridiculous in 
comparison to the rest of the human and natural order, you are ridiculous in turn, and I 
cast my laughter upon you so you are marked as laughable. Or: I am laughed at, I have 
done wrong, I represent foolishness, and I am laughed at in turn.  In this context, the 
analysis of humor in some of its oldest accounts cannot be cleaved from an analysis of 
social dynamics and power. 
 In modern philosophy, Hobbes discusses power-laden laughter in the context of 
feelings of superiority that accompany laughing at others.254 Hobbes is thus often framed 
as the quintessential superiority theorist due to his emphasis on humor as a passion 
radiating from superiority and triumph.255 The Hobbesian view presents a laugh that 
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revels in its power. I have triumphed over you, and laughter’s levity lifts me above your 
feebleness to truly delight in my magnificence.  
 In these cases, though Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes emphasize relationships of 
power that may tie to a social order or hierarchy, but they do not explicitly discuss larger 
social structures. However, Bergson, who is frequently discussed in the context of both 
superiority theory and his own distinct mechanical theory of humor,256 explicitly frames 
humor as a practice of societal policing. Though Morreall appropriates Bergson’s 
emphasis on humor as an “anesthesia of the heart,257 Bergson also distinctly emphasizes 
humor as a force of social correction against those who become rigid and nonadaptable in 
the context of society and life in general.258 Looking through Bergsonian eyes, when 
encountered by clockwork souls, absentminded ticks, and simulacrums in human drag, 
society imbues us with laughter in the name of life so to avoid its reduction to repetitious 
mechanism. And if we find ourselves repetitive, constantly repeating ourselves, saying 
the same message over and over again, laughter serves as punishment for turning against 
vitality. Bergson thus presents humor here as the operation through which society molds 
its subjects and their gestures towards a more socially acceptable, even if supposedly 
more vital, way of being. Bergson’s approach thus deploys laughter and humor as tools 
for mass social correction, with each laugh and giggle serving as a defense mechanism to 
protect the vital social organism.  
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 In each of these approaches, there is a richer topography centering power, 
hierarchy, and social control than the box of superiority can contain. These theories are 
not solely about one person mistreating another, but also a more robust way of situating 
humor in a social world with others involving differences in power and differing 
placements according to the social order. In this context, it is useful to consider that 
superiority theory is not a static, dead, category, but in rather the origins of a social and 
political philosophy that was too quickly confined to humor studies’ attic. By locking 
these theories into such a general grouping, their complicated and differing approaches to 
humor’s power lose due consideration. 
 However, this does not mean that my turn towards a feminist social and political 
philosophy of humor requires directly returning to these old philosophies of humor. 
While I find their emphasis on humor and power relations useful, none of these theories 
focus on gender and patriarchy to an extent that would be satisfying for a feminist 
theorist. The social and political philosophy of humor from Plato to Bergson also seems 
at best neutral and at worst enthusiastic about humor as a means of establishing unequal 
power relationships or reinforcement of the status quo. Bergson, for example, seems 
positively excited that humor as a means for social control can rightly contest automatism 
in favor of life.259 In contrast, my feminist perspective leads me to be more suspicious 
about top-down deployments of social correctives, given the extent to which patriarchy 
has shaped a sexist social order. 
                                               




For this reason, as an example of more contemporary considerations of humor and 
its power, I will turn to feminist and transfeminist theory to consider the social and 
political effects of humor when deployed on the stage of stand-up comedy and in public 
space. Doing this will not only help work towards an explicit feminist social and political 
consideration of humor, but also indicate that such a feminist social and political 
philosophy of humor needs to go farther into considering humor’s operations and 
transform the landscape of humor studies even in the realm of incongruous acts and 
wordplay. 
 
Laughter and Misogyny: Kate Manne and Stand-Up Comedy 
 In Down Girl, Kate Manne sets out to define misogyny as distinct from sexism, 
objectification, and patriarchy. Specifically, Manne describes sexism as a branch of 
justification for the oppression of women, misogyny as a branch that enforces the 
oppression of women, and patriarchal ideology as the underlying systematic ideology of 
male dominance over women that utilizes both sexism and misogyny.260 In this system, 
Manne emphasizes that misogyny “functions to enforce and police women’s 
subordination and to uphold male dominance, against the backdrop of other intersecting 
systems of oppression and vulnerability, dominance and disadvantage, as well as 
disparate material resources, enabling and constraining social structures, institutions, 
bureaucratic mechanisms, and so on.”261 Misogyny is thus the “law enforcement branch” 
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responding to potential threats to the norms of patriarchy.262 In addition to including 
violence and threats, Manne associates with misogyny a long list of actions aiming to 
punish, deter, or warn, including “ridiculing, humiliating, [and] mocking,” indicating that 
practices related to laughter could be used for misogyny.263 I will argue in this section 
that Manne’s account of misogyny can be used to explain laughter targeting women with 
more explanatory power through a focus on social and political dynamics than an 
individualist ethics of humor. 
 I opened this section with a discussion of Rousseau’s “laughter of mockers,” tying 
it with the association between rape and laughter by both comedian Daniel Tosh and a 
student at Steubenville in 2012. Considered in more detail, I will argue here that Tosh’s 
actions were an instance of misogyny going beyond an individual ethical relationship into 
a broader system of inequality targeting women for punishment and silencing under 
patriarchy.  
In 2012 comedian Daniel Tosh, star of Comedy Central's then highest rated show 
Tosh.0, which continued its high ratings streak in 2018,264 told a rape joke at the Laugh 
Factory in that was afterwards widely discussed on the Internet. News of the joke broke 
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when a woman described her experience attending Tosh’s show on Tumblr, a popular 
(but recently declining) blogging and social networking website, writing, 
So Tosh then starts making some very generalizing, declarative statements about  
rape jokes always being funny, how can a rape joke not be funny, rape is 
hilarious, etc. I don’t know why he was so repetitive about it but I felt provoked 
because I, for one, DON’T find them funny and never have. So I didnt appreciate 
Daniel Tosh (or anyone!) telling me I should find them funny. So I yelled out, 
“Actually, rape jokes are never funny!”265 
 
After this, Tosh responded with, “Wouldn’t it be funny if that girl got raped by like, 5 
guys right now? Like right now? What if a bunch of guys just raped her…”266 She then 
left the show while the audience watched and laughed at her. Her challenge to Tosh’s 
attempt to cast rape jokes as universally funny was thus responded to by “the laugh of 
mockers” encountered through Rousseau, this time laden with violence through its 
threatening style of targeting in front of a hostile audience, her disagreement trivialized as 
not worth confronting on its own terms. The woman who objected to Tosh, explaining 
her decision to speak out against his assertion that rape jokes are funny, wrote,  
I did it because, even though being “disruptive” is against my nature, I felt that 
sitting there and saying nothing, or leaving quietly, would have been against my 
values as a person and as a woman. I don’t sit there while someone tells me how I 
should feel about something as profound and damaging as rape.267  
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And yet, her attempt to break the silence about rape in the comedy club was shifted back 
into silence when Tosh and his audience joined in laughter against her words.  
In this instance, Tosh is not using laughter to explicitly assert that claims of 
having been raped should be silenced as lies in the same way as Rousseau, but his 
technique of humor nonetheless silences the actuality of rape. By claiming that rape jokes 
are always funny, Tosh is condoning his following action of using a joke about a woman 
being raped to silence her words. He is also trivializing, through this violent joke, the fact 
that rape is already used to silence and restrict the lives of women, presenting the idea 
itself of a woman being raped into silence as something for the audience to laugh at. 
Additionally, Tosh is condoning jokes such as the one given during his comedy special, 
Happy Thoughts: 
I play practical jokes on [my sister] constantly though. I got her so good a few 
weeks ago. I replaced her pepper spray with silly string. Anyway, that night she 
got raped. And she called me the next day going, “You son of a bitch! You got me 
so good!...As soon as I started spraying him in the face I’m like DANIEL! This is 
gonna really hurt!”268 
 
A significant element of this joke involves the simultaneous presentation of a casual 
reaction to a practical joke with the seriousness of rape. However, laughing at a 
juxtaposition between rape and triviality, which may initially seem edgy or transgressive, 
does not confront the actuality that rape is already often trivialized and dismissed. 
                                               






Through his joke, Tosh is reinforcing already existing patterns that result in the silencing 
of women who were raped and silence about rape in general. 
  At the time popular comedian Louis C.K., who later himself admitted to sexual 
misconduct against women comedians in the form of ejaculating in front of them,269 was 
asked to weigh in on the Tosh controversy by fellow male comedian Jon Stewart on The 
Daily Show. C. K. remarked, 
“I’ve read some blogs during this whole thing that enlightened me about some 
things I didn’t know. This woman said how rape is something that polices 
women’s lives. They have a narrow corridor that they can’t go out late, they can’t 
go to certain neighborhoods, they can’t dress a certain way, ‘cause they might 
get…so that’s now part of me now...”270 
 
C. K. remained silent about women also getting policed when interacting with predatory 
comedians like himself. Nevertheless, C. K.’s response began to acknowledge that jokes 
about rape can be silencing and contribute to the silencing of the actuality of rape and the 
threats of rape that women must deal with every day. 
In the same interview, though C. K. criticizes the inability of stand-up comedians 
to take criticism, he also claims that “any joke about anything bad is great,” including 
rape. Earlier in the interview C. K. emphasizes the importance of dialogue, conversation, 
and listening, so it could be that he believed jokes about bad topics that are often not 
discussed are great because they use the opportunity that a humor venue offers to open 
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the floor for conversation rather than continue the pattern of silence. However, even this 
perhaps overly charitable interpretation fails to recognize that the way these jokes are told 
vary and can often lead to further silence, such as the effect that Tosh’s rape joke had in 
driving the woman who challenged him from the room. C. K.’s defense of Tosh also 
ignored the complicated ways of jokes and laughter can restrict the terms through which 
people can speak to begin with, such as when the woman attempted to speak about a 
subject often pushed into silence in front of a laughing man and his laughing crowd. This 
lack of complexity is also present in Tosh’s apology tweets on Twitter, where he wrote,  
all the out of context misquotes aside, i'd like to sincerely apologize” but then 
clarified his original intention with, "the point i was making before i was heckled 
is there are awful things in the world but you can still make jokes about them 
#deadbabies271 
 
Even if Tosh intended to be sincere, the point fails to recognize the ability of not only 
Tosh’s and his audience’s laughter but also the capacity for the laughter of mockers more 
broadly to differentially silence groups of people and their experiences. 
One response to the discussion of Tosh's joke, made by comedian Dom Irrera, 
was to remark, "Do you think all the things we say we mean, do you think he really 
thought that? How stupid is the overreaction to this? You might as well say that about all 
comedy then."272 Ironically, Irrera was correct that this critique might be used for a larger 
critique of comedy, though he intended to join the chorus of people defending comedy 
from the voices of the outraged. Among the outraged voices of male comedians, the focus 
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on a misunderstood intention through Tosh, the importance of joking about bad events 
through C. K., and the distinction between what comedians say and what they mean 
through Irrera, links back to individualist ethical theories of humor as discussed by 
Morreall and Carroll. Carroll’s interpretation of rape jokes according to the intentions of 
the joke teller,273 thus granting Tosh priority over his interpretation over its impact on the 
woman in the audience. C. K. does acknowledge, like Morreall, that such jokes can signal 
a problematic distancing between the unaffected comedian and the effect of rape on many 
women’s lives but does not acknowledge that the joke itself could be participating in the 
silencing oppression imposed by rape culture rather than merely unethically insensitive. 
Finally, Irrera’s words echoes the focus of much of humor theory outside the ethics of 
humor, namely, that the woman in the audience misunderstood that Tosh’s humor is 
doing something else entirely than creating an ethical or political situation. 
 The proposed approaches by male comedians and the more sophisticated 
theoretical frameworks they echo potentially miss the role of misogyny in the situation 
created by Tosh. The comedian’s stage is a space of attention, where the comedian 
delivers jokes for the varying approval or disapproval of their audience, expressed as 
roaring laughter, clapping, awkward spare laughter, damning silences, and even more 
damning booing sounds. This attention and response dynamic centers the people on stage 
while the audience reacts primarily as a crowd, not intended to draw attention to any 
individuated person audibly responding in the crowd but instead to continue drawing 
their attention towards the performer. Hence, heckling from the crowd is usually 
considered a particularly egregious sin because it disrupts the attention due to the 
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comedian and redirects it to a now individualized person who is not due attention 
standing out from the crowd. 
 Because of the dynamics of attention in performances of stand-up comedy, Tosh’s 
action of verbally going after and directing his audience to ridicule a heckler from his 
audience may be considered his right as a performer on stage. At the time comedian Jim 
Norton took up this perspective by placing blame on the woman heckler, writing on 
Twitter, “Some attention-seeking woman heckled a comedian, so if anything, she owes 
him an apology for being a rude brat. #SayYoureSorryToots.”274 It might thus be 
tempting for some to dismiss Tosh’s response as a justified takedown of a heckler that 
may or may not have gone too far. 
 Centering the social and political dynamics of the situation reveals the dynamics 
of misogyny at play in the situation that the conversations of many comedians and the 
humor theorists they echo have ignored. Tosh was not only a comedian on stage 
encountering a heckler in a solely one-on-one encounter, but he is also a man taking up 
the central space of the stand-up comedy stage that has often pushed women out, as 
indicated by C. K.’s sexual harassment of women stand-up comics. Tosh was also not 
only a comedian dealing with a rude heckler, but also a man who was met with response 
by a woman after using his comedy platform to claim all rape jokes as funny in front of 
her. Finally, Tosh was not only a comedian doing his best to shut down a heckler by 
turning the crowd against them, but also a man referencing the threat of rape to join 
others against a woman in his audience. This indicates that the situation of the comedy 
                                               





stage at work here is not a depoliticized situation of “mere comedy,” but instead a place 
where the silencing dynamics of misogyny are in play to empower Tosh and push a 
woman who disagrees with him away from the attention of his crowd and out of the room 
by punishing her with the specifically gendered threat of gang rape. 
 Tosh’s threat of rape from the comedy stage as a tactic of gendered silencing is a 
helpful clue that he is exacting misogyny against the woman who spoke against him, but 
more details are required to detail the specific operations of misogyny in this political 
situation. In Down Girl Manne argues that a key part of the male dominance that fuels 
misogyny is the differential norm of giving between men and women. Specifically, 
women are expected to be “human givers” and provide “moral goods and resources” to 
men as part of their moral and social role in society.275 Manne emphasizes, “...women are 
tasked not only with performing certain forms of emotional, social, domestic, sexual, and 
reproductive labor but are also supposed to so in a loving and caring manner or 
enthusiastic spirit…”276 While women are expected to primarily give in this way, gender 
norms often impose expectations that men are entitled to and owed attention, favor, and 
care from women.277 When women refuse to play into this entitlement, Manne provides 
the analogy of a restaurant customer “who expects to not only be treated deferentially - 
the customer is always right - but also to be served...attentively with a smile.”278 When 
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not met with the deference and enthusiasm owed to his position, and even more so when 
expected to give attention and service to women, Manne points out that men often behave 
like an angry customer who is not given the service they expect from their server.279 
Manne thus emphasizes that when women do not fulfill their roles as “human giver” in 
relation to entitled men, men often react with overblown frustration, anger, or even 
heightened violence to reimpose the gendered norms of domination that supposedly 
entitle them to special service. 
Looking back at Tosh’s reaction to the woman “heckler” after considering the 
dynamics of misogyny indicates that Tosh using gang rape against the woman in his 
audience who challenged his freewheeling approach to rape jokes was an instance of 
misogyny. Considering my earlier point that Tosh was not just a comedian on stage, but 
also a man occupying a position where he is entitled to a specific kind of attention from 
the audience, the woman was not merely contesting the norms of stand-up comedy but 
also challenging gender norms, for which she was punished through Tosh’s misogyny. 
The woman in the audience refused to give to Tosh the approval he was accustomed to 
not only as a comedian but also as a man who tells rape jokes, and she stood as especially 
threatening to not only challenging his stand-up comedy practice as a “heckler” but also 
as a woman directly challenging his right to make rape jokes in front of others. Met with 
a woman challenging on the stage, the locus of the attention and praise due to him, Tosh 
lashed out against her with laughter like Rousseau with the mask, reasserting his power to 
make rape jokes uncontested in the form of a threat punishing a woman for refusing to 
accept his entitlement to tell and enjoy any kind of joke. The laughter of mockers is thus 




a form of misogyny, and a form of social correction following Bergson for women who 
refuse to toe the line of letting male comedians say whatever they want onstage. Tosh 
was thus not merely participating in an individual unethical distancing or exercising his 
right as stand-up comedian against the abstract figure of a heckler as sworn enemy to 
stand-up comedy, but also directing misogyny against a woman to silence her and invite 
the crowd to participate in his misogynistic punishment through laughter. Although this 
analysis does not merely reiterate superiority theories of laughter and humor, it does 
center power relations to capture a dynamic of laughter and misogyny that has otherwise 
been ignored or obscured. 
 By focusing on this dynamic between men and women in the context of laughter 
and comedy, I am not claiming that the use of laughter by men is essentially oppressive 
in contrast to the use of laughter by women as essentially aimed at liberation. This would 
be an obvious simplification, and I will directly challenge theories of humor as primarily 
liberatory or oppressive in chapters VI and VII. As Kate Manne argues, misogyny not 
only punishes transgressions from women but also rewards women who successfully 
practice the norms such as “constancy and loyalty” towards men,280 and it is thus not 
surprising if there were also women in the audience joining in laughter against the 
woman who spoke out against Tosh. Likewise, men may use laughter to stand against 
misogyny or refuse to laugh altogether and may be met with punishment or ridicule from 
others as a result. As Manne emphasizes, misogyny is primarily a system aimed at 
punishing “‘bad’ women” and policing their behavior, which also involves systems of 
                                               




reward for women who conform to the norms of patriarchy and punishment against men 
who contest or refuse to perpetuate norms of sex inequality.281 It is thus important to be 
careful to not be too reductive during an analysis of power and laughter, even while 
noting pervasive patterns such as the use of humor, laughter, and comedy for misogyny. 
 Caveats aside, I have aimed to show that Tosh’s actions require an understanding 
of power and social hierarchies to fully capture the dynamics of misogyny involved 
rather than a focus on apolitical incongruity, individualist distancing, or the humorist’s 
intentions divorced from social and political life. I have also primarily discussed a 
dynamic of humor and laughter as social and political that took place through a 
relationship between a person on stage and a person in the audience, so more analysis is 
required to address the complicated dynamics of humor and power in public and in 
person beyond stand-up comedy. I will thus focus on the death of Tyra Hunter in the next 
section to discuss the relationship between laughter, power, and emotion in public space 
before concluding this chapter. 
 
Laughter, Emotions, and the Restriction of Public Space: Transphobic Laughter 
         Rousseau imagines women who report rape being met with “the laughter of 
mockers,” and there are more contemporary examples of mockers deploying laughter and 
humor in reaction to the presence of people who deviate from a norm in public space, as I 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. I focus specifically on trans studies and 
transfeminism as a branch of feminism located at the intersections between women’s and 
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trans liberation, because trans people as a group are frequently met with violent derision 
and disrespectful humor about their lives. 
         In trans studies, the death of Tyra Hunter has often been referred to as an example 
for discussing transphobia in public space.282 Hunter was a 24-year-old black trans 
woman who died in 1995 due to violent EMT inaction after she received treatable injuries 
from a car crash. Instead of giving Hunter emergency medical care, after discovering that 
Hunter had a penis, the pair of technicians deployed to help her instead exchanged 
laughter and disparaging jokes about her condition.283 Hunter’s death is thus relevant for 
considering connections between laughter, gender, and race in public space because 
EMTs laughed at her body rather than getting her the immediate care she needed to 
survive a car crash. 
         Initially, it may be tempting to fall back on individualist humor ethics to account 
for the unethical use of humor and laughter by EMTs. Under Hurley, Dennett, and 
Adam’s account, the EMTs’ humor can be read as a result of their realization that 
Hunter’s body did not conform to their expectations, and the mirth that interrupted her 
care is a mirthful reward for their thwarted expectations. However, this ignores the larger 
social context within which trans bodies are reduced to objects of laughter and jest, since 
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the effects of this laughter, joke-telling, and their resulting violence cannot be understood 
separately from systematic social inequalities. As a black trans woman, Hunter was 
already in a precarious position in relation to structural violence and systematic 
discrimination, and the laughter and joke-telling participated in this dynamic by meeting 
her threatened life with ridicule rather than with care. Thus, the response of the EMTs is 
not merely a neutral personal realization that their assumptions were incorrect, but also 
ties into larger patterns of derision, dehumanization, inequality, and precarity. 
         Likewise, we might follow Carroll to argue that these EMTs were unethically 
reinforcing problematic social norms, and that the intention of their laughter and humor is 
clearly based on transphobic derision based on norms about bodies. However, issues of 
determining intention aside, this still does not address the operations and effects through 
which humor was deployed against Hunter and is directed against other trans people in 
public space. Even when Carroll’s questionable focus on intention is bracketed out, his 
theory, like Hurley et. al’s, suffers from a lack of social and political development and is 
thus unable to think the political practices of humor beyond a rough sketch of individual 
intention. 
         Interestingly, Morreall’s theory of unethical humor seems to be the most 
compelling in this context. Morreall focuses on humor and laughter as a potentially 
unethical practice that distances people from confronting stereotypes or giving proper 
concern to others. In this context, then, Morreall might argue that the EMTs practiced an 
unethical distancing through humor and laughter of themselves from Hunter’s 
predicament. This displacement resulted in their lack of attention to Hunter and the care 
she needed, resulting in her death at the hands of violent negligence. However, Morreall’s 
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argument about unethical humor relies on humor as practice as disengagement. I will 
argue instead that humor’s relationship with transphobia is more active, but to do this I 
must discuss transphobia and its relationship with humor and laughter in more detail. 
         To argue that transphobic humor and laughter are more politically engaged than 
Morreall suggests, I will discuss an instance of a cis (non-trans) person experiencing 
transphobia, and the role laughter, humor, and mockery played in restricting and 
endangering their presence in public space. In 2013, director Ali Coates recorded 
performance artist Signe Pierce walking around Myrtle Beach in South Carolina at night 
for a short film called American Reflexxx.284 The film also involves a social experiment, 
as Pierce is wearing a reflective mask obscuring her face, a short blue dress, and lime 
green high heels, with the film centering the reactions of passersby through subtitles and 
occasional disorienting video edits. Throughout the night Pierce experiences 
dehumanizing speech, sexual harassment, a violent shove, and the accumulation of a mob 
that starts following her around from place to place. Due to the combination of her dress, 
mask, and poses, Pierce’s place as a spectacle and target of the crowd is also informed by 
transphobia as she is frequently called out to be a trans woman or as “really a man.” 
         The context of a cis woman being read as a trans woman is interesting because it 
means that her body is taken up as a specific kind of problem in public space through 
both transphobia and misogyny (often called transmisogyny). As Talia Bettcher argues, 
trans women are often associated with the realm of “make believe,” entailing that their 
identities are seen as a form of dress-up or costume rather than as authentic or “real” as 
                                               





part of the “natural attitude” or gender and sex norms.285 This is interesting in the context 
of Pierce’s outfit, because her dress combined with her face-obscuring mirror mask signal 
to the onlookers that she might be in costume and hence actually a man or at least a false 
woman. Her mode of being in public space is that of someone whose gender is seen to be 
masquerade or artifice, like a trans woman, and the reaction to her presence in public 
space is thus a reaction to readings of her gendered style. 
         In this context, laughter, jeers, and mocking tones are deployed not as a form of 
disengagement or distancing but instead as part of the crowd’s engaged reaction to 
Pierce’s presence as costume/trans woman. Borrowing from the old superiority theorists 
permits a more detailed consideration of this derision than Morreall’s distancing affords, 
as the laughter of a crowd against Pierce’s presence in public space is not merely turning 
away but also a shared practice of the crowd attempting to bolster themselves before a 
trans woman’s unsettling appearance. Recall the discussion from the beginning of this 
chapter about Rousseau, the mask, and the “laughter of mockers” against women. Like 
Rousseau’s reflection on the boy and a mask, transphobic laughter appears as a way of 
disinvesting Pierce’s body of its power to disturb, the crowd raising themselves so far 
above her that violently pushing her over seems like a permissible response to the public 
situation of Coates’ appearance. Bergson would distinctly see this form of laughter as a 
social corrective, as Pierce is being met with mockful scorn and her presence is indicated 
as unwelcome unless she changes her ways to better fit the regulated gendered ecosystem 
of public space. Like with misogyny, the intersection between transmisogyny and 
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laughter is an interaction between people in a social and political context constituted by 
imbalances in power. 
         However, other than Rousseau’s sexism and Bergson’s emphasis on societal 
correction through laughter, these approaches to superiority say little about the regulation 
of gender specifically in public space, whether discussing Tosh’s misogyny or the 
laughing misogyny of a transphobic crowd. Furthermore, Rousseau may even approve of 
such as scornful approach to a woman acting far beyond the brainwashing he wishes for 
Sophie, and Bergson considers laughter to be a benign social corrective. These theories 
are thus mostly helpful for drawing out the engaged practice of humor by people and 
societies, but a more explicit feminist analysis is required to discuss gendered bodily 
being in this situation of power and laughter in public space. 
         I thus find it helpful to turn to Viviane Namaste’s discussion of genderbashing in 
Invisible Lives, as she focuses specifically on gender, policing, and violence in public and 
private space. Namaste builds upon discussions of queerbashing against gay men and 
lesbian women to argue that violence against sexual and gender minorities are often a 
matter of “policing gender presentation through private and public space.”286 Namaste 
notes that because sexuality is frequently read off of gender presentation, situations of 
violence and harassment frequently are based on normative assumptions about gender 
expression, including the use of pejorative names and slurs that often are used to justify 
an attack.287 Because public (and private) space are regulated based on gender norms, 
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Namaste asserts that trans people (and especially trans women) have a higher risk of 
being violently put in check for daring to enter public space.288 
         Namaste’s analysis is helpful for understanding both the violent reactions to 
Pierce’s costumed presence in public space and its relationship with laughter, mockery, 
and humor-making among the crowd. If Pierce is experiencing, as Namaste suggests, a 
reaction to her presence as someone perceived to be a trans woman in public space, then 
gender norms also bring Pierce into contact with violence and other forms of expulsion. 
Namaste focuses specifically on violence and genderbashing as a parallel to 
queerbashing, but this expulsion need not reach the level of the person who pushed Pierce 
onto the sidewalk and caused her leg to bleed. Borrowing from the insights of the old 
superiority theorists and centering the social and political philosophy of humor in the 
context of feminist analysis, laughter and jeers serve as part of a spectrum of responding 
to a body marked as having an abnormal gender (and read as like a woman and hence a 
target for misogyny) when daring to enter policed sites of gender normativity. This 
analysis shares with Rousseau, Hobbes, Bergson, and others an emphasis on power 
differentials that influence deployments of laughter and humor. But by centering a 
feminist (and here transfeminist) critique, this analysis also avoids seeing this form of 
expulsion as a good for society or the “superior” laughing individuals, instead situating 
the deployment of laughter, humor, and jeering as part of the fabric of regulated control 
of space under patriarchy including misogyny and transmisogyny specifically. 
                                               




         Returning to Hunter, her death was not only the result of individual unethical 
applications of humor by the EMTs, but also part of a larger situation of oppression in 
which people engage with trans lives through derision and ridicule as a common 
collective practice in public (and private) space. Humor is thus not only a way through 
which individuals cause each other harm, but also a larger network of people engaging in 
complicity with (and resistance against) systematic norms that mark some bodies and 
lives as threatening and not worthy of care. Hunter was not merely laughed at due to the 
unethical actions of two EMTs, but also the larger society that fosters transphobic 
expectations and reactions to bodies that do not fit transphobic, racist, and sexist norms, 
related to the mechanics of misogyny discussed in the previous section. 
 Hunter’s death at the hand of laughing EMTs also indicates the rich social and 
political emotional life of laughter as it connects with oppression and violence. I 
mentioned in the previous chapter that along with power, the emotional life of humor has 
often been decentered to focus instead on less messy necessary and sufficient conditions 
of humor. Dennett, Hurley, and Adams consider social and political uses of humor to be 
secondary to its purposes as an evolutionarily developed reward for epistemic 
debugging.289 In contrast, the laughing reaction of the EMTs to Hunter as she was dying 
goes beyond the emphasis on humor as primarily an epistemic emotion to humor in 
interaction with other emotions as part of a political situation. It is thus useful to expand 
an account of the relationship between humor and emotions to include emotions other 
than mirth that are central to understanding the political life of humor. This emotional life 
                                               




is already suggested by some historical superiority theories of laughter and humor, such 
as the emphasis Hobbes gives to the passions as a link between laughter and a distinct 
feeling of superiority or power over others.290 Rousseau too suggests that laughter can be 
used against objects that cause fear to reduce their power, as I have mentioned several 
times in this chapter. To develop this link between social and political laughter and 
emotions with an explicitly feminist analysis, I will draw from scholarship on emotions 
and affect by Sara Ahmed centering emotions, culture, and politics as intertwined.291 
 In The Cultural Politics of Emotion Sara Ahmed emphasizes that disgust is 
frequently mediated by cultural meanings of emotions that stick to some objects and 
people to signify them as dangerous, polluting, sickening, contaminating, and too close 
for comfort in a way that demands reactions such as expulsion. Ahmed writes,  
To name something as disgusting – typically, in the speech act, “That’s 
disgusting!” – is performative. It relies on previous norms and conventions of 
speech, and it generates the object that it names (the disgusting object/event). To 
name something as disgusting is not to make something out of nothing. But to say 
something is disgusting is still to “make something”; it generates a set of effects, 
which then adhere as a disgusting object.292 
 
Ahmed emphasizes that although disgust does not attach to just any object or person, it 
arises from a fertile ground of norms to performatively name the object or person as 
disgusting. In this context, disgust relies on the “historicity of signification,” and hence is 
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not merely natural but instead accrued through history and culture.293 Bodies become 
threatening not in and of themselves, but through “an effect of the histories of contact 
between bodies, objects, and signs.”294 The circulation of emotions such as disgust and 
their stickiness to specific objects and bodies are thus a social relationship based on 
interaction deserving of political analysis rather than simply attributed to unmediated 
natural causes, habits, or dispositions. 
 Ahmed notes that in some cases of disgust, the object or person associated with 
disgust is seen to be a too close, threatening, and beneath the disgusted. Ahmed writes,   
...the bodies of others become the salient object; they are constructed as being 
hateful and sickening only insofar as they have got too close. They are 
constructed as non-human, as beneath and below the bodies of the disgusted. 
Indeed, through the disgust reaction, ‘belowness’ and ‘beneathness’ become 
properties of their bodies. They embody that which is lower than human or civil 
life.295 
 
With disgust, encountered objects may be encountered as not only bounded outside 
human and civil life but also below it, with the othered and lowered status of the 
encountered object combining with the need to remove it from threatening close contact. 
It is thus not a surprise that the circulation of disgust is also frequently a circulation of 
dehumanization, neglect, and violence. 
 The circulation of disgust emotions likely played a role in the death of Hunter, 
brought about by the EMTs reacting through laughter. If misogyny, as explained by 
Manne, frames women as human givers owing services to men, transmisogyny also 
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frames trans women in relation to their utility to men and to the larger situation of gender 
domination, primarily considered conditional or subhuman lives according to expected 
gender roles. As Bettcher argues, this subordination occurs at the level of ideology with 
the “natural attitude” that either trivializes all bodies falling outside non-trans norms or 
casts them as inherently threatening or violent. As Namaste argues, the regulation of trans 
bodies is also institutionalized in the construction and policing of public space. The 
bodies of trans women, as indicated by the prevalence with which they are consumed 
within pornography and pushed into sex work amidst other forms of mass culture 
marginalization and the frequent denial of material subsistence through expulsion from 
the labor force, are frequently tethered to the system in which women are punished for 
not serving the desires of men as human givers.296 But due to their deviation from norms 
about women’s bodies and from expectations about the ideal role of women in 
relationships, trans women are also frequently not granted the “human giver” role 
described by Manne as a key factor of misogyny. Rather, through the distortions 
highlighted by Bettcher that enact transphobia as a reductive trivialization and 
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sexualization of the other, trans women can be appropriated into this role but also easily 
thrown away as mere refuse, capable of fitting the needs of the patriarchal state and the 
individual man but also not considered a clearly appropriate choice for the human giver 
role. Accorded a specific subhuman or outside-human status through ideology and 
institutions, the bodies and lives of trans women are thus frequently used or expunged 
from civil society as is convenient for effecting and maintaining dominant gendered 
power relationships.  
The encounter with Hunter’s body by the EMTs is thus not merely a reaction to a 
trans body that is unexpected, but also a reaction fueled through a specific imbalanced 
gendered economy that centers some gender roles (men) as receiving attention and care 
in relation to other gender roles (women) that are expected to serve as human givers (via 
Manne’s analysis), with the bodies of trans women frequently serving on an as-needed or 
as-wanted basis for more underground forms of male desire. An unwanted trans woman, 
and especially an unexpected and unwanted trans women’s body thus circulates through 
emotions such as disgust, through which any contact with a trans woman might be 
experienced emotionally as dangerously close such that she must be pushed away as a 
dangerous outlier of gendered norms. As Namaste emphasizes, this emotional encounter 
is often not solely about gender, as it may also circulate histories of disgust around black 
bodies under racism, women’s bodies under patriarchy, and sex worker’s bodies under 
sexualized and racialized capitalism.297 Disgust thus frequently characterizes the cultural 
circulation of emotions around trans women’s bodies, further distributed by productions 
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of mass culture such as The Jerry Springer Show that frame the revelation of an 
unwanted or unknown trans woman as a scene of spectacle and disgust, revealed not to be 
a human giver but instead an abject form of gender masked through deception. 
This relationship between the social and political circulation of disgust explains 
the social and political deployment of laughter used by the EMTs against Hunter. The 
realization that someone is a trans woman, whether mistaken or otherwise, carries with it 
not just shock but also the danger of having been attracted to her or having shared a 
world with her. This potential reaction of shock and danger also extends to people who 
may have unexpectedly provided intimacy or care to a trans woman, as is the occupation 
of EMTs. Ahmed emphasizes that disgust not only involves a contact between the 
disgusted and the object or other circulated as disgusting, but also a reaction of pushing 
away. Ahmed writes,  
Disgust is clearly dependent upon contact: it involves a relationship of touch and 
proximity between the surfaces of bodies and objects. That contact is felt as an 
unpleasant intensity: it is not that the object, apart from the body, has the quality 
of ‘being offensive’, but the proximity of the object to the body is felt as 
offensive. The object must have got close enough to make us feel disgusted. As a 
result, while disgust over takes the body, it also takes over the object that 
apparently gives rise to it.298 
 
In addition to this relationship of contact and closeness Ahmed emphasizes that disgust 
motivates a relationship of pushing away, following the work of Julia Kristeva on 
abjection. Circulated through disgust, the presence of the disgusted risks undermining the 
stable walled-off self of the disgusted subject through its threatening permeability, and 
thus must be pushed away as abject.299 Returning to the EMTs, the emotions of disgust 
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refract the encountered black trans woman into a mode of too-close-and-must-be-pushed-
away, not merely the other of experience but also, following Julia Kristeva, the 
threatening abject whose denial is also the constitution of the man’s self as not interacting 
with a subhuman contingent giver. Transmisogyny here acts as the expulsion of a body 
that could be co-opted into service but merely on reserve or through sexualized curiosity, 
generally a danger to the social relations of gender and its connection with intimacy and 
care, hence circulating as disgust in interaction with a threatening body to be pushed 
away to preserve the self. Disgust is thus a strong contender to explain the reaction of the 
EMTs as they refused to do their job of caring for the sick and injured, and instead chose 
to laugh. 
When disgust has been circulated in the contact between a person and a body they 
hold as threatening, too close, and outside the civil duty to care as occupation, laughter 
serves as a potentially powerful antidote to the abject encounter. Rousseau framed 
laughter as a counter to fear in the form of the child encountering a mask, but laughter 
can no less be used as a response to the too-close and must-be-pushed-away abject 
encountered through the cultural life of emotions such as disgust. The EMTs, in contact 
with a black trans woman not experienced as a person but instead as a threatening 
subhuman presence through the circulation of cultural disgust, were able to change the 
terms of this contact through the response of laughter and its accompanying mirth and 
relief. As with Tosh’s deployment of laughter for the purposes of misogyny, the EMTs 
were able to change the terms of the confrontation through the transmisogyny of their 
laughter. The refracted encounter with Hunter’s critically injured living black trans body 
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through disgust was removed of its threatening too-close contact as the EMTs asserted 
their power over the situation through laughter.  
Earlier I explained that the analysis of Hurley, Dennett, and Adams falls short of 
capturing the social and political deployment of humor and laughter. In the case of the 
EMTs, Hurley et. al’s analysis of disparaging “humor in modern society” as not serving 
humor’s “original or even secondary purpose”300 falls even shorter. The EMTs were not 
solely disparaging through humor to make themselves or an audience look superior,301 
and they were not attempting to “gently encourag[e] revisions of behavior” by intending 
to correct Hunter’s body or very presence in public space.302 Rather, the EMTs dissolved 
their duty to provide intimate caring work for the sick and injured through an interaction 
between laughter and cultural emotions such as disgust. Here laughter and humor are no 
longer merely epistemic, depending on a cultural knowledge but also an interplay 
between social power and cultural emotion. Theorizing laughter and humor in a social 
world thus requires a robust framework that takes the social, political, cultural, and 
emotional into account without dismissing them as secondary to a more primary 
individualist nature of laughter and humor. Otherwise, great injustices through laughter 
such as the EMTs’ response to Tyra Hunter cannot be adequately explained in their 
complexity. 
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Finding More Power in Humor 
         In sum, in this chapter, I have argued that a social and political philosophy of 
humor has been neglected, and then suggested that feminist philosophy is an apt choice 
for theorizing humor, power, and hierarchy. To do this, I began by discussing Rousseau’s 
reflections on laughter in Emile, which I argue is part of a longstanding (and 
contemporary) trend of using humor as a force of restriction in public and private space. 
After this, I turned to popular discussions in the contemporary ethics of humor and 
emphasized that each lacks a sufficient social and political philosophy of humor that is 
influenced by their turn away from the social and political philosophy found in the 
category of “superiority theory.” I returned to the theories grouped as superiority, 
disparagement, or aggression theories of humor and emphasized that they distinctly 
center the role of power, hierarchical orders, and social control in the context of humor, 
which is missing from contemporary approaches in the philosophy of humor. I then 
ended by referring to feminist (and specifically transfeminist) theory to show that the 
social and political aspects of humor vis-à-vis patriarchy can be understood as an 
engaged enforcement of gender norms in public (and private) spaces through laughter and 
humor as violence. My aim with this tome of a chapter was, quite modestly, was to 
suggest that feminist theory (and philosophy I wager) is crucial for considering social and 
political dynamics of humor. 
         However, my final example is also limited. If we focus solely on laughing and 
humor as a matter of power, hierarchy, emotions, and policing in public and private 
space, we would only need a social and political philosophy for instances of laughing-at 
or humor aimed at a target. While this may seem like it is still an obvious win for an 
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account of social and political philosophy, having this limited focus does little to consider 
the “purer” and “loftier” types of humor such as wordplay that are held in such high 
esteem by incongruity theorists and others who tend to sap humor of its power in favor of 
watching its purified mechanisms dance. Rather than ceding this territory, I aim to argue 
that a much broader range of humor can be understood in their social and political 
dimensions. To do this, in the next chapter I will critique the “laughing feminist century” 
for simultaneously invoking an important space for considering the political potential of 
feminist laughter and humor while not going far enough to study the specific, detailed 


















FROM LAUGHTER TO PRACTICE: 
AN ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF HUMOR 
 
 
Feminist Laughter and Resistance on Film and in Text: A Question of Silence, Irigaray, 
Cixous, and Willett 
In Chapter II I appealed to Anca Parvulescu’s discussion of “the laughing feminist 
century” in Laughter: Notes on a Passion to indicate that feminist theory and philosophy 
provide an approach to humor and laughter that has been neglected in contemporary 
humor studies.303 Now that I have critiqued both interdisciplinary humor studies and 
philosophy of humor specifically for failing to center social and political concerns (let 
alone feminist concerns) in chapters II and III, I will critically engage with the 
topography of laughter and humor in feminist theory and feminist philosophy. 
Specifically I am interested in works of feminist philosophy that interrelate a situated 
subject with her social and political world in the context of humor. For this reason, I turn 
to feminist philosophers who consider the social and political possibilities of humor, such 
as Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and Cynthia Willett. 
Even as I appeal to the insights of feminist theory and philosophy of humor, this 
chapter will ultimately end with the sense that feminist work has yet to tackle an engaged 
social and political situation of humor. Specifically, I will argue in this chapter that while 
                                               




existing feminist theories of humor open an important space for laughter’s possibilities, 
they do not go far enough to examine specific practices of humor in social and political 
life, and hence are unable to respond to Kristeva’s charge that subversive speech may be 
at best an intimate revolt and at worst a collapse into madness before the ordered 
structure of the (patriarchal) world. To argue this, I begin by discussing relationships 
between laughter and resistance in the context of Marleen Gorris’ film A Question of 
Silence. Then I discuss central feminist theorists and philosophers of laughter who take 
up its revolutionary promises, including Irigaray, Cixous, and Willett. After this, I 
critique these theories for lacking a concrete analysis of humor in practice and discuss the 
work of Julia Kristeva, who introduces both limited and concrete perspectives on 
subversive speech and laughter. Finally, I suggest that the most important way to update 
the “laughing feminist century” for contemporary studies of humor is to turn to its 
concrete practice by a subject in social and political life, which I will explicate as 
humorwork in the next chapter. 
The classic 1982 feminist film A Question of Silence directed by Marleen Gorris 
focuses on a murder committed by a group of women in a shopping mall.304 At the 
beginning of the film three women, a waitress named Annie, a secretary named Andrea, 
and a housewife named Christine, are arrested by police to be confined until their trial. 
Over time, through conversations by law officials and flashbacks that piece together their 
story, the timeline of events leading to the murder in the boutique is revealed to the 
audience. Christine, who is shopping at the boutique with her daughter in a stroller, 





begins to place clothing into her bag while the shopkeeper seems distracted. The male 
shopkeeper notices the theft, walks over to Christine, grabs her bag, and takes the 
clothing out, scolding her. But in response, Christine continues taking garments, while 
the other women in the store watch. The other women join in, taking clothing from the 
boutique to place in their bags, until Annie, Christine, and Andrea group together around 
the perplexed boutique owner. Without exchanging a word, Christine eventually slaps 
him, while the two other women hit him with various objects, as the other women 
shoppers watch and the audience hears his death yells. Though no women at the scene, 
including Christine’s daughter, tell on the trio of women who killed the man, the police 
nonetheless find the boutique owner’s body having been kicked in and mutilated with his 
genitals destroyed beyond recognition, and they proceed to bring the women in. This is 
when the criminal psychologist and main character, Dr. Janine Van Den Bos, is called in 
to determine the three women’s sanity.    
When questioning the three women, Van Den Bos has trouble drawing out a 
satisfying explanation for the collective boutique homicide. Annie continuously talks, but 
does not provide Van Den Bos with clarifications about why she joined in the murder. 
Christine, as a sharp contrast, does not talk at all except for occasional drawings of homes 
and women in them, some depicting a man, woman, and child, and others with women 
together. Andrea responds to Van Den Bos, but only through challenges to her 
assumptions about the case and the women involved, constantly perplexing Van Den Bos 
on the subject of the women’s sanity. For example, when Van Den Bos asks if the murder 
would have happened had the boutique owner been a women, Andrea states matter of 
factly that it couldn’t have, but Van Den Bos cannot wrap her head around Andrea’s 
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common sense tone about the subject. It isn’t until Van Den Bos realizes that there were 
other women at the scene and she hears about each woman’s story that she realizes that 
they are not insane, but rather responding together to restrictive conditions of patriarchy. 
Though Van Den Bos attempts to speak with the women on their own terms, and 
connects their murder to a situation of oppression experienced by women as a group 
rather than individual insanity, the male lawyers of the court are convinced the women 
are insane, putting Van Den Bos herself on trial as she argues face-to-face with a 
prosecutor who is skeptical of her expertise and conclusions. Over the course of the film 
Van Den Bos has not only become convinced that the women are not insane, but also 
takes the stand that their murder was justified by the restrictive conditions of living as 
women under patriarchy. Despite standing before an all-male panel of judges, going toe-
to-toe with an aggressive male prosecutor challenging her expertise, and her husband 
protesting that her stance was making him look bad, Van Den Bos persists in standing by 
the women in court. Whereas before she was hired as a woman psychologist to explain 
the women’s insanity before the court of men, now she stands in the face of the 
institution that hired her, refusing to back down in defending the actions of women that 
the court has (willfully) refused to understand.   
The main moment of laughter in A Question of Silence emerges while Van Den 
Bos is met with the perplexity of the male prosecutor, who insists that gender does not 
matter for the case and that the women would have also murdered a woman boutique 
owner. Earlier in the film, the theme of humor showed up, with Annie being asked 
“Where’s your sense of humor?” by a misogynist diner patron. In contrast to this 
insistence that women fall in line with the sexist laughter of men, the women’s laughter 
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in the film are typically directed against men after they participated in the murder. When 
Van Den Bos asks Ann why she did not remarry another man instead of living alone, Ann 
responds to the idea with heavy laughter. And after the murder, Andrea grabs an ice 
cream cone, gets paid to do sex work while topping the john for her pleasure, and then 
laughs in his naked face about fucking him for money. Building upon these moments of 
individual women’s laughter, the courtroom is the first scene in the film where all the 
women laugh together, including Van Den Bos and the defendants but also the other 
women who were in the boutique but were not caught to stand trial. In response to the 
perplexed prosecutor stressing gender neutrality, Christine breaks her silence throughout 
the film to laugh, further irritating and confusing the men of the court. This laughter 
grows to infectious heights, and Van Den Bos joins with the other women to laugh at her 
colleagues and their pitiful attempt to instill their limited understanding and the system it 
has constructed upon all women.  
 Latent in this film is a meditation on the relationship between laughter and 
women in society. The context from which the film speaks, as indicated by its title, is one 
of women’s perpetual silence in the face of both sexism from individual men and the way 
these relationships are integrated into a larger system of patriarchy. Christine, for 
example, is particularly silent during the Van Den Bos’s questioning, and only speaks for 
the first time after the psychiatrist is convinced that the women are not insane. We learn 
throughout the course of the film that Christine was a housewife and often condemned to 
a situation where her words did not matter, and Van Den Bos concludes that Christine has 
chosen not to speak in a context where her voice has no impact. Despite this longstanding 
situation of silence, first enforced and then chosen, Christine is one of the first women to 
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laugh at the law in the courtroom and she appears in the last scene being ushered from the 
courtroom as she refuses to stop responding to the male prosecutor with uproarious 
laughter. As Parvulescu emphasizes, this scene exemplifies a laughter that “interrupts, 
repeats itself, and spreads,” serving as its own “raison d’etre” standing apart from the 
aims of the men in court.305 
Christine’s relationship between being silenced over the course of her life as a 
woman and as a housewife, juxtaposed with her chosen silence and reaction through 
laughter, frames a contrast between the silences imposed by patriarchy with a more 
disruptive, agential laughter that refuses to speak in its court. Kathleen Rowe’s reading of 
this moment in The Unruly Woman stresses that A Question of Silence marks a journey 
from silence imposed by patriarchy to a chosen silence that refuses patriarchal language, 
and finally an outpouring of laughter that surmounts both.306 Laughter erupts in contrast 
to patriarchy-imposed silence, whether this include small deaths in the sphere of the 
home or male-imposed institutions such as psychiatry or the law. When the women laugh 
in the courtroom, the men not only are unable to understand it, but also see it as a 
disruption of orderly processes of law that needs to be expunged from the court. In the 
context of a conversation about whether or not the women are sane, laughter is 
understood by the men of the court as not only disruptive, but also insane.  
At the same time that the male lawyers meet the laughter with confusion and 
censure, it also brings the women together in a distinct way. In the courtroom, it is not 
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only the women defendants who burst into laughter, but also the women participants who 
are not on trial, and the psychiatrist Van Den Bos herself. At the end of the film the 
psychiatrist decides against leaving the court with her husband to instead stand among the 
other women who laughed. In this context, though men are unable to understand the 
laughter and exile it from their institutional spaces, it brings the women together as the 
film ends with the promise of something new. Parvulescu notes that the film is “in the 
spirit of the revolutionary twentieth century” by suspending the question of what the 
future will look like and instead focusing on the potentiality found within the moment of 
laughter and coming together.307 
Finally, it is important to note that laughter is not quite a killing blow to 
patriarchal institutions in the film. The men are ultimately unable to confront the laughter 
and expunge the women from the courtroom, and continue their conversation about 
women without any women present. This signals that though there might be potential for 
resistance when the women group up at the end of the film, laughter has not brought the 
institution of the courtroom and the men who oversee it to their destruction in a way that, 
for example, militant action may have accomplished. Perhaps the context of women 
grouping together through the resistance of laughter signals that they (the psychiatrist 
included) may take up more militant action, especially after the male shopkeeper was 
beaten to death. However, it was not laughter itself that ended the boutique owner’s reign 
over the dresses of women, but the physical action of women’s fists, feet, and a sharp 
coat hanger. Despite the important space it opens, whatever possibilities for women’s 
collective action that laughter has evoked remains unscreened after Gorris’ film 
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pronounces “The End,” and laughter itself has not proven itself yet as a destroyer of 
patriarchal worlds. Rowe is correct to note that the film hints at the possibility of women 
banding together to shatter the status quo through laughter,308 but Gorris does not make 
this explicit point in the film through her decision not to showcase laughter’s direct 
destructive powers. It is important and potentially powerful that the women’s laughter 
has opened a space of collective possibilities, but these possibilities have not been fully 
explored.  
 A Question of Silence, I suggest, shares a structure with Parvulescu’s emphasis on 
the “laughing feminist century” by presenting an illustration of what I call revolutionary 
laughter. This laughter is revolutionary, in that it presents a wholly different and often 
unrepresentable challenge to the terms of an existing status quo. Though Gorris’ film 
does not show laughter destroying the world of men, it does bring women towards a new 
space of standing together in a new space of mutual understanding that hints at 
revolutionary possibilities. The laughing feminist philosophers I will discuss add to this a 
revolutionary shattering laughter, suggesting that the threat women’s laughter raises for 
the status quo does carry a real possibility for dissolving masculine institutions in favor of 
radically new possibilities. In this context laughter is almost akin to the sirens of legend, 
in that it meets men (or more accurately the society they have forced upon the world) 
with an eerie unassimilable sound that ultimately pulverizes them upon the shoals of their 
folly. Distinctly, this sound is also not necessarily “attractive” and perhaps more powerful 
for failing to meet expectations of pleasantness, like the piercing, maddening sound of an 
                                               




uprooted and angry (wo)mandrake plant, or a sphinx’s bloody muzzle after she tires of 
games. This laughter is thus potentially in kinship with the (unfortunately male) Satan 
from Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger, who champions that laughter can blow 
human vices and systems “to rags and atoms at a blast,” asserting, “Against the assault of 
laughter nothing can stand.”309 Perhaps a stranger is not so different from an other in this 
regard, as both bring us to a meditation on shattering revolutionary laughter. 
 Luce Irigaray emphasizes a similar dynamic between silence and the promises of 
laughter. In texts such as This Sex Which is Not One, Irigaray envisions the world that has 
been constructed by men as a hall of mirrors designed to only reflect a man-made world 
back to the men who created it. In this display of narcissistic world-building, in which 
everything is reduced to the masculine-hued same, Irigaray asserts that women in turn 
can only be reduced to the limited discourse of a male-constructed world. The life- and 
language-world built by men thus confines women to an otherness that can only haunt a 
pre-engineered reflective mirror.310 
 In this context, Irigaray suggests that laughter can provide a momentary act of 
shattering the world of men in hopes that women might architect a world of difference on 
their own terms. Whereas the discourse of men is stifling and breeds either women’s 
silence or a form of stultified speech that may as well be silence, women’s laughter 
potentially occurs in the service of liberation. In an interview, Irigaray states that her first 
impulse upon envisioning possibilities for women outside of the masculine imaginary "is 
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to laugh."311 In this context, Irigaray links laughter to the first stages of liberation, as it 
both contrasts with the masculine “seriousness” of meaning” and points beyond “a simple 
reversal of the masculine position” when properly sustained among women who can 
share a sense of humor.312 Irigaray thus fittingly associates laughter with the first clearing 
of liberation after women’s subjugation,313 suggesting that laughter is both revolutionary 
and able to crack the mirror of man to reveal a space beyond his totalizing looking glass. 
In An Ethics of Sexual Difference Irigaray goes further to uniquely connect women with 
the resistant space of laughter, asserting that women’s laughter is related to women’s 
position “at the threshold of utterance.” In this context, Irigaray imbues women’s distinct 
ways of chattering, gossiping, laughing, and shouting with a capacity to have “taken over 
the word and thereby exposed the circularity of ‘male’ discourse, unmask[ing] its rituals 
and failures.”314 
Beyond Irigaray’s brief reflection on the revolutionary potential of laughter is 
Cixous’ more sustained investigation into revolutionary shattering laughter in her essays 
“The Laugh of the Medusa” and “Castration or Decapitation?”. In her earlier “The Laugh 
of the Medusa, Cixous emphasizes the ability of women to write for themselves in 
contrast to men’s frequent relegation of women to a “dark” or “unintelligible” position.315 
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Cixous links women’s self-asserted and self-driven writing to feminine embodiment, as a 
discourse on women’s own terms would also be a discourse permitting their bodies to 
speak, thus “seizing” upon the ability to speak outside masculine discourse. Like Irigaray, 
Cixous shares a concern with women being able to creatively find their own place beyond 
the imposed world of men. And like Gorris, laughter indicates a space beyond the 
understanding and captivation of men. 
Along with an opening of women’s space and potential for speaking and writing, 
Cixous sees laughter as an integral moment of revolt away from a male-constructed 
world. Tapping into the distinctness of feminine embodiment, laughter represents 
feminine power beyond masculine impositions, insisting “laughs exude from all of our 
mouths.”316 Here we find Medusa herself, embodying feminine self-assertion, distinction, 
and laughter. Cixous writes, “You only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her. 
And she’s not deadly. She’s beautiful and she’s laughing.”317 Cixous’ Medusa not only 
represents the feminine laughing on her own terms outside masculine discourse, but also 
harbors a distinct threat against the world that men have made, with laughter able to 
pulverize masculine-centric institutions, laws, and “truths.”318 Whereas Bergson (as I 
discussed in Chapter III) sees laughter as a force for the vitality of a society that Cixous 
would likely call masculine, the laugh of the Medusa in contrast is able to, as Jack J. 
Spector puts it, “turn oppressive dogmas about gender upside down.”319 But Spector is 
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incorrect to suggest that this would involve a simple turn upside down, or inversion. Like 
Irigaray, after all, Cixous is concerned about feminine world-making that is not a mere 
mirror inversion of an existing male order - a true écriture féminine. In this way, the 
laugh of the medusa stressed by Cixous is one of revolutionary shattering laughter, or at 
least a hint at such if only we were truly able to listen for the Medusa’s desettling 
guffaws. 
Likewise, Cixous’ “Castration or Decapitation?” meditates on a myth that 
juxtaposes women’s ability to speak with laughter, suggesting that reclaiming women’s 
laughter is a crucial path away from women’s stunted growth and enforced misery under 
patriarchy. In Sun Tse’s The Art of War he declares that women who laughed at his 
training orders were mutinous, and carries through with their decapitation and 
replacement by women more willing to fall in line with his commands.320 Cixous 
describes this as an example of a masculine economy of order that forces women to either 
“lose their heads by the sword” or keep their heads on the condition that they surrender 
their heads to silence and as an “automaton” for male order.321 In this context, Cixous 
shares Irigaray’s concerns about masculine seriousness, as “feminine disorder” and “its 
laughter” stand in direct contrast and serve as a threat to men and their castration 
complex.322 In contrast to a masculine order of seriousness that denies women’s 
capacities for action and self-articulation, Cixous promotes women’s laughter and humor 
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as a force that “breaks out” and “overflows,” allowing women to carry their loss forward 
into living on her own terms.323 Like in “The Laugh of the Medusa,” Cixous here 
emphasizes the revolutionary power of women’s laughter in contrast to a male order built 
upon the effacement of women. Parvulescu finds great promise in both Cixous’ 
meditation on laughter, referring to “The Laugh of the Medusa” as “a call or something 
like a manifesto” for the reader to listen for and hear women’s laughter, and seeing in 
“Decapitation or Castration?” a powerful “vision of change.”324 Laughter’s revolutionary 
shattering potential is also a structure of women’s new possibilities. 
Revisiting A Question of Silence, Irigaray and Cixous helpfully articulate the 
space from which women are marking through laughter a subject position that has been 
heretofore been passed over as insignificant by the institutions of men. The women in the 
courtroom distinctly laugh as women and against men, just as they earlier chose 
specifically to murder a man and Andrea rejects the proposal that they would have killed 
a woman boutique owner. This laughter also marks a refusal that stretches beyond the 
court, as the women choose to laugh rather than speak a male-imposed code of law that 
would mark them as insane, and continues to stamp them as insane by not recognizing 
their laughter. Finally, the laughter gestures toward a future space of possibilities for 
women that have not yet arrived under the masculine order. Though the aftermath of the 
film remains unscreened, one of the most compelling aspects of the film is the curious 
space of what will happen next once the women have joined together and the question 
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women’s silence has been responded to with laughter. The movement of Christine from 
imposed silence to chosen silence and then to laughter and camaraderie with other 
women can thus be compared to the manifesto Parvulescu locates in Cixous’ “Laugh of 
the Medusa:” if we truly listen to the women’s laughter, what might be the deferred 
possibility of difference that we hear? 
 The camaraderie between women found in the film is also worth considering in 
more detail. In this context, I find it useful to consider Cynthia Willett’s distinct emphasis 
on humor (and specifically comedy) as a relationship of love oriented towards future 
possibilities beyond entrenched norms. In contrast to the hubris and individualism of an 
imperialist nation such as the United States, Willett proposes turning towards an ethics of 
a global, interdependent community.325 In this context, she asks how such a reconciliation 
between the United States and the world can occur,326 or even a reconciliation between 
humans and other species.327 Against the American tragedy of unchecked imperialism, 
Willett proposes that we turn toward the perspectives offered by American comedy.328 
Willett argues the approach of comedy not only stalls hubris through its promotion of 
“self-humbling laughter,” but also aligns with an interdependent or social conception of 
freedom in contrast to individualism.329 Romantic comedies, for example, stress a 
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principle of Eros, which Willett emphasizes occurs best at “home,” or a place of 
creativity, social freedom, community, and friendship.330 Willett’s account is thus useful 
because it provides a hopeful political perspective on the position of comedy. In an essay 
co-written with Julie Willett (and likely to be followed up in their forthcoming co-written 
book on the subject), they complicate comedy’s more ambivalent potential for reinforcing 
norms or subverting the status quo, recognizing that comedy may not always align with 
Eros as a force for feminist good.331 Nonetheless, the Willetts continue to emphasize 
comedy and humor’s potential for Eros, joy, freedom, and ability to disturb “ready-made 
norms.”332 
  Rather than characterizing laughter as a force for revolutionary shattering, as 
seen in the work of Irigaray and Cixous, Willett sees comedy as a practice of laughing-
with that presents an alternative beyond the world of capital and imperialist militarism 
(which, of course, is not wholly separable from patriarchy). Nonetheless, the vision it 
presents is revolutionary for refashioning a relationship among people, nation-states, and 
species, even if not expressing the same structure of shattering in the way Irigaray and 
Cixous describe.  
While this may seem at odds with Gorris’ film, it is useful to consider that the 
women in A Question of Silence do not share their laughter with men. It is thus useful to 
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consider that laughter may be a distinct force bringing the women of the film together, 
even as it is not extended to the men who have confined them through patriarchal 
oppression over the course of their lives. A staging of A Question of Silence from the 
perspective of the Willetts might thus include more togetherness through laughter and 
less murder and militancy, and specifically highlights the power of revolutionary 
shattering laughter to bring people together in joy and freedom. Once the men are out of 
the picture, and the women have been brought together through laughter and a refusal of 
male-imposed legibility, it is useful to not only wonder about the space of possibility 
beyond patriarchal norms, but also the construction of that space by women who now 
stand together rather than divided, silent, and alone. As Annie discovered, the sexist jokes 
of men in diners have hitherto only upheld their world in various ways; the point of 
women’s laughter is to change it. 
 
A Critique of Feminist Laughter: From Promise to Practice 
 These feminist visions of laughter, humor, and comedy contain compelling 
insights into humor’s potential social and political import. In contrast to the humor 
ethicists discussed in the previous chapter, Irigaray and Cixous write from a perspective 
informed by larger structures of power, specifically the construction of the world and its 
writing by men and for men. Though practicable by an individual woman writer or 
activist, the practice of le rire is a matter of challenging existing patriarchal social 
structures rather than a mechanism of sheer disengagement, entertainments of fantasy, or 
a potential reinforcement of an existing stock of stereotypes (see my discussion in 
Chapter III). In this context, Cixous and Irigaray see contained within laughter a social 
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and political promise for women that marks a future hope for writing and bringing forth a 
different feminine paradigm into a totalizing masculine world. Willett also shares with 
Irigaray and Cixous a social and political interest in the potential for humor and comedy 
to shift towards an alternative framework of world relations, though she focuses 
specifically on reconfiguring the imperialist US and destructive relationships between 
humans and animals. The laughing feminist century and beyond thus points distinctly 
towards laughter, comedy, and humor as a promising social and political intervention into 
existing social paradigms. 
 Additionally, these feminist philosophies of humor are precisely those that would 
be rejected in the contemporary mainstream consolidation of interdisciplinary humor 
studies. Certainly, these accounts could be plugged into existing humor theories. For 
example, laughter at the dissonance between patriarchal assumptions, women’s 
experiences of the world, and the necessary actions for achieving women’s liberation, can 
emerge through a sense of incongruity. As I mentioned in Chapter II, prominent humor 
linguist Victor Raskin argues that laughter is brought about when different 
understandings of a situation are brought together and pronounced through an “unreal” or 
“incompatible” situation.333 Janine Van De Bos’s journey from agent of the court towards 
an identification with women whose oppression will never be recognized by the court’s 
laws certainly places her into a situation of incompatibility between her previous 
allegiance to a law that cannot understand the resistance of women against the patriarchy 
through which is was formed. How could Van De Bos not laugh in the courtroom after 
                                               




her personal transformation against what it stands for? Christine also responds to the 
court with laughter, the prosecutor’s inability to understand the significance of gender to 
the murder now derealized after her insights into the injustices of patriarchy after a long 
sentence of silence in the home. 
 And yet, the insights of A Question of Silence and feminist philosophers of humor 
and laughter are also simultaneously and of necessity political and contextual rather than 
demanding that humor be purified of the social and political world within which its 
practice is situated to achieve a proper understanding. The political emphasis of 
revolutionary shattering laughter also moves beyond the limitations of older “superiority 
theories” while distinctly holding together relationships between humor and power. 
Feminist theorists of humor explicitly articulate the type of power that is of concern (be 
that a world constructed by phallogocentrism or a nation destroying itself through 
imperialism), and place humor distinctly on the side of resistance rather than a neutral 
defense of current social and political relationships. Feminist theorists of humor thus 
acknowledge a situated and gendered subject, to the extent that they would likely be 
denounced by Christie Davies (who I introduced in Chapter II) as mere 
“gobbledygook.”334 The strengths of feminist theories about humor and laughter may thus 
lead the reader to suspect that I have finally found the social and political theories attuned 
to the reflections on power, hierarchy, and patriarchy that I have sought after in the 
previous chapters. If my satisfaction has been attained, then the task now falls on me to 
simply explain these theories in more detail, articulate their distinctness from existing 
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prominent research in humor studies in this chapter and perhaps another, and then finally 
collect my doctorate after brushing off some polished objections and replies. Oh, if only! 
 However, I cannot help but return to an unsettled question of what precisely the 
laughter in A Question of Silence has to offer intrigued feminists beyond a poignant 
dynamic between silence, laughter, and the possibilities of a new space. Does laughter 
still have anything to offer the women after they have banned together and the credits 
have rolled? Going beyond the initial space of togetherness opened by laughter in the 
courtroom, what are the specific ways with which women might continue to deploy 
laughter while engaging with and resisting a patriarchal world? Might there be more or 
less efficacious practices of this laughter, and how might we determine its continued 
effects?  
A Question of Silence highlights a distinct bond shared among the women that 
also reflects a resistance to constraints and expectations of patriarchy, but the continuing 
practice of laughter after its conclusion is less clear. At the end of the film, the lawyer 
joins in with the other women’s laughter because she finds a resistant space with them 
amidst the laughable institutions of men. One could imagine this instance of feminist 
laughter taking the form of a contagion, marking the women who finally recognize that 
they should lock arms and carve apart the patriarchal institutions (and men) previously 
confining them, and perhaps this is a case for A Question of Silence 2 (perhaps in which 
the women are visited by Samuel L. Jackson’s Nick Fury and drafted into the endless 
sequelization of the Marvel cinematic universe). But the bond shared among women is 
also one that is not understood by the men, despite the film’s conclusion of women 
laughing in solidarity with other women. Their resistant laughter may bring them 
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together, but this does not mean that patriarchal psychology and law will crumble apart. 
Additionally, the women’s laughter is marked as one of madness. This is part of the male 
judges’ misunderstanding but also a sign that laughter is easier for them to stomach (even 
in its unease) than a barrage of kicks, as the murdered man at the beginning of the film 
found out. The laughter of the women in the film and of Medusa herself may thus echo in 
defiance or solidarity but this does not mean it will itself make the world of men crumble 
apart. The scene at the end of A Question of Silence, just like the reader reaching the end 
of “The Laugh of the Medusa,” leaves patriarchal institutions standing even if laughter 
contains a promise of more to come. What, then, is the argument for continued laughter 
after the women have been brought together? 
 The “laughing woman question” I am leading to with this meditation on the 
“laughing feminist century” and beyond is an interrogation of laughter’s continued 
revolutionary promise for feminist praxis. Even if feminist forays into humor harbor a 
social and political consciousness that is lacking in mainstream contemporary humor 
studies, it is useful to consider in more detail what these practices of humor might 
specifically look like in their ongoing practices and variations, as well as considering the 
larger field of humor and laughter as they occur in social and political spaces. When 
acknowledging a world of power relations and potential actions of resistance, it is 
important to detail how praxis and process through which humor might be a part of this 
action beyond focusing on deferred feminist action and a shaking of norms that might 
occur through women’s laughter about their situation. To establish the importance of 
laughter and humor to feminist liberation, I thus find it useful to consider how precisely 
laughter, comedy, or humor more broadly serves or sows feminist revolution. I yearn for 
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a feminist theory of laughter that continues rolling after the final scene from A Question 
of Silence. 
 To establish that there is more to say about humor’s particularities beyond the 
framework of revolutionary shattering, it is useful to not only look at the strengths of 
feminist theories of humor but also at their limitations, and I plan to discuss Irigaray, 
Cixous, and Willett in turn. First, Irigaray focuses on the yet-to-be-seen potential of 
laughter at the expense of looking more dynamically at its specific and ongoing practice 
by women. By associating laughter with the first stage of promise for women’s liberation, 
and casting women’s laughter with a distinct form of resistance against the universe made 
by men, she is suggesting that laughter provides a distinct hope for future feminist praxis. 
However, she only touches very briefly upon what such a praxis looks like beyond its 
promise. She does not continue her analysis by analyzing particular instances of women 
utilizing laughter against the world of men, instead gesturing towards its efficacy, and 
thus makes it difficult to consider laughter beyond its general capacities of disruption.  
Suppose that I am to be thrown in prison for spontaneously kicking a man to 
death in a shop, and I laugh (perhaps with other women) at the man-made law that 
intends to cast me behind bars or in the middle of a padded cell. From Irigaray’s 
perspective, my laughter marks a promising potentiality for revolution, or disrupts the 
circularity of men’s discourse and institutions, and is perhaps linked with my own 
position of being a feminine ghost within a masculine system from which I cannot truly 
be seen or build a world on my own terms. But how precisely might this laugh function to 
open up this promise, and how might it disrupt entrenched social institutions or even 
language itself as I continue to engage in its practice? Irigaray leaves me to guess or 
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cobble together the precise roadmap between laughter and feminist action, which is 
understandable because she mostly gestures towards laughter as a key to resistance 
without making it a key, elaborated upon aspect of her own work. I am left properly 
intrigued, but also to my own devices if I am interested in knowing more about laughter 
as a specific feminist practice along the road to revolution. 
I might expect to find more assistance from Cixous’ more explicit and drawn out 
meditations on figures of laughter such as Medusa or the laughing headless women in 
The Art of War, but even here I am left without a roadmap or demonstration of how 
precisely laughter is to bring about the revolution, let alone more specific, smaller 
examples of disrupting the patriarchal order. Cixous’ “The Laugh of the Medusa,” far 
from providing the reader a detailed demonstration of laughter’s power, spends very little 
time on the laughter that is supposed to animate its central mythical figure. For instance, 
Cixous suggests that woman may be able “to smash everything, to shatter the framework 
of institutions, to blow up the law, to break up the "truth" with laughter,”335 but just like 
our consideration of Irigaray we are left with little detail about how precisely this 
happens beyond women’s unique embodied and discursive situation. The proliferation of 
possibility beyond phallogocentrism is intriguing, but I want to know more about specific 
examples of political laughter and humor, their methods, and their particular effects. 
In the article’s defense, it is about much more than laughter, setting forth the 
subversive program of l’ecriture feminine as a way for women “to bring about a mutation 
in human relations, in thought, in all praxis.”336 Medusa and her laughter thus cannot be 
                                               
335 Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” 888. 
 
336 Ibid., 882. 
149 
 
separated from her prophetic call for women more generally writing on their own terms. 
Parvulescu herself sets up her analysis of Cixous by framing “Castration or 
Decapitation?” and its emphasis on the threat of laughter as the beginning for “The Laugh 
of the Medusa” despite falling later chronologically in Cixous’ corpus.337 In contrast to 
the imposed silence of patriarchy in “Castration or Decapitation?” Parvulescu describes 
“The Laugh of the Medusa” as a call or manifesto for its reader to discover the laughter 
contained within its pages,338 with Medusa’s decapitation and transformation into stone 
highlighting her as a threat that is nonetheless promising to listen for and look towards.339 
In this context, Parvulescu refuses to frame Medusa’s laughter as utopian or a potential 
weapon of feminist subversion.340 To weaponize laughter would be to reshape the gift 
that Medusa offers women into the same masculine tool of control and mastery that 
should be disrupted and moved beyond. Parvulescu thus suggests, “The point will not be 
to forensically learn how laughter works so that one can make it work in one’s favor and 
have the last laugh.”341 In Parvulescu’s reading, Cixous is offering a vision of laughter 
that contains a feminist promise yet also avoids utopian leanings through her emphasis on 
“textual materialism” through women’s writing342 that nonetheless cannot be reduced to 
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mechanical strategizing. Laughter is an earth-shaking phenomenon for a feminist 
resistance, but not one that can be reduced in the manner of the humor studies theorists 
discussed in Chapter II. 
Unfortunately, Parvulescu’s disdain for weaponizing and strategizing laughter is 
also one that extends to readers of Cixous who seek more information about analyzing 
feminist laughter in more detail through specific examples. Parvulescu even specifically 
laments “the reduction of Cixous’ complex and nuanced laughing textual choreography 
to an argument about the ‘subversiveness’ of women’s humor,”343 indicating that feminist 
strategists err when attempting to see in Cixous’ work a specifically deployable mode of 
revolutionary action. Écriture féminine may bring to Cixous’ text a material dimension, 
but Parvulescu safeguards laughter itself from being fully weighted down by the 
practical, preferring to hold it as an irreducible feminine force that remains yet to be 
seen.344 Parvulescu’s emphasis on the promise of laughter in the context of material 
textual resistance is also related to her general preference for focusing on studies of 
feminist laughter over studies of feminist humor. Generally, Parvulescu is interested in 
theorizing laughter on its own terms outside of any reduction to humor, jokes, or 
comedy,345 later insisting “We need to start from laughter, rather than from the joke” to 
explain such phenomena as women laughing with sexist jokes.346 Cixous’ article thus 
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stands out as especially strong from Parvulescu’s point of view if it calls for the reader to 
seek out Medusa’s laughter without reducing it to the strategic, specific controlled 
subversions of jokes and humor. 
Nonetheless, it remains important to Cixous that the tide of laughter represented 
by the Medusa is able to rattle and shake apart men’s discourse and institutions in favor 
of feminine writing and world-building. Parvulescu compensates for the lack of 
elaboration about laughter (including more specific examples of its operations) by 
pointing to laughter’s deferred promises as a prophetic strength on the part of Cixous, 
forcing us to listen for laughter’s call and joyfully look towards a vibrant source of life 
yet to fully echo in this universe of the masculine. As someone interested in direct, on-
the-ground feminist practice, and the political potentials of laughter and humor, I am not 
satisfied with the vision of laughter’s promise that Irigaray and Cixous provide. In the 
previous chapter, I singled out the humor ethicists for depoliticizing laughter by focusing 
instead on its operations and individualistic effects. Looking to Irigaray and Cixous, the 
political dimension of laughter disengaging from the logic of patriarchy and masculine 
discourse is helpfully centered, but more remains to be said about the various specific 
ways in which women creatively engage with laughter, humor, and the powers of 
Medusa’s promises. I thus prefer to look at laughter (and, as I shall emphasize, humor 
more broadly) as a way of feminist engagement rather than feminist disengagement, 
focusing on humor’s specific practices of recontextualization and destabilization rather 
than the deferred possibilities of laughing the world away. To an extent, this puts me in 
alignment with the weaponization of laughter that Parvulescu admonishes, but I would 
like to see not just laughter in its disruptiveness or subversiveness but also how it may be 
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able to (some extent) creatively shape and reshape this world. I thus have a distinct 
interest in looking at specific examples of humor and the changes humor offers rather 
than more general promises of disrupting an existing order. As I will explain below, I 
believe looking to practices of humor rather than laughter provides this generative focus. 
For now, I also wish to address Willett’s emphasis on comedy and humor 
providing a social and political ethos for relationships between nation-states and species. 
Willett’s emphasis on the community-leaning Eros of comedy seems like it would satisfy 
my objections to Irigaray, Cixous and Parvulescu. After all, Willett (and her sister) is 
presenting a way comedy can impress actual changes upon the world through its 
particular ethos of collective cooperation and, which seems to involve a greater emphasis 
on comedy’s creative and concrete import for feminist amelioration. However, the 
specific methods through which comedy might impress a social and political ethos is 
unclear. Even if Willett is correct that comedy offers a more ameliorative vision than 
tragedy for worldwide and human relationships it is unclear how precisely comedy 
impresses itself upon the social world that produces it to effect concrete change. How 
might comedy be a force that brings women together beyond the ethos it projects? And 
how might embracing comedy or its ethos effect a lasting change in powerful 
institutions? Again, I am intrigued and inspired by the promises offered by feminist 
humor theorists, but I want to know more about humor’s concrete practices. 
And even if it was clear how embracing comedy as an ethos is supposed to work 
and reach effectiveness, it does not seem necessary or even probable that comedy offers a 
feminist ethos to begin with. In the previous chapter, I discussed the classic ‘superiority’ 
theories of laughter and humor that impress a differing ethos of exclusion, derision, and 
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policing public space according to certain (often antifeminist norms). It thus does not 
seem necessary that comedy, laughter, and humor more broadly produce an ethos that is 
ameliorative for human and extra-human relationships. Bill Burr, for example, expresses 
a comedic ethos of exclusion against “all those goddamn groups” that are sensitive to 
how language (with the language of comedy itself included) might affect marginalized 
people.347 The Willetts may briefly acknowledge that comedy may not necessarily align 
with feminist goals, but do little to address the potential alliance between comedy and 
antifeminist aims in detail (or as I call it in Chapter VI, humor’s counterameliorative 
work). Willet’s account, though focused on comedy’s positive contributions, does not 
illustrate how comedy can form the basis for concrete situations of feminist praxis. 
 
Julia Kristeva, Volcanic Practices, and Haunted Clocktowers 
At this point, I am tempted to already make the externally critical move of 
shifting away from meditations on revolutionary laughter and towards an emphasis on 
concrete deployments of humor. This is where I will end up at the end of the chapter, 
because I think looking at specific examples of feminist humor and how its practice 
works will illuminate in more detail the precise ways that feminist humor is useful for 
liberation against oppressive societal institutions and norms, as well as the risks and 
limitations that may result from taking up humor as a means for amelioration or even 
revolution. Otherwise, existing feminist theory, despite opening an important space for 
considering laughter and humor in general, does not provide enough detail about how 





humor is precisely to be efficacious and fails to account for how it operates in action, 
choosing instead to linger upon more general promises of laughter or comedic ethos. 
However, feminist philosophy, and feminist poststructuralism specifically, 
already brings us to this point. Beyond her focus on laughter, Cixous associates women’s 
writings with a subversive effect linked with laughter when deployed in a world 
fabricated by masculine texts and institutions, referring to l’écriture féminine as volcanic. 
Cixous writes, 
A feminine text cannot fail to be more than subversive. It is volcanic; as it is 
written it brings about an upheaval of the old property crust, carrier of masculine 
investments; there's no other way. There's no room for her if she's not a he. If 
she's a her-she, it's in order to smash everything, to shatter the framework of 
institutions, to blow up the law, to break up the "truth" with laughter.348 
 
In Cixous’ framework a truly feminine text irreducible to the masculine, like the laughter 
that women uniquely generate, represents an inherent subversion against the ossified 
masculine world.  
 This framework of women’s writing (and especially poetic writing) as disruptive 
to a masculine social order is shared by Julia Kristeva, who Parvulescu also enshrines as 
one of the key figures of her “laughing feminist century.” Written prior to “The Laugh of 
the Medusa,” Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language nonetheless spends more time 
discussing the relationship between subversive language and stable language in relation 
to practices of poetry, laughter, and humor. Kristeva argues that linguistics often fails to 
account for the speaking subject who produces language349 instead focusing on the 
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symbolic remains of speech while covering over the subject’s involvement in language as 
a process.350 Kristeva is critical of theories that either lack a subject completely, or rely 
on a “transcendental ego”351 that maintains symbolic purity without incorporating a more 
immanent, desiring subject.352 In this context, structural linguistics often only addresses 
the subject to explore purified structures of language, acknowledging linguistic style only 
in relation to the pure, transcendental ego.353 By ignoring the subject, structural 
linguistics only considers signification at the realm of the symbolic and propositions.354 
Even when the subject is given attention, it is often stripped of its drives, with even the 
unconscious cast as merely "a depository" of symbolic laws and discourse.355 In this 
framework, language has been deprived of the flowful and fragmented speaking subject, 
instead presented as a patch of earth unrelated to any molten semiotic. The subject of 
these language theories can only be terra firma, with symbolic totalization rendering their 
speech incapable of rupture or the flows of desire. 
In contrast with the “symbolic” level of language, which presents language as a 
set of organized and unchanging “static thoughts” divorced from any signifying 
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process,356 Kristeva puts forward a philosophy of language which highlights the 
embodied subject’s role in processes of signification. Referring to Freudian insights, 
Kristeva seeks a materialist account of signification that is "based on the subject, his 
formation, and his corporeal, linguistic, and social dialectic.”357 
  To better account for the subject’s involvement in signifying processes, Kristeva 
turns to the linguistic field of “semiotics” which focuses on “signifying practices, such as 
art, poetry, and myth that are irreducible to the ‘language’ object.”358 For Kristeva, the 
signifying process depends upon two “modalities,” consisting of both the semiotic and 
symbolic, whose dialectic is involved in “the signifying process…constitutive of the 
subject.”359 The mode of the semiotic relates to the drives and the energy that moves 
throughout the subject’s body, with the totality of the drives and their energy forming 
what Kristeva calls a “chora.”360 This chora, operating in the “rhythmic space” of 
“rupture and articulations,” and involving the process by which “significance is 
constituted,”361 acts as the “kinetic functional stage” that precedes the sign.362 As a 
contrast to symbolic structural linguistics, Kristeva seeks to return the semiotic, the body, 
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and its drives to the study of language,363 maintaining both symbolic and semiotic 
registers of language in their heterogeneity. In making this move, Kristeva is making 
explicit the particular subversions brought about by poetic speech, and indeed, laughter 
and jokes. 
Parvulescu attributes to Kristeva a similar displacement of laughter as the 
structure of social change as she associates with Cixous’ deferred Medusa. In Desire in 
Language Kristeva identifies the maternal space of the semiotic chora as a space of 
laughter.364 Laughter can be a practice in addition to a space, as Kristeva associates 
laughter and wordplay in Revolution with “the site of the most radical heterogeneity” 
maintained through practice.365 In this context, Kristeva ties her analysis of laughter with 
her analysis of language by insisting that laughter is connected to the “ephemeral” 
meanings and excesses of a subject and language still in process.366 Laughter is also part 
of a “leap” that instates a “process of social change” within a subject via a “moment of 
heterogeneous contradiction.”367 Specifically, Kristeva draws from Freud to stress the 
difficulty of irrupting laughter into discourse, since it always involves a painful play with 
prohibition,368 and the “lifting of prohibitions” always results in the production of “new 
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devices” which “contain the rupture from which laughter bursts forth.”369 But the upside 
of this practice is that laughter is ultimately the logic of producing something new.370 In 
this association between laughter and a production of the new, Parvulescu asserts that 
Kristeva links practice with the structure of laughter, as revolutionary discursive practice 
generally “obeys laughter’s logic and provides the subject with laughter’s advantages.”371 
In this context, Parvulescu associates Kristeva’s laughter with a similar ineffability or 
evasiveness as Cixous’ account of laughter, stressing that Kristeva’s work tells us 
“[l]aughter is thus the merely the witness of a process which remains the privileged 
experience of the ‘artist.’”372 Like Cixous’ figure of the Medusa, Parvulescu considers 
Kristeva’s laughter to be a figurehead of feminist praxis rather than laughter as a 
concrete, meticulous practice to be analyzed in more precise detail. 
However, Kristeva’s particular emphasis on subversive semiotic ruptures in 
supposedly stable discourse provides more promise for looking at laughing practices 
beyond serving as a model for other forms of feminist praxis or general disruptive 
practices of speech such as poetry. Consider, for example, the website Reductress, which 
serves a similar function as the parody news website The Onion for feminist discourse 
(and especially contemporary feminist discourse found online). In one article, Lisa 
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Mongillo plays on the phrase “a lady in the street and a freak in the sheets” by instead 
writing on “How to Be a Lady in the Streets and a Haunted Clock Tower in the Sheets.” 
The article reads like a warped sex advice column, instructing women how to 
entertain a man’s family, cultivate romance, dress, and behave at intellectual gatherings, 
with constant absurd references to horror tropes. For example, Mongillo advises, 
IN THE STREETS: Dress with graceful modesty. 
 
IN THE SHEETS: Trap him in a winding staircase of doooooooooooom. 
Whatever you wear, make sure it is loose enough to completely hide the actual 
shape of your body, like a modest kaftan or a toga. But in the bedroom, your man 
won’t be able to hide when you’ve trapped him in a winding staircase that seems 
to have no end! For extra fun, throw some spider nests and swarms of bats into 
the mix.373 
 
In this example, Mongillo’s potential success with making laughter is also one of 
subversive practice, twisting stock phrases and cliché romance columns that instruct 
women about how to regulate their behavior into an absurdist fanfare of winding 
staircases and bats. In this context, it is too limiting to frame laughter as primarily a 
deferred promise of subversive discursive practice when humor itself, like poetry, can 
directly serve as subversive writing and speech. Like poetry, humor in practice breaks up 
the supposedly stability of speech (and especially stock patriarchal speech), shaking up 
platitudes and imposed clichés such as those found in women’s magazines through the 
injection of playful discursive heterogeneity. Kristeva emphasizes that language is not 
stable, and humor is one of the practices that reignite the magma underneath ossified 
discourse, reclaiming language and discourse in its unstable malleability. This link 
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between humor and practice in Kristeva’s thought is distinctly impressive because humor 
fits into her framework in such concrete ways, linked with the particulars of feminine 
subjectivity and women’s relationship to politics and subversive practice.  
Despite both my and Parvulescu’s attempt to emphasize Kristeva’s work in the 
context of laughter and humor, it also poses a distinct threat for considering radical 
humor as effective praxis. Kristeva stands apart from Christie Davies, whose work I 
discussed in Chapter II, in that she emphasizes the subversive potential of language, and 
provides a path for situating practices of humor within lively revolts of the speaking 
subjects who generate it. But she shares with Davies a skepticism and limit to what such 
subversive practices of speech can potentially accomplish. On one hand, Kristeva’s 
laughter is truly volcanic, retaining the excess of the semiotic and the subject within 
which it continues to seethe and roil. But this also causes her (unlike Cixous) to 
cautiously limit the potential of women wielding laughter, suggesting in About Chinese 
Women that women who take up the magmatic chaos of laughter may fall into madness 
due to women’s unstable relationship with the chora and the semiotic in contrast to the 
sanity granted by the constraint of symbolic speech.374 Kelly Oliver explains that this 
passage tempers the ability for women specifically to call upon the semiotic’s disruptive 
potential. Oliver writes, “the semiotic threatens women since it cannot ‘free’ [women] 
from a symbolic that they have never fully known; but, it ‘frees’ men from a symbolic 
that they know all too well.”375 This framework may restrict both the revolution in poetic 
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language and revolutionary laughter to men, whereas women “must take the symbolic 
order very seriously to challenge it.”376 While feminist philosophers may be tempted to 
save Kristeva’s subversive practice for women by recasting her association between 
laughter and madness as a practical suggestion about women needing to engage in serious 
praxis, Kristeva is also making a claim about women’s embodied, psychical connection 
with language that essentially challenges women’s access to subversion against the 
symbolic. 
Kristeva’s limitation on laughter falls into general concerns that feminist 
philosophers have had with the limits Kristeva sets on radical feminist praxis.377 
Elizabeth Grosz, for example, emphasizes that there is a limit to the revolution offered by 
semiotic language, since subverting the symbolic too much results in “a dissolution of 
sociality itself,” and the limits of the symbolic can only be changed by gradually pushing 
it through reform rather than accommodating a more radical upheaval.378 Butler asserts 
that Kristeva’s theory of language ultimately “denies the semiotic as an emancipatory 
ideal” and “concedes that it is a kind of language which never can be consistently 
maintained,” lest it lead to “psychosis and to the breakdown of cultural life itself.”379 
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Perhaps this limitation of the semiotic is why Kristeva has turned from her earlier work 
on revolutions in poetic language to a discussion of “tiny revolts.”380 
Despite these concerns with the limits Kristeva’s theory may or may not place on 
subversive practices of humor, I find her notion that subversive practice may have limits 
refreshing in comparison to the general references to the potentiality of laughter hinted at 
by Irigaray, Cixous, and Willett. Though entirely assenting to Kristeva’s emphasis on the 
limits of women’s laughing practice would commit me to an essentialist model that bars 
women from the practice of laughter (which I will discuss at greater length in the next 
chapter), I do find her emphasis on the limits of laughter refreshing. Kristeva’s more 
concrete analysis, combined with her emphasis on laughter’s limits, calls for a more 
careful and localized account of humor’s effectiveness for feminist praxis, pointing 
towards a more concrete analysis of humor in practice. As indicated by A Question of 
Silence, laughter (and I would suggest humor as well) involves concrete, localized 
practices that are not covered by embodying laughter through a general model (or myth) 
of totally revolutionary shattering resistance. The women in A Question of Silence may 
very well have failed to achieve concrete change despite recruiting another to their cause 
through laughter, and it may be the act of kicking that needs to be proliferated rather than 
meeting the situation with laughter. Or alternatively, though laughter served as an initial 
cause for bringing the women together, its continuing effectiveness for feminist 
revolution remains unclear. 
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Though feminist philosophy has taken a lengthy break from humor (perhaps 
departing for trendier subjects like tragedy), contemporary humor studies has included 
recent significant investments in simultaneously theoretical and concrete studies of 
humor by feminist humor scholars. For example, Janet Bing and Joanne Scheibman 
attempt to draw out potential feminist insights for praxis from contemporary incongruity 
theory, since the shifts of incongruity theory “provide feminist alternatives to more 
traditional cultural interpretations.”381 Ultimately, feminists can refer to the subversive 
spaces provided by humor to “suggest alternatives to the ‘normal’ world where males 
predominate.”382 To show this, Bing and Scheibman frequently draw from sources 
ranging from feminist graffiti to art by the Guerilla Girls, which I will discuss in more 
explicit example in the next chapter. The authors prefer to look at concrete subversive 
practices of humor rather than laughter in a general, broad, and often limitless sense, 
referring to specific jokes rather than extravagant myths such as the Medusa. They also 
do this by adapting the methods from the incongruity theory of humor into feminist 
analysis, centering the relationship between power and the ways humor operates. 
 I contend that feminist philosophy should join the path of concrete humor if it is 
to continue the important insights of the laughing feminist century. Specifically, feminist 
philosophy should emphasize how the practice of humor relates a situated subject to a 
social and political life of power and its manipulations through language and praxis. That 
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is to suggest, feminism does need to learn from many of the more concrete attempts in 
contemporary humor studies even as it refuses to accept the subordinate role feminist 
theory has in this discipline. To fail to do this is not only a matter of not fitting 
developing trends in humor studies, but also to fail to account for the specific practices of 
humor in social and political life from a feminist perspective. As I will discuss in the next 
chapter, the practice of humor represents a dynamic set of tools for recontextualizing and 
transforming a situation for feminist aims through what I call humorwork. 
 In this chapter, I have considered feminist theories and philosophies of laughter 
and humor as found in A Question of Silence and the works of Irigaray, Cixous, and 
Willett. Specifically I considered the association between laughter, comedy, and 
revolution in feminist philosophy, which I critiqued for not going far enough to explain 
humor’s concrete and specific practices. After this I discussed Kristeva’s more tempered 
views on practices of humor and laughter to suggest that feminist philosophy requires a 
more tempered, concrete account of humor in practice especially as it relates to the 
subject, their situation, and their engagement in social and political life. 
 This, of course, does not free us from the important doubt raised by Kristeva’s 
distinct suspicions about subversive discourse and laughter. In the next chapter I will 
focus on the differences between a subjective, subversive picture of humor offered by 
Kristeva and Monique Wittig’s emphasis on disruptive discourse in public life, finally 
augmenting the “laughing feminist century” with the powerful concrete descriptions of 






MEDUSA’S WAR MACHINE: 
KRISTEVA, WITTIG, AND HUMORWORK IN FEMINIST ACTION 
 
 
Guerilla Girls and the Semiotic 
 In the previous chapter I worked through existing theories of feminist humor and 
laughter to emphasize that we need a concrete philosophy of feminist humor. I argued 
that an emphasis on laughter fails to examine humor as practiced by feminists in a 
political context, and incorporating the work of feminist humor studies scholars is critical 
for reaching a more specific understanding of humor’s feminist potential. 
In the previous chapter I discussed Julia Kristeva as a philosopher who 
simultaneously expresses the concrete, embodied situation and severe restraints for 
practicing humor as a form of resistance. The laughing woman presented by Kristeva 
cannot laugh away the patriarchal world, and she may well stand as a threat to herself or 
she may fail to actually shift the symbolic with her semiotic fire breathing upon stable 
speech. In this context, though humor represents a subject’s temporary disruption of the 
static order through semiotic practice, the symbolic structure imposed by men 
nonetheless underpins this work as part of necessary structures for a socially intelligible 
world. In Kristeva’s picture, laughter and humor teeter-totter between inflaming madness 
and accomplishing limited concrete effects upon the world and its structures beyond its 
effect upon the subject. 
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 In this chapter I will finalize the move from abstract revolutionary laughter that I 
began in the previous chapters by bringing Wittig’s materialist view of language to bear 
on the practice of humor, adding nuance to the capabilities of humor that Kristeva’s 
model of revolutionary practice as semiotic significantly constrains. To accomplish this, I 
will first discuss Monique Wittig’s discussion of language as a Trojan horse to show that 
feminist disruptions of discourse and situations are not fully covered by the semiotic-
upon-symbolic model of laughter and its practice. I then bring in humor scholar Delia 
Chiaro’s discussion of humor preying upon speech and build upon this account by 
drawing from other feminist humor scholars Janet Bing’s and Joanne Scheibman’s 
discussion of humor and political possibilities. This will allow me to consider more 
directly humor’s manipulations as material and concrete disruptions of language, which I 
will refer to as humorwork to emphasize the engaged interaction between humor and the 
world.  The upshot of this focus is that it discloses the practice of the revolutionary 
feminist humorist, who experiences the world and its patriarchal structures as 
fundamentally manipulable in both subtle and overt levels of humor practice, which I will 
refer to as humorwork, at varying levels of scope and effects. However, this focus on the 
material and concrete practice of humor also loses the special link between women, 
feminist practice, and progressive laughter proposed by the philosophers and theorists of 
revolutionary laughter. The practice and power of the humorwork does not seem limited 
to practitioners of humor, and may even be a potent tool for the antifeminists and white 
supremacists of the alt-right. The next chapter will thus build upon this chapter’s material 
and concrete analysis of humorwork, since this power does not seem limited to feminist 
practitioners of humor. 
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 When we last left off, I considered Kristeva and concrete feminist explorations 
into the potential manipulations provided by humor. Kristeva distinctly centers the 
situated force of a subject’s semiotic practices, describing the ability of an unstable 
subject to inject their instability into language, if only for a time. However, this move 
severely limits humor’s potential social and political effects. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter, Kristeva risks locking subversive practices of laughter into a forbidden 
practice for female subjects due to its potential maddening effects upon laughing 
women.383 Because of this, it is unclear how feminist subversions through humor and 
laughter are to occur, to the extent that it might even be better if women did not practice 
humorful resistance at all for reasons of sanity and safety. Kristeva may be suggesting 
that the subversion of laughter is best left to the men who are more firmly anchored to the 
symbolic realm that they subvert. 
 As I also discussed in the previous chapter, feminist humor scholars have 
considered the more concrete potential of humor to disrupt a situation. Bing and 
Scheibman specifically focus on the potential for women to latch onto existing sexist 
situations and project a world of anti-sexist possibility. To better understand this practice, 
it is helpful to consider their examples. One of Bing’s and Scheibman’s examples is the 
suggestion of “calling in queer to work” as a response to the pathologization of queer 
desire, shifting the psychological classification of “deviant” and “disordered” sexualities 
into the more absurd context of using this as an excuse to receive paid leave from the 
workplace.384 Though this practice is of course restricted in actualization because the 
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ability to call in sick from work in this way and get paid without getting fired is the 
privilege of a limited few, the suggestion itself projected a way to turn the scripts of 
pathologization into unintended consequences that subvert the working world and its 
dependence on LGBTQ workers.  
Another example that Bing and Scheibman draw from is a chart by the Guerilla 
Girls art activist group that reconfigures the homeland terror alert system introduced by 
the Bush administration by replacing each threat level with worries about rising sexism 
and nationalism.385  
If we consider the specific humor directed at the homeland terror system, the 
model presented by Bing and Scheibman creates a space of transformed meaning by 
blending a warning system based on threats to citizens with a concern about threats and 
obstructions to women’s rights. This process, which Bing and Scheibman describes as 
“conceptual blending” borrowing from the work of Seana Coulson,386 playfully creates a 
space where threats to women have now become foregrounded through the 
reappropriation of the original warning system. Drawing from Coulson’s work is crucial 
because she acknowledges that shifts in language connect with shifts in background 
knowledge about the world,387 and that language involved in humor, frame-shifting, and 
conceptual blending can interact with images and situations.388  
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Figure 1. Reappropriation and transformation of the U. S. Homeland Terror Alert System 
by The Guerilla Girls. The Guerilla Girls, “The U.S. Homeland Terror Alert System for 
Women,” Posters, Stickers, Billboards, Videos, Actions: 1985-2017, 2003, last accessed 




Though their reappropriation borrows from the existing structure of the image 
such that the Guerilla Girls’ reiterated chart could have never happened without the Bush 
Administration creating the existing homeland security threat scale, the Guerilla Girls’ 
reconfiguration simultaneously has been steered against the original intentions of the 
image. The Department of Homeland Security, created under President George W. Bush, 
would certainly never center his administration and its platforms as a cause for worry 
about homeland security (let alone reconfigure the meaning of “homeland security” to 
center women in the US and internationally), and yet the Guerilla Girls have repurposed 
the structure of the image to center the administration’s policy as a danger. The original 
context of the image has thus been juxtaposed with a feminist message, and effectively 
decontextualized and recontextualized against its own aims through humor’s ability to 
transform a situation by reworking its existing framework against its own terms. 
On one hand, I find it important to acknowledge that this reappropriation of the 
W. Bush administration’s iconography refuses to engage with the content of the image on 
its own terms. The Guerilla Girls do not launch into a straightforward public treatise or 
reasoned procedure of discourse (such as those advocated for by liberals who might 
disdain, say, punching Nazis in favor of instead defeating them in the combat of debate). 
The Guerilla Girls do not provide a set of premises and conclusions for why the 
homeland security office should have instead addressed feminist concerns, or why their 
set of warnings may be better served by taking the health and safety of women worldwide 
seriously, which likely would have fallen on unconcerned ears. Instead, the Guerilla Girls 
effectively prey upon the existing message, addressing its imagery and iconography, and 
turn away from it by transforming the image itself. I will consider this process in more 
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detail shortly, but it is useful to point out here that though this practice of reappropriation 
is more publicly intelligible than Kristeva’s focus on humor, it is not a slave to thetic or 
straightforward symbolic demands. I will refer to this practice as humorwork to center the 
skilled process of recontextualizing an existing message, image, or situation through 
engaged practice. 
Despite this aside into the tricks at the disposal of humorwork, I am convinced 
that Guerilla Girls’ practice of transformation through reappropriation and reworking the 
existing image is not wholly accounted for by Kristeva's description of semiotic 
subversion against the concretized symbolic register. While the Guerilla Girls rework the 
administration’s own “terror alert system” through possibilities revealed by its existing 
structure of color-coded threat levels, the feminist message that is now harbored by the 
Guerilla Girls’ transformed feminist “homeland terror alert system” is understandable as 
a public critique of the existing regime. Kristeva’s emphasis on the subversion of 
humorous practice and its threat of madness or chaotic semiotic revelry thus seems to 
mismatch the more overt political alteration of the homeland security system on a public 
scale. The Guerilla Girls have not tapped into unintelligibility and insanity, and remain in 
conversation with the public sphere while choosing to engage with the administration’s 
icons through reappropriation and transformation rather than confronting the icon on its 
own terms through ordered critique or public debate. 
I am thus not convinced that all practices of humor will risk throwing women into 
a revolutionary semiotic insanity, and I suspect that the many women practitioners of 
humorwork who do not find themselves at the thrall of uncontained semiotic rupture will 
agree. As with the Guerilla Girls, it strikes me that many women do not slide on the slick 
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slope towards total semiotic instability when practicing many different kinds of humor, 
and that even if we granted that women have less symbolic protection than men due to 
their relationship to a chora or some other structural principle of unstable psychology, the 
reality of feminist political humor seems to go beyond madness while still evading classic 
liberal (though perhaps often masculine-coded) public debate. Examples such as 
reappropriating the homeland security terror alert system convey an intelligible 
engagement rather than a more dichotomous war between the weaponized irrationalism 
of the semiotic and an intelligible symbolic world of patriarchal order. Women have more 
tricks up our sleeves, even if we might reserve the right to bare our most serpentine 
selves and finally return the men to stone. 
Of course, administrations change, but feminists continue to practice political and 
public forms of humorful reappropriation and transformation even during the politically 
tumultuous and disorientating first days of the Trump administration. In addition to 
President Donald Trump’s racist and enthusiastically ignorant approach to policy, he has 
expressed extreme sexism towards women with his actions (cf. the reinstatement of the 
global gag rule) and comments about women. Famously, Trump’s statements about 
women recorded from behind the scenes at a 2005 shooting of the show Access 
Hollywood displayed his virulent and casual sexism. Trump is recorded talking about his 
sexual advances on a woman, recounting that he “moved on her very heavily” and 
advising to another man, “Grab ’em by the pussy. You can do anything” when interacting 
with a woman.389 After the transcript of Trump’s conversation was leaked, feminists 
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online and graffiti artists in the street immediately began reappropriating and 
transforming Trump’s now-iconic sexist statement by centering “pussy” in a different 
light, creating the rallying cry “PUSSY GRABS BACK.”390 
Though there were more direct political responses to Trump’s leaked statement, 
and many feminists engaged in direct, traditional (liberal and/or discursive) critique in 
addition to physically standing together in the streets, the practice of reappropriation and 
transformation displayed in the “PUSSY GRABS BACK” slogan introduces a 
humorwork that engages with Trump’s slogan by transforming it against its own terms 
into the creation of a feminist call for resistance. It takes up Trump’s emphasis on pussy 
and acknowledges the visceral sexism of his support for nonconsensually grabbing 
women’s bodies, but also reappropriates the centrality of “pussy” to effect a 
transformation towards feminist action against Trump.  
This practice of humorwork is both intelligible in public speech and as a public 
rallying cry. Trump still won the election despite the use of “PUSSY GRABS BACK” to 
encourage women voting against Trump, but the reappropriation of Trump’s “pussy” 
maintains (and perhaps has increased) in its power. During the record-setting Women’s 
March on Washington and across the globe on January 21st, one of the most iconic 
symbols of the mass protests was the “pussy hat,” simultaneously bringing together the 
dire circumstances of Trump’s “pussy” comment, the rallying reappropriation of 
“PUSSY GRABS BACK,” and a heightened focus on the attack against women’s 
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autonomy caused by the threatened access to abortion, contraception, and health services 
in the United States and globally.  
 
 
Figure 2. “PUSSY GRABS BACK” graphic by Amanda Duarte and Jessica Bennett 
promoting voting. Amanda Duarte and Jessica Bennett, Twitter post, October 7, 2016, 




The humorous reappropriation and transformation of Trump’s slogan is thus, like 
the Guerilla Girl’s “The U.S. Homeland Terror Alert System for Women,” an intelligible 
practice even as it powerfully refuses countering Trump’s through polite debate and 
straightforward, measured discourse. In a few paragraphs I will explain why this refusal 
is so important, and how this distinguishes humorwork as a political practice (or feminist 




Figure 3. “PUSSY GRABS BACK” graffiti on a sidewalk in Eugene, Oregon. Photo 
taken by the author at the intersection of Blair Ave. and 4th Ave. during winter 2017. 
 
 In her book Memes in Digital Culture Limor Shifman emphasizes more broadly 
that humor on the Internet, especially in the form of viral humor and memes (which I will 
discuss more in Chapter VII), can be used to participate in public and political life as a 
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practice of expression, communication, and connection. Specifically, Shifman argues that 
viral humor and memes often serve a variety of goals, ranging from uncoordinated 
expression to viral and meme coordination in “both in grassroots and top-down 
campaigns.”391 Shifman breaks the varieties of political participation through “virals and 
memes” into three kinds of practices. First, she emphasizes that memes may be used as 
“forms of persuasion or political advocacy,” including election campaigns and public 
persuasion. Second, memes may serve as “grassroots action,” coordinating action among 
citizens that may have otherwise not have taken place or had as much broadcasting 
power. Third, memes may serve as “modes of expression and public discussion,” 
providing social and political commentary, a vehicle for sharing opinions and debating, 
negotiating identity with others, and socially passing time.392 It is thus limiting to frame 
humor primarily as a surge of semiotic chaos against the more stable symbolic, since 
viral humor and humorous memes can be used for a wide range of intelligible, public, 
and even mundane or trivial expression.  
In their essay “Between Feminism and Fun(n)ymism,” Limor Shifman and Dafna 
Lemish connect the public and political practice of humor to women and feminism more 
specifically. In contrast to the hope that Web 2.0 would provide more agency for women 
for political self-expression on their own terms or the proposal via Hélène Cixous that 
women’s writing unleashed would open a voice beyond patriarchal norms, Shifman and 
Lemish conclude that much of women’s humor and humor distributed to and among 
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women online is post-feminist humor rather than feminist humor.393 Whereas feminist 
humor “includes opposition to the current state of gender inequalities and hegemonic 
stereotyping,”394 post-feminist humor instead shallowly takes up the feminist goal of 
empowerment devoid of liberatory political aims, instead emphasizing stereotypical 
individualist consumption.395 Specifically, when analyzing post-feminist humor in more 
detail, Shifman and Lemish reported, “…the stereotypes underpinning [post-feminist 
humor] tend to preserve traditional framings of femininity and masculinity, and entrench 
them even further in more sophisticated and salient ways.”396 The intersection between 
capitalism, patriarchy, and mass culture on the Internet thus leads many women to a 
practice of humor that is not necessarily a revolutionary, embodied, and chaotically risky 
upsurge against stable speech, but instead may take the form of patriarchal backlash 
while adopting a feminist, revolutionary guise. 
There thus seems to be a wider range of ways in which women and feminists 
practice humor, and that the effects of this practice are not totally captured by Kristeva’s 
warnings about women’s humor, and even by her emphasis on semiotic practice upon and 
within the symbolic register. Humor need not be a play of the revolutionary sensuous 
nonsense within order, but may also involve an intelligible reappropriation and 
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transformation of contexts ranging from political iconography (such as the Homeland 
Security Terror Alert System) to supposedly off-the-record articulations of desire and 
conquest (such as Trump’s articulation of his desire for sexual assault).  As seen with the 
warning system, or the use of “PUSSY GRABS BACK” and pussy hats, humorwork can 
be orderly and calculated even as it significantly shifts the icons and speech it preys upon. 
Such practices of humor, I suggest, challenge Kristeva’s location of humorous 
disruptions (and perhaps even poetic disruptions) at the semiotic register. While some 
practices of humor and laughter seem to disturb the register of the symbolic and 
patriarchal/men’s speech itself, perhaps including the avant-garde humorful wordplay 
that preoccupied Kristeva in Revolution, the register of the symbolic itself seems open to 
a rupture that is not covered by a primary focus on semiotic subversions. 
 
Symbolic Disturbances: Humor from Derrida to Wittig 
 In this context, it is useful to consider why Kristeva emphasizes the semiotic in 
relation to revolutionary poetic language. In addition to her general critiques of 
linguistics and philosophers of language who ignore the role of the embodied subject who 
produces language,397 she also critiques Derrida’s emphasis on subversions of speech 
through differance. In Limited Inc. and Of Grammatology Derrida distinctly emphasizes 
that speech is not tethered to a particular intention, but instead can be frayed apart and 
reweaved into different configurations. The author does not control the interpretation of 
the text, which leads to a proliferation of possibilities for encountering a text in the 
                                               




author’s absence.398 In contrast, Kristeva’s Revolution critiques Derrida for featuring the 
play of language without its embodied force of life. Kristeva argues that Derrida’s 
linguistics gets lost in a "deluge of meaning" that abandons the subject and the material 
aspects of language, as if the possibilities provided by differance only involve a 
disembodied sovereign reorganizing language as a dead refuse.399 In this context, 
Kristeva’s emphasis on the semiotic also serves as an endrived emphasis on the subject 
who speaks by bringing their chaotic semiotic practice of language to the fore rather than 
hiding the messiness of the psyche in an attempt to understand language in a purified 
register. Tilottama Rajan suggests that Derrida remains an influence for Kristeva as she 
continues to borrow from and work upon Derridean insights into repetition through her 
discussion of rejection, which relocates differance in materiality and drives.400 In this 
way, Kristeva presents a unique emphasis on poetic language (and indeed humor and 
laughter) as a motivated practice undertaken by a speaking embodied subject, and her 
concurrent semiotic and symbolic registers restore this life to discussions of language. 
 However, given my emphasis earlier that humorwork (including humorwork 
undertaken by women) need not be a practice that is fundamentally aligned with the 
semiotic against the symbolic, I suggest that Derrida recognizes a key aspect of play and 
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self-disruption within the more intelligible reaches of language, including the symbolic 
that Kristeva views as a concretized, rigid surface obscuring (but produced by) semiotic 
play.401 Derrida rightly indicates that play and self-disruption can occur in the register 
that Kristeva associates with the publicly intelligible symbolic, with produced language, 
text, and iconography prone to profound feats of recontextualization, reappropriation and 
transformation. Though Kristeva rightly centers the embodied subject as a focus for 
philosophers’ sustained concern, Derrida is also crucially invested in the ways language 
can become decontextualized, recontextualized, and transformed beyond semiotic 
disturbances. That is to say, though language disruptions may not be separable from the 
semiotic ruptures that produce and interrupt language in Kristeva’s model, this does not 
foreclose the additional disruption of language in the realm of the symbolic and public 
discourse, and hence a disruptive play of language, image, and situation that may be 
madcap without risking madness. Or, in other words, language is not only ruptured by a 
one-sided disruption of solidified speech by the endrived forces of the semiotic and its 
chora a la Kristeva, but also may occur primarily within the realm of reworkable and 
transformable stable speech. Humor may have an affinity for madness, but is capable of 
wearing many different (sometimes pink-eared) hats. 
 Beyond Derrida, a more political emphasis on feminist disruptions of symbolic 
speech that do not depend upon the molten semiotic are found in the work of Monique 
Wittig. Like Kristeva (and, indeed, Irigaray and Cixous), Wittig shares an interest in the 
world set forth by men and its resulting discourse, in contrast to the ability of women (or 
                                               




in Wittig’s framework, those classed as women) to forge a world on their own terms. 
Though Wittig is often rightly distanced from other French feminist theorists such as 
Irigaray and Kristeva due to disagreements over the ontology of woman, she still 
distinctly shares an interest in how to shatter the world constructed for women by men.  
In this context, Wittig asserts that sex does not exist (at least in its current form) 
except as the oppressive production of an "ideology of sexual difference,"402 stressing 
that this ideology is maintained by "the dominant thought" reinforced by a "body of 
discourses."403 Because of these discourses, sex is asserted as natural rather than socially 
constructed in order to instate “society as heterosexual” and subjugate women to men 
through marriage,404 denying the possibility for the class of women to live on their own 
terms outside of the heterosexual demands of the category of sex. Wittig stresses this 
category is "totalitarian," enforced through law and violence, and shapes both the body 
and mind through the control of "all mental production."405 For Wittig, the heterosexual 
ideology's silencing language is best understood not as involving a realm of “Irreal 
Ideals” but instead as enacting “material oppression” and violence upon its subjects.406 
Wittig writes, "These discourses of heterosexuality oppress us in the sense that they 
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prevent us from speaking unless we speak in their terms"407 to the extent that “Outlaw 
and mad are the names for those who refuse to go by the rules and conventions, as well as 
for those who refuse to or cannot speak a common language.”408 
Wittig refers to the bundle of discourses that use their totalizing power "materially 
and actually upon our bodies and our minds" as “the straight mind.”409 The straight mind 
universalizes itself into "history, social reality, culture, language, and all the subjective 
phenomenon" and is unable to think outside of its concepts.410 Wittig asserts that in order 
to escape the discourse of sexual difference that has been instated by the straight mind 
such that the class of women can speak outside of it, a revolution must occur at the level 
of concepts involving "a political semiology” and operating "at the level of 
language/manifesto” and “language/action" that will "break off the heterosexual contract" 
and "abolish men and women."411 In order for women to speak, the totalizing category of 
sex that subjugates them in a totalizing, heterosexual relationship to the class of men 
must be destroyed. 
For this purpose, and this is the moment I am most interested in for the present 
task at hand, Wittig introduces what she calls a "war machine," a practice of language 
that disrupts the discursive order imposed by the class of men. She compares the war 
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machine to the figure of the Trojan horse, a statue that was accepted because the Trojans 
thought they recognized its form, but which led to their ruin when let in the gates.412 
When considering an existing body of literature, the task of a writer is "either to 
reproduce existing forms or to create new ones," with language serving as a "raw 
material" for this purpose.413 During this process, words can be divested of their typical 
meaning and re-fashioned to impress a "shock" upon the listener due to the generation of 
new associations, dispositions, arrangements, and separate uses of words.414 Under 
Wittig’s framework, these ripples within language have real material effects upon the 
world because language is a crucial part of the material fabric from which the world is 
made. This refashioning of words is thus also a refashioning of worlds and their 
possibilities.  
Wittig’s figure of the “war machine” metaphor dwells on the politics of this 
refashioning, which initially covertly and ultimately concretely disrupts the (already 
politicized) realm of established speech. The material link between word and world 
causes the disruption and refashioning of words to have material effects upon the existing 
constructed reality, to the extent that disrupting and reworking language may function as 
a “war machine” upon the established order. While these war machines may be more 
blatant, some practices of language disruption like the “Trojan Horse” are initially 
introduced covertly as a familiar formation but then revealed as overtly revolutionary and 
shocking. Though Wittig asserts that women’s revolutionary disruptions in language are 
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often situated outside dictated arrangements of language such that they may be seen as 
mad, women (and especially lesbian women), they can nonetheless sow the seeds of 
revolution by overtly contesting the existing paradigms of the straight mind (or what we 
might call heteropatriarchy) through language in order to blast it apart from within. In 
this context, associations between disruptions of the existing order and insanity may 
come not from the workings of the psyche, but instead from the heteropatriarchal order of 
the world and its language. 
I do not intend to wholly dismiss Kristeva’s work by challenging its claim to 
humor in its entirety. In fact, at the end of this chapter I will explain cases of humor 
where Kristeva’s insights continue to be distinctly helpful and relevant. I find this to be a 
moderate and accommodating move, since Kristeva’s writings on laughter and its 
practice were often focused on avant-garde poets specifically415 and hence need a bit 
more elaboration when solely focused on laughter or humorwork. 
 It is also important to address that though Wittig does share an interest in laughter 
through her novel Les Guérillères, she does not specifically discuss humor in her work. 
However, her materialist emphasis on the manipulable fabric of the language produced 
under the regime of the straight mind and the redeployment of this material language as a 
war machine against the world-making language of a heteropatriarchal order stands out as 
a potentially useful framework for humor beyond its semiotic force and beyond a risk of 
psychic madness (even as the humorist might be labeled mad or outcast through the lens 
of the straight mind). 
                                               




 In this context, I find it useful to lay down a more concrete formulation of 
humor’s manipulations to both situate my position in relation to Wittig and Kristeva, as 
well as to fulfill my own mandate from the previous chapter that feminist theories of 
humor need to be more concrete and specific. In what follows I will thus further specify 
how humor works in the context of its practices from symbolic to semiotic, and from 
trivial and outright political to avant-garde and truly loony. 
 
Specifying Humor’s War Machine 
I have argued thus far that humor need not lapse into madness to reappropriate 
and transform existing discourse and imagery. This does not mean that Kristeva is wrong 
that laughter and humor can be related to madness and the rupture of stable speech 
through an upsurge of the living endrived body. Rather, I am suggesting there are other 
practices of humor that do not draw their powers from such an unstable source, instead 
more firmly anchored in the crust of intelligible (but manipulable) messages. Before I 
flesh out a topography of humor’s varying levels of disruption, I want to further specify 
humor’s ability to prey upon existing discourse and imagery. In short, I am unsatisfied 
with using a language of humorwork that can only describe vague notions of 
“reappropriate” and “recontextualize” and “transform” without including more detail 
about how this happens. 
 In the effort of further specifying humor’s practice, I find it useful to turn to the 
work of Delia Chiaro. Chiaro is an editor, along with Raffaella Baccolini, of the 
explicitly feminist volume Gender and Humor: Interdisciplinary and International 
Perspectives volume of humor studies research. In her earlier book The Language of 
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Jokes, Chiaro discusses several key operations of humor in the context of word 
manipulation, explicitly linking humor to laughter416 but also crucially with wordplay and 
its practice. She writes, “...[A]ny joke, whether it contains a pun or not, by their very 
nature of its verbalization, necessarily plays on language."417 Due to this focus on 
wordplay, Chiaro thus distinctly centers humor’s intricate ability to play with words 
while avoiding the rigid and abstract schemas of Raskin’s and Attardo’s general theories 
of humor that I critiqued in Chapter II. Chiaro places wordplay in motion so to center its 
dynamism without getting lost in formulating the necessary conditions of humor via 
scripts and schemas. Importantly for my concern of discussing humorwork in action, she 
is also interested in concrete deployments of humor and jokes rather than abstract 
laughter. 
Throughout her book, Chiaro mentions several ways jokes play with words, often 
relying on creating traps, exploiting ambiguity, or otherwise disrupting the context of a 
situation. Generally, the art of trapping through humor creates or exploits manipulable 
traps in language to dramatically transform the context of discourse. An example of this 
is when graffiti is used on existing signs and posters in order to alter the language (by 
manipulating words and letters) to humorous effect.418 This is the tactic used by the 
earlier Guerilla Girls example, as the existing iconography of the poster is used as a trap 
to bring the Terror Alert System into the context of more feminist aims. In this context, 
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Chiaro writes, "The joker tempers with serious written language in a way which is not 
immediately obvious, yet which, at the same time, reflects some kind of unseen trap 
inherent in the original text..."419 This strategy primarily focuses on reappropriating an 
already existing artifact or situation. 
In other cases, a joke-teller might set up an interactive game of word formation 
for the recipient that leads them to an unforeseen trap in language.420 When practicing a 
trapping technique in the form of luring, the humorist tricks the other party (or parties) 
into having their discourse twisted away from its original context by luring them into a 
prepared recontextualization. In grade school I recall minding my own business while 
enjoying recess when another student asked me if I would sing the song “Yankee 
Doodle” with an F in front of every word. I of course complied, singing, “Fankie Foodle 
fent foo fown a-fiding fon fis fony, fe fuck…” while the student went to the nearest adult 
and told on me for saying the offensive word fuck. This resulted in quite a lecture from 
the recess monitor while the other student had trouble holding in his amused laughter.   
Similarly, jokes often create an expectation only to thwart it and lead to a 
surprising result,421 such as replacing an expected outcome with a pun.422 For example, 
one protest sign attached to a dog during the Women’s March on Washington began to 
ascribe high values to the canine sign-bearer with the message “I WALK AND STAND 
                                               
419 Ibid. 
 
420 Ibid., 36. 
 
421 Ibid., 49. 
 




FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE…” which then leads to the more light-hearted “...- and Sit / 
-and Fetch.”423  
 
 
Figure 4. “Protestor pup” photographed by user @arzesux on Twitter during the 2017 
Women’s March. Arzesux, Twitter post, January 21, 2017, 12:33 p.m., 
https://twitter.com/arzesux/status/822905013332799488/. 
 
                                               






Other jokes, such as prank phone calls may ensnare their marks into manipulative play in 
ways that are not quite so adorable or delightful for their target. Jokes thus frequently 
play unfair with expectations and habits,424 and Chiaro writes, "... all jokes work on 
opportunity, and surely part of the inventor's skill is to seek out the unseen traps of the 
language and then exploit them for humorous means."425 
Another related element of jokes is playing off ambiguity. Chiaro asserts that 
"lexical play" often involves placing an ambiguous, "two-faced" item within a situation 
only to have that situation unexpectedly "adapt" to the item itself rather than vice 
versa.426 In this way, the clever placement of a linguistic trap can completely 
recontextualize the situation due to the possibilities offered by ambiguity. A classic 
feminist example of this is an image of graffiti from the 1970s that targeted a car 
advertisement. Originally, the ad features a photo and displays the sexist script, “If it 
were a lady, it would get its bottom pinched,” comparing a woman to a car. In response a 
woman took of the latent ambiguity of the comparison between women and cars to 
respond in spray paint, “If this lady was a car she’d run you down.”427 
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Figure 5. Car advertisement feminist graffiti photographed by Jill Posener in 1979. Jill 
Posener, “Fiat/Ad Graffiti,” in Gender and Humor: Interdisciplinary and International 
Perspectives, ed. Delia Chiaro and Raffaela Baccolini (New York: Routledge, 2014), 21. 
 
Ambiguity is thus exploited as a certain "open-endedness" which "[paves] the way for 
manipulation."428 Jokes, in this way, can expose the "two-faced" character of certain 
texts,429 even when this has previously gone unnoticed.  
Another way that a joke can play with language is through disruption. Sometimes 
this disruption concerns distinctions between straightforwardness and play. In addition to 
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the previously mentioned playful manipulation of set slogans and iconography via 
graffiti, certain jokes begin in a serious manner only to betray their humorous intention in 
the punchline.430 There are also jokes that use the technique of trapping to convince the 
interlocutor that they are in the realm of humorous discourse when in fact the joke ends 
on a serious note, the unexpected trajectory from humorousness to seriousness becoming 
itself part of the joke.431 Chiaro asserts, "...the area in which serious discourse ends and 
humorous discourse begins is not necessarily well-defined."432 Even in serious, everyday 
conversation, jokes are able to change our course "so that an interlude of humorous 
discourse replaces the serious discourse which had been going on previously,"433 often 
resulting in a cascade of jest.434 Graffiti is again a useful context where the malleability of 
markers and spray paint in public space permits interesting (and frequently humorous) 
disruptions of context through words and imagery. In the image below, for example, the 
phrase “feminism is cancer” is manipulated by crossing out the “is” to replace it with 
“Fights.” 
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Figure 6. “Feminism Fights Cancer” graffiti in a coffee shop bathroom. Taken by the 
author in Eugene, Oregon during spring 2017. 
 
Other times this disruption occurs at the same time as a new context or new 
message settles into the disrupted space. Even though when a trap is placed, it often 
makes it so "the text unravels," this disruption is also able to contribute to "overall 
cohesion,"435 the disruption completely shifting the text into an unexpected, yet cohesive 
formations. The Guerilla Girls simultaneously disrupt the messages of the government-
issued Terror Warning System while concretizing their own feminist and anti-imperialist 
message. 
 
                                               




Humorwork in Public and Off the Wall 
 Chiaro’s analysis of humorous wordplay are relevant for the interests of both 
Kristeva and Wittig, as well as the other feminist philosophers discussed in the previous 
chapter. From a Kristevan perspective, Chiaro’s framework is useful for the various ways 
that concretized language is not so stable, able to be disrupted through deployments of 
excess in discourse such as playing off of ambiguity. In this way, the open-endedness of 
humor retains its connection with new possibilities. From a Wittigean perspective, the 
manipulations of language that occur through humor’s techniques of play are distinctly 
helpful for her emphasis on deploying language as a war machine and Trojan horse. Like 
the Trojan horse, humor deftly is able to trap and warp the existing structures of 
language. Finally, humor fits many of the aims that feminist philosophers have in 
praising laughter, as its ability to bend and trap existing speech opens up distinct new 
possibilities beyond the existing setup of the world. Several forms of humorwork are thus 
a potentially potent form of feminist political practice, capable of stretching and bending 
structures of the world to revel in new arrangements. 
 To further specify how humor operates, it is also helpful to discuss the range of its 
practice from trivial rearrangements, to political transformations, and finally to more 
semiotic and chaotic modes of practice. Reaching this moment is the main point of the 
critique of Kristeva earlier in this section, and now it will become apparent that her 
insights remain relevant rather than cast aside as obsolete. 
The first grouping of humor that I find useful to distinguish is banal humor. In this 
case, neither a Kristevan nor Wittigean perspective on political aesthetics seems to cover 
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the manipulations made by trivial humor. One example we might consider in this case is 
a classic joke made by the Joke Analysis Production Engine, mentioned in Chapter II: 
Q: What kind of murderer has fibre? 
A: A cereal killer.436 
In this context, Kristeva’s emphasis on the flows and surges of embodied drives and the 
ability of the semiotic to rupture the symbolic stands as too profound in comparison to 
the blandness of this specific linguistic maneuver in the form of a terrible pun. Likewise, 
though this passage does play on an existing ambiguity in language that may have passed 
through undetected in more straightforward contexts, in this context we are dealing with a 
hobby horse rather than the might of a Wittigean Trojan Horse. As the worst of puns 
reminds us, not all humor may be primarily a chaotic, semiotic upsurge, or a revolution 
against racist heteropatriarchy, even if these symbolic displays still retain their 
connection to heterogeneous, disruptable language. 
Consider another trivial joke, which you may blame on the author of this essay: 
 Q: What do you call a depressed pianist? 
 A: Chopinhauer. 
At best, the ambiguity in the symbols and their phonetics are being revealed, but this 
mostly occurs in the form of a disruptive triviality. The reason for this is that these jokes 
only manipulate the least potent ambiguities and detect the most mundane, politically 
distant traps, as if language is splayed out before the humorist like a quaint skeleton and 
they are satisfied with merely showing that the elbow looks funny when glued to the 
forehead of the skull. As such, trivial jokes have the revolutionary might of a ripple in a 
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pond on a summer’s day, although they may serve an important role in fostering 
community through shared laughter.437 
Second, it is useful to consider more impactful examples of wordplay, which 
cause the symbolic to fall prey to unseen traps in language that involve significant 
subversions. The classic example, as seen in Bing’s and Scheibman’s work,438 is the car 
advertisement graffiti that I discussed above. In this context, we may also consider 
additional signs from recent protests.439 The “First They Came for…” protest sign held up 
during protests against Executive Order 13769 issued President Trump against refugees, 
immigrants, travelers, students, and citizens from predominantly Muslim countries 
reappropriates and transforms the well-known quote from German pastor Martin 
Niemöller reflecting on the violent mass murder of political dissidents and marginalized 
people during Nazi Germany: 
 First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out— 
Because I was not a Socialist. 
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out— 
Because I was not a Trade Unionist. 
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out— 
Because I was not a Jew. 
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.440 
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Figure 7. “First They Came for…” protest sign against Executive Order 13769 
photographed by Jessie Sholl. Jessie Sholl, Instagram post, January 28, 2017, 
https://www.instagram.com/p/BP03IH7hzhb/?hl=en./ 
 
The protest sign, drawing from connections that protestors and other concerned US 
residents have been making between the policies of the Trump administration and fascist 
administrations across the world and throughout history (including Nazi Germany), 
begins with the pattern of “came for” in Pastor Niemöller’s poem. The past of who the 
Nazis came for is brought into the present of a fascist Trump administrator coming for 
Muslims through the immigration executive order. However, this reappropriation of the 
Pastor’s reflection into contemporary times also allows for the possibility that this pattern 
could be stopped, for example, through engaged action and protest. Hence, the line, 
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“…And We SAID NOT TODAY MOTHERFUCKER!” is a transformation of the 
possibilities presented in the original quote through a contemporary space of resistance. 
 This protest sign, like the transformed slogan in the advertisement of the car, 
represents Bing’s and Scheibman’s emphasis that humor’s recontextualizations and 
transformations are a practice of introducing “a new possible world” from existing 
situations.441 When analyzing the car advertisement graffiti and Guerilla Girls Homeland 
Security mentioned above, Bing and Scheibman argue that that humor practice can effect 
a shift towards a previously unasserted array of possibilities in the form of a 
“hypothetical world,” even including a “utopia.”442 Examples such as the “NOT TODAY 
MOTHERFUCKER” sign are thus able to recontextualize an energetic shift from the 
morbid past of fascism towards a possible world that does not repeat brutal practices of 
marginalization and elimination. The car graffiti similarly projects different possibilities 
through transforming the sexist ad, as the practice of humorwork here recontextualizes a 
message about objectifying women into a possible situation of women’s agency, 
including the ability to strike back and “run over” worlds of sexist objectification. While 
these examples of humorwork do not engage in straightforward argumentative discourse, 
they nonetheless maintain a clear message in publicly digestible discourse, cooling any 
semiotic fire enough to remain intelligible while recontextualizing sexist and fascist 
projections. 
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Finally, consider the most chaotic and subversive practice of humor that call forth 
significant semiotic eruptions. These might range from absurdist jokes that defy neatly-
regimented symbolic discourse while nonetheless making their intelligible and effective 
mark upon the existing order to a practice of humor that revels in extreme disruptions of 
intelligibility through inappropriateness, bizarreness, and/or nonsense. 
A more intelligible yet chaotic (and forcefully semiotic in Kristevan terms) 
practice of humor includes many (but by no means all) of comedian and performance 
artist Kristine Wong’s scripted shows and interviews. While Wong is interested in 
feminist and antiracist practices of humor, to the extent that she explicitly describes her 
humorwork practice as “getting inside the situation like the Trojan horse,” Wong also 
frequently uses frantic speech, gesture, and embodied movement along with props to give 
her humorwork a disruptive, semiotic edge.443 It makes sense that Wong would want to 
incorporate this technique in her political displays of humor, as one of her more frantic 
and off-kilter performances is an embodied practice of staging mental illness and the 
ways it gets covered by society. Wong is thus politically taking up gestures often 
associated with women undergoing a mental health crisis to highlight the extent to which 
women (and especially Asian American women) are expected to be hypercompetent and 
not ask for help.444 
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More non-political forays into unintelligibility and absurdity is displayed by 
several practices of Internet humor that recontextualize existing images and disrupt 
discourse with extreme results. One simple example is the transformation of the 
otherwise benign Garfield comic by Jim Davis into varying levels of absurdity. The 
Garfield without Garfield trend of comic manipulations, for example, showcases the 
strange results when the character Garfield is removed from the comic strip while Jon and 
his speech bubbles remain. What results is a transformation of the comic that lacks a 
concrete politics and is mostly humorous for its absurd (or even nihilistic) results. 
Garfield without Garfield itself has resulted in several similar absurd 
transformations of the comic, including “Realfield” where Garfield is replaced with a 
non-responsive more realistic cartoon orange cat. Another Garfield variant is Lasagna 
Cat, which was started by the sketch comedy group Fatal Farm in 2008 and features 
awkward live-action performances of Garfield strips, including a costumed Garfield and 
Odie, that are followed by more absurd (and sometimes disturbing) remixes of the strip 
set to music. In one video, set to the tune of Billy Idol’s “Eyes Without a Face,” 
Garfield’s face becomes distorted and blown up, with his eyeballs eventually falling out 
of their sockets as he continues to stare with gaping eyeholes at the viewer, in a strange 
mix of humor and horror.445 
 
                                               






Figure 8. Garfield comic strip by Jim Davis edited by Dan Walsh to exclude Garfield in 
Garfield Minus Garfield as absurdist humor. Dan Walsh, Garfield Minus Garfield, 
February 23, 2008, http://garfieldminusgarfield.net/day/2008/02/23/. 
 
In addition to these Garfield manipulations, other Internet accounts use 
disruptions of speech and expectation in the form of ongoing Twitter accounts. One 
example is the account Carrot Facts (@RealCarrotFacts on Twitter), which on its face is a 
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Twitter account that states facts about carrots, but instead plunges into frequent 
misspellings, unintelligible juxtapositions between carrots and politics, and frequent 
lamentations over some other character named Megan. Tweets such as “croat have 
flavor,”446 “Merry chrismas carrot have vitaman A Megan left me I wish she was still 
with me I will never met another girl like her I am so deprensed,”447 and “carrot are Good 
and taste good  donal Trump should not be president”448 range from confusing to absurd. 
Here, we may even reach the moment in Kristeva’s About Chinese Women in which 
Kristeva describes the threat of laughter shattering “symbolic armour” unto ecstasy and 
madness.449 It is this laughter and practice of humor that a non-Kristevan contemporary 
humor theory is least equipped to analyze, as it can only gaze at a symbolic play of pure 
words without any intimate revolts of the subject. More broadly, absurdist and chaotic 
humor also shares an affinity with the subversive but suspended temporality of the 
Bakhtinian masculine carnivalesque450 and the “destruction without reserve” found in the 
work of Georges Bataille.451 
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Each of these examples suggests a range of humor in relation to semiotic and 
symbolic, and I invoke them to suggest not only that Kristeva’s writings on language 
transform the disembodied domain of contemporary humor studies, but also that 
engaging Kristeva’s writings with specific, concrete practices of humor may alter her 
picture of laughter as well. The heterogeneity of language that Kristeva seeks to restore is 
thus an intricate, messy heterogeneity, and admits of a range of intricate and conflicting 
perspectives on humor. Feminist philosophers such as Wittig help to make this range 
clearer, and the work of feminist humor scholars such as Chiaro, Bing, and Scheibman 
help to ground the discussion of humorwork’s practice with more specificity. 
 
The Enduring Importance of Feminist Philosophy for Humor Studies 
There is a risk that the reader could finish this chapter and decide that feminist 
philosophy is not very useful for much at all. What is the value of framing humor studies 
through a feminist philosophy of humor when feminists in linguistics and across the 
many non-philosophy vantage points of humor studies as an interdisciplinary practice are 
certainly up for the challenge of theorizing humor? Before moving to the next chapter, I 
find it worthwhile to reiterate why I find it valuable to continue centering Irigaray, 
Cixous, Willett, Kristeva, Ahmed, Wittig, Bettcher, Manne, and other feminist 
philosophers as interlocutors in the project of crafting a robust feminist social and 
political philosophy of humor. 
 First, I find it important to linger on the importance of Kristeva for feminist 
philosophy, and especially a feminist understanding of language as it connects with the 
practice of an embodied speaking subject. There is a risk that this chapter comes across as 
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consigning Kristeva to the fate of tempered correction, having distributed the dynamics 
of humor between semiotic and symbolic according to various intensities that leaves 
more semiotic, revolutionary upsurges of language back on the fringes. This is 
unsatisfying from a Kristevan perspective, given that it may come across as setting her 
insights that semiotic drives continue to constitute the seemingly-stable symbolic aside in 
favor of reasserting precisely the stable symbolic picture that she argues against while 
trivializing her unique contributions to feminist philosophy.  
 In this context, it is helpful to return to the passage from About Chinese Women 
contrasting men’s and women’s laughter. As a refresher, in this passage Kristeva asserts 
that men’s laughter avoids falling into total semiotic chaos through a gendered symbolic 
armor in contrast to women risking total semiotic madness when engaging in laughter.452 
Because Kristeva writes very little explicitly about laughter, it is tempting to take up this 
one passage as an insurmountable barrier to women’s capabilities for political laughter 
since Kristeva suggests it always risks falling into a total semiotic break with 
intelligibility. Overall, by invoking Wittig I have rejected a dichotomy between stable 
speech and revolutionary speech by focusing on the ruptures possible in even the 
supposedly stable speech of political life exploitable through humor as a Trojan horse 
upon language, but this does not mean abandoning the Kristeva’s insight that semiotic 
drives continue to persist and destabilize the symbolic. 
 Despite this focus on symbolic disruption through humor, I do not intend to 
dismiss Kristeva as counterproductive to considering humor as a political force. It may be 
                                               




hasty to pit the one passage in About Chinese Women against the revolutionary potential 
for laughter and humorous, playful disruptions of language as part of a revolt of the 
subject found in Kristeva’s work such as Revolution in Poetic Language. Kristeva’s 
overall framework of language as an unstable process connected to a desiring, embodied, 
and gendered subject capable of revolt against and through language thus remains a core 
guiding framework for me as I continue my work in this dissertation. I depend upon 
precisely this Kristevan insight in the next two chapters as I read the circulation of 
emotions beyond apolitical language into the practice of humor, although I complicate 
the passage in About Chinese Women to suggest that the instability of humor in relation 
to the subject also impacts the humor of men and more broadly the field of patriarchal 
and racist humor (not to simplify and totalize men with patriarchy and women with 
revolution, as I clarified in Chapter III). This will get taken up again in Chapter VII as I 
turn towards the unstable, embodied, and gendered practice of humor by a subject who 
may very well have humor turned against them, a point that Kristeva’s work stands out 
among the work of other feminist scholars in elucidating. By suggesting a range of 
symbolic and semiotic resistance beyond simply the symbolic in contrast with the 
semiotic, I am also hoping to continue acknowledging Kristeva’s insight that semiotic 
drives continue to constitute the seemingly stable symbolic, flowing underneath 
‘established’ language like magma flowing under crust and always ready to erupt.  
 More broadly, the work of feminist philosophers remains key to studying the 
political meaning of humor and should not be held merely as secondary to the work of 
feminist scholars of humor outside philosophy. The work of feminist scholars of humor 
outside of philosophy is compelling because much of it focuses on humor more explicitly 
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and in more depth than the treatment given to the subject by many feminist scholars 
outside philosophy. As I have argued since Chapter II, feminist philosophy is a key 
resource for considering the meaning of feminist practices of humor in more depth. I 
have brought the work of feminist philosophers and theorists such as Cixous, Irigaray, 
Kristeva, Wittig, Bettcher, Ahmed, Willett, and Manne further into conversation with the 
subject of humor because they provide robust frameworks for thinking through the 
significance of humor in a way that goes beyond the work of current feminist scholars of 
humor outside philosophy.  
 One way in which feminist philosophers and theorists continue to stand out when 
brought to the subject of humor is considering the motivations through which humor is 
practiced. Feminist philosophers such as Ahmed and Kristeva focus on not only language 
and politics considered at the surface level, but also the relationship between language, 
emotions, and the more volatile drives of a speaking subject. I thus find feminist 
philosophy a key resource for considering the more volatile dynamics of humor in touch 
with living subjects, which I will continue to focus on through emotions in Chapter VI 
and both embodied and gendered instability in Chapter VII. 
 Additionally, feminist philosophers more explicitly recognize the situatedness of 
language and resistance within the context of power, and especially within systematic 
dynamics of domination and inequality such as sexism under patriarchy. As I discussed in 
Chapter III, feminist philosophers such as Manne and Bettcher are crucial for providing a 
more detailed analysis of how laughter and humor operate in the context of complex 
systems for enforcing sexism such as misogyny, and Ahmed’s emphasis on the 
circulation of emotions as both personal and cultural provides a more robust 
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understanding of the ways in which humor circulates emotions such as disgust or fear that 
tie in with larger systems of subordination such as sexism, transphobia, and racism. The 
practice of humor within systems of power is also crucial for understanding the use of 
humor for resistance against the status quo, as I discussed in Chapter IV and this chapter. 
Crucially, many feminist philosophers explicitly connect the very constitution of 
language to power as it relates to hierarchies of gender and domination. This is what 
continues to draw me to philosophers such as Cixous, Irigaray, Wittig, and Kristeva, 
despite their differences, and why I have chosen them to discuss them in so much detail 
during this chapter and the previous chapter. These feminist philosophers remain crucial 
to the project of bringing together feminist philosophy and humor because humor so 
frequently involves a disruption in language, images, and other systems of meaning that 
are part of the sinew upholding sexism, misogyny, and patriarchy. These philosophers 
stand out in bringing significance and meaning to the practice of feminist humor as not 
merely a trivial practice but also one that is messing with and warping the situation of 
patriarchy against its own terms. If the construction of ‘proper’ speech and 
communication is also a gendered construction, then these feminist philosophers stand 
out in their ability to highlight the significance of feminist humor in practice. 
 
Humorwork: Feminist and Antifeminist 
 In sum, in this chapter I argued that bringing feminist humor scholars into 
conversation with feminist philosophers is helpful for understanding the concrete, 
specific practices of humorwork upon the world as practiced by feminists in action. I 
began by juxtaposing Kristeva’s semiotic-upon-symbolic model of laughter and its 
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practice with Wittig’s focus upon disruptions within existing language. Then I grounded 
and specified the disruption of situations through humorwork by discussing the work of 
feminist humor scholars Chiaro, Bing, and Scheibman, including a specification of 
humorwork’s techniques and its varying relationship to politics, banality, and semiotic 
excess. 
 One result of decoupling my focus from women’s and feminist laughter to 
concrete humorwork is that these specific manipulations do not seem to be the sole 
province of feminists and others who seek transformative amelioration. As I already 
discussed in Chapter III, laughter and humor are also distinctly tied to the practice of 
hegemony, and focusing on recontextualization, reappropriation, and transformation does 
not distinctly entail a focus on feminist aims. Consequently more work is required to 
distinguish feminist humorwork, which I will class more broadly as ameliorative or 
counterhegemonic, from antifeminist and racist humorwork, which I will class more 
broadly as counterameliorative. The next chapter (Chapter VI) thus studies the 
humorwork of racist anti-black protestors to lead towards a culminating discussion of 











HUMORWORK AS COUNTERAMELIORATIVE PRACTICE: 
RACISM AND AFFECT IN FERGUSON 
 
 
Humorwork against Liberation 
Regrettably, humorwork is not solely aligned with the laughing feminist century 
and will not be practiced by only feminists in a laughing 21st even as women will 
certainly continue to deploy humor as part of resistance to the manifold forms of racist 
heteropatriarchy. I am thus interested in tempering the strong emphasis on humor as 
feminist political resistance in this chapter by discussing humor used for ends that are 
distinctly antifeminist, racist, and homophobic. Already in Chapter II I referenced 
comedians such as Bill Burr who are concerned about the specter of feminism and other 
“goddamn groups” as a threat to humor through their sensitivity.453 Many practices of 
humor go beyond Burr’s staged performance to strike at marginalized groups and 
ameliorative activism in public space. For this reason, it is crucial to acknowledge 
humor’s potential for both feminist good and for counterameliorative ill. 
To describe regressive deployments of humor I will focus on a particular example 
of racist humor from Ferguson, Missouri to examine a practice I call 
“counterameliorative humor,” which reinforces or recalls a situation of domination or 
subjugation, including (but not limited to) humor that is antifeminist, sexist, racist, or 
homophobic. Specifically, I will argue that understanding counterameliorative humor in 




practice requires an approach that tracks how humorwork navigates complex systems of 
domination and the histories of their emotional circulations. More broadly, I understand 
counterameliorative humor as a practice that attempts to shut down or gradually whittle 
away movements that aim for better social and political conditions for marginalized 
groups within a society. 
First, I will explain Luvell Anderson’s overview of theories discussing racist 
humor, and his emphasis that racist humor includes the harm done to people or groups of 
people target by it and the intentions and attitudes of the agents who practice racist 
humor. Next, I will discuss the ameliorative aims of Black Lives Matter and the 
reclaimed slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot,” as well as the racist response through 
counterameliorative humorwork of “Pants up, don’t loot.” I then return to a more detailed 
analysis from Sara Ahmed’s book The Cultural Politics of Emotion first mentioned in 
Chapter III to emphasize the importance of cultural and historical emotional circulations 
for understanding counterameliorative humorwork. I conclude by suggesting that 
counterameliorative humorwork, and indeed all forms of humorwork, carry potential 
failure, risk, and instability, which will be the subject of the next and final chapter. 
 
Counterameliorative Humor 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that humor can foster reappropriation and 
transformation practices that range from trivial to political to manic. Rather than a 
simplistic vision of humor as an enforcement of superiority or hegemony, or an exciting 
poetic uptake of humor as a creative force of liberation that can drown out the status quo, 
I have argued throughout this work that humor is a political but multivalent practice. 
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These tools and this spectrum of more or less political humor is also relevant for 
counterameliorative humor as it is practiced in public (and private) space. 
 More specifically, humor that is decidedly not geared towards liberation is able to 
effect recontextualization and transformation just like more feminist or banal practices of 
humor. Just as humor can be used to recontextualize an existing situation into an 
absurdist or liberatory direction, it can also work in service of more regressive stances. 
Attempts to change the status quo, including slogans and messages that have been created 
for the aim of liberation, are not self-sufficient and self-guaranteed radical acts, but 
instead are vulnerable to manipulation and transformation just like other practices of 
speech and action. In this context, counterameliorative humor can act to stave off social 
change and reinforce the status quo or even aim for a more regressive atmosphere.  
 First, I want to clarify that I use the term “counterameliorative humor” to both 
relate and distinguish this discussion from other discussions about racist humor and sexist 
humor that do not take up my specific approach to studying the social and political 
practice of humor, or namely, my interest in the practice of humorwork as a political 
practice of recontextualization and transformation. In this context, I will argue that 
counterameliorative humor is an instance of individual and collective practices of 
humorwork that aims for the entrenchment of a more oppressive, dominant, and 
regressive society. 
 In this context, I find it helpful to look at Luvell Anderson’s analysis of 
definitions in his essay “Racist Humor.” Anderson organizes theories of racist humor into 
two groups: harm-centered and agent-centered. Harm-centered definitions of racist 
humor, which Anderson attributes to Michael Philips and David Benatar, defines humor 
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as racist when it intends or causes harm against a racial group, causing “hurts, offenses, 
and beliefs, and other disliked mental states.”454 In this picture, humor becomes racist 
when it causes unjustified harm, regardless of intention. Agent-centered definitions of 
racist humor, which Anderson draws from Merrie Bergmann and Jorge Garcia, instead 
focuses on “racist beliefs, attitudes, and/or norms” held by the creator of humor, or the 
ways in which these beliefs, attitudes, and/or norms are “used to add to the fun effect” of 
the humor in question.455 
 Anderson then moves beyond harm-centered and agent-centered definitions of 
humor, stressing that categorizing humor as either “racist” or “not racist” forces the 
discussion into missing key nuances and gradations when people make humor related to 
race. In this vein, Anderson proposes a distinction between (1) “merely racial humor” 
that subverts racial stereotypes in ways successfully received by an audience; (2) 
“racially insensitive humor” which fails to subvert racial stereotypes by either not aiming 
for their subversion or not getting properly received by an audience; and (3) “racist 
humor,” defined as either wrongfully harming people based on their membership in a 
racial group or when the speaker’s attitude is “malevolent or one of disregard.”456 
Anderson thus usefully expands definitions of racist humor to take into account both the 
harms of humor and the agent’s attitudes informing them, the humor’s uptake by an 
audience, and the range of race-related humor from “merely racial humor’s” subversions 
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to the failures of “racially insensitive humor” to the harmful effects or malevolent agents 
of racist humor.  
 When I discuss counterameliorative humor, I am similarly interested in both the 
effects of humorwork and the aims of the agents who practice it, as well as gradations in 
its practice. However, my focus is specifically on the social and political implications of 
humorwork as a practice of reappropriation and transformation, and how this 
reappropriation and transformation is taken up towards counterameliorative social and 
political ends. In this context, I do not prioritize the specific harms of humorwork’s 
practice upon individuals, nor am I solely focused on the individual attitudes and beliefs 
of those who practice a particular instance of humor, although both of these factors 
continue to matter and have mutual implications. Rather, my interest in 
counterameliorative humor synthesizes not only the effects of humor and the attitudes 
behind it, but also the specific implications of how humor is practiced. I thus turn to the 
phrase “counterameliorative humor” rather than “harmful humor” or “malevolent humor” 
to center both the political effects of humorwork and the specific manipulations of words, 
images, and beliefs that result in these effects. 
 Abstractly describing my approach is limited without illustrative examples, so I 
will consider a case of counterameliorative humor, and specifically racist humor, through 
which a practice-focused approach can be clarified. Providing an example will also show 
that the humorwork I have been discussing extends beyond the ameliorative examples I 
considered in the previous chapter, as it is capable of being deployed for regressive and 
oppressive ends. The specific concrete techniques of humorwork will thus be shown in 
their more politically ambiguous dimensions, not merely a tool for some agents of 
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liberation but also part of a larger interplay of disruptive language that may respond by 
shutting down attempts to end oppression and domination. 
 
Counterameliorative Anti-Black Racist Humor in Ferguson 
 On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown was murdered while unarmed by police 
officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri. Protests formed shortly after both in 
Ferguson and across the United States, responding to the epidemic of unarmed black 
people getting murdered by white police officers or through Stand Your Ground policies 
without consequence, including the unpunished murders of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and 
both Tamir Rice and Eric Garner in 2014. After the shooting, a witness reported that 
Michael Brown held up his hands in front of Darren Wilson and stated “Hands up, don’t 
shoot,” before Wilson fatally shot him. While the grand jury later rejected this account 
based on changing witness testimonies, the words “Hands up, don’t shoot” became an 
important phrase marking continued injustice and pointing towards a need for change.457 
 In this context, “Hands up, don’t shoot” has often served as an ameliorative 
phrase. After news of Brown’s murder spread, it appeared in protests, on t-shirts, across 
social media, and was referenced by five St. Louis Rams players during a football 
pregame.458 Activist DeRay Mckesson said of the phrase, “When we say 'hands up,' it's 
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about reminding police we are unarmed and reminding them of a pattern of police 
brutality."459 The phrase has joined other slogans such as “I can’t breathe,” which was 
used by activists calling for justice and an end to police brutality against black people 
after Eric Garner was killed by a chokehold from a police officer.460 “Hands up, don’t 
shoot” has also been deployed in the context of broader long-term social movements such 
as Black Lives Matter, which work against racist police brutality and other aspects of 
oppression caused by systemic anti-blackness.  
The phrase “Hands up, don’t shoot” is thus often reclaimed as an ameliorative 
slogan. We might consider in more detail, for example, the use of the phrase in the 
context of Black Lives Matter. Black Lives Matter was co-founded as a social media 
hashtag by Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi in 2013 after the murder of 
Trayvon Martin. Garza wrote of the political aspirations of Black Lives Matter,  
Black Lives Matter is an ideological and political intervention in a world where 
Black lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. It is an 
affirmation of Black folks’ contributions to this society, our humanity, and our 
resilience in the face of deadly oppression.461 
 
Garza thus stresses that Black Lives Matter and related protests stand against systematic 
anti-blackness and for the flourishing of black lives in the US and beyond. 
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In this vein, Black Lives Matter fits the description that sociologist Manuel 
Castells gives to social movements that both employ and extend beyond social media, 
asserting that digital social movements are rooted in the call for justice against an unjust 
society.462 In contrast to the construction of institutions used to perpetuate the values and 
desires of those in power, Castells emphasizes the amplified ability of social movements 
that include a digital space to contest the status quo. Castells refers to the power of digital 
movements as “counterpower,” defined as “the capacity of social actors to challenge the 
power embedded in the institutions of society for the purpose of claiming representation 
for their own values and interests.”463 In this context, Black Lives Matter serves as a 
counterpower against the status quo, claiming representation through the use of protests 
and slogans for a more just society that will not excuse killings by police and other forms 
of racist violence. The phrase “Hands up, don’t shoot” has similarly served as an 
ameliorative call for representation and action in its reclaimed form. Other calls for 
amelioration in the context of Black Lives Matter would include reclaiming “I Can’t 
Breathe” for protests, as well as NFL player Colin Kaepernick’s decision to “take a knee” 
during the national anthem, which was taken up by other players and met with direct 
scorn by President Trump’s tweets in November 2017.464 
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Despite a link between the use of the phrase “Hands up, don’t shoot” and 
ameliorative protest, the phrase is open to attack in the form of reappropriation and 
transformation using humorwork for the purpose of thwarting attempts at social justice. 
For this reason, I refer to this form of humorwork as counterameliorative, since it serves 
to disarm, disrupt, and take away social justice words, images, and actions against 
themselves by reasserting the status quo. One practice of counterameliorative humor has 
been taking elements from the ameliorative reclamation of the phrase “Hands up, don’t 
shoot” to shift it into the racist phrase “Pants up, don’t loot.” The phrase was popularized 
by Ryan Lovelace in a National Review article from August 2014 that attributed “Pants 
up, don’t loot” to “one voice” shouting in response to protestors chanting “Hands up, 
don’t shoot.”465 Later, the slogan was held up by a group of white counter-protestors over 
a bridge in Ferguson, Missouri amidst ongoing protests. In November, as protestors 
awaited the eventual court decision that would not indict officer Darren Wilson, a 
GoFundMe page was started by Tennessee resident Don Alexander to pay for a billboard 
in Ferguson displaying the giant hashtag “#PantsUPDontLOOT.” While Alexander’s 
campaign appears to have not been able to find a billboard company willing to display 
the sign, it was still able to receive well over the $3000 asking price on their website the 
first day that donations opened.466 
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In this vein, the slogan “Pants up, don’t loot” has both ideologically and 
materially contested the aims of reclaiming “Hands up, don’t shoot.” The shift from 
Brown’s reported utterance of “Hands up, don’t shoot” to the use of “Hands up, don’t 
shoot” by protestors is clearly not a practice of humorwork as reappropriation and 
transformation in the sense discussed in the previous chapter. Rather than being 
transformed against its own aims, Brown’s reported words were instead seriously taken 
up by protesters to continue striving against the conditions that resulted in Brown’s death. 
The protestors thus may be using Brown’s reported words in a different context, but they 
are not playing with these words or twisting them back upon themselves. 
The phrase “Pants up, don’t loot,” however, does participate in the techniques of 
reappropriation and transformation discussed in the previous chapter as humorwork. So 
far, I have described humorwork as a concrete practice of taking elements embedded 
within existing words, images, ideas, and discourses in order to transform them against 
their original intentions, meanings, and aims. For example, I drew from Monique Wittig’s 
discussion of politically and strategically using language as a “Trojan horse” against itself 
to emphasize that social and political humorwork such as graffiti or reclaimed slogans 
like “Pussy Grabs Back” are able to rework or even prey upon their origins in oppressive 
(i.e. sexist, racist, etc.) frameworks. Though this practice frequently takes up ameliorative 
aims, “Pants up, don’t loot” is an example of humorwork that takes up these techniques 
for counterameliorative purposes.  
First, “Pants up, don’t loot” would not exist as a phrase without its origin in 
transforming “Hands up, don’t shoot.” It was specifically created as a transformation of 
this phrase by people who do not agree with it being reclaimed for protests, and who 
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likely disagree with the aim of the protests to end police brutality and its particular 
relationship with anti-black racism. However, it is important to note that the specific 
techniques of reappropriating the phrase are part of its categorization as humorwork. For 
example, we might consider the ways in which #BlackLivesMatter has been responded to 
by counterprotestors through similar phrases with different intentions such as 
#AllLivesMatter and #BlueLivesMatter. These shifts are not humorwork (and indeed 
almost nobody finds these phrases themselves humorous) precisely because of the 
directness of their responses. In contrast to Black Lives Matter, the “All Lives Matter” 
and “Blue Lives Matter” responses directly contest the focus on anti-black racism, 
erroneously pitting black lives against “all lives” and the lives of police officers.  
“Pants up, don’t loot,” in contrast, is more indirect in its response to “Hands up, 
don’t shoot.” First, it relies not on a direct contestation (which is not to say that it is not a 
real attempt at contestation), but rather a similarity in the sounds of words and underlying 
racist stereotypes. It is not coincidental that “hands up” sounds similar to “pants up,” and 
“don’t shoot” to “don’t loot.” These sounds are part of the “Trojan horse” embedded 
within language that enables the transformation of the ameliorative phrase towards a 
racist phrase. Likewise, “pants up” and “don’t loot” are not carelessly chosen words, but 
rather specifically geared towards racist stereotypes and discourses around Ferguson and 
ameliorative justice. The National Review essay from which “Pants up, don’t loot” was 
popularized, for example, is entirely focused on the conduct of protesters and the specter 
of protesters looting or not following police instructions467 rather than centering the 





attempt of protestors to fight against the reality that racist police brutality is 
systematically excused and rendered invisible. Additionally, the focus on “pants up” 
shifts the image of “hands up” to a racist stereotype that generalizes and ridicules the 
ways black men dress as inappropriate and unruly. The “Pants up, don’t loot” phrase thus 
evokes the controlling image of the “thug,” through which black men are depicted as an 
unruly threat needing containment rather than voices to be heard.468 
 
Counterameliorative Humor and Affect 
Noting the phonetics lurking in the words and the racist images they invoke is still 
not enough, as understanding this instance of counterameliorative racist humorwork 
requires a more systematic, affective, and collective sense of what precisely this humor is 
attempting to accomplish for the subjects who are bringing it into practice. For this 
reason, I find it helpful to turn to Sara Ahmed’s work on the political life of emotions in 
circulation in her book The Cultural Politics of Emotion. This will add an affective and 
collective practice dimension to the discussion of humorwork thus far and provide a more 
detailed account of the process through which “Pants up, don’t loot” preys upon already-
circulating emotions tied to ideologies such as racism to warp reclaimed words. 
The relationship between humor and emotions has sometimes been disputed by 
notable theories of humor. Philosopher of humor John Morreall, for example, asserts that 
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humor is primarily a practice of the intellect through “cognitive shifts” that disengage 
people from “conceptual and practical concerns,” and thus are fundamentally removed 
from emotions through rational disengagement.469 However, in addition to the critiques I 
offered of the disengagement approach in Chapter III, contemporary philosophical 
accounts of humor have also contested the removal of humor from emotion. The 
“epistemic emotion” approach offered in Inside Jokes by Matthew Hurley, Daniel 
Dennett, and Reginald B. Adams, for example, foregoes foreclosing cognition from 
emotion in favor of emphasizing how they work together. While I will not take on an 
“epistemic emotion” approach due to my focus on social and political humor, as 
discussed in Chapter III, I will similarly emphasize that emotions play a critical role in 
the practice of humor. 
 Already, this analysis has an emotional undercurrent that is worth making 
explicit. Earlier I mentioned Castells’ description of digital activism as a form of 
counterpower, and linked this to Black Lives Matter as an ameliorative movement that 
has an important digital element. Castells also emphasizes the affective dimension of 
protest, stressing that “affective intelligence” is a key element in responding to 
oppression.470 Affects such as enthusiasm, hope, anger, outrage, and empathy are thus 
key parts of activist movements in an arc from “emotion-driven action to deliberation and 
project construction.”471 Sociologist Deborah Gould has also written on the continuous 
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rich affective life of social movements in the context of ACT-UP and responses to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, stressing that  “emotion is fundamental to political life 
and always a factor in the realm of activism, something that stirs, inhibits, intensifies, 
modulates, impedes, incites...”472 Thus, when Garza emphasizes the importance of 
affirmation in the context of Black Lives Matter, she is also emphasizing an affective 
protest against anti-blackness.473 
 The anti-blackness enacted against Brown by Wilson, the US police system, and 
the courts also has an affective dimension.  In The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed 
is interested in describing what emotions and affects do in the context of complex 
interactions between history, culture, bodies, and politics.474 Refusing to offer a definition 
of emotions as clear and stable entities, but interested in the structure of how different 
cultural emotions such as fear, disgust, hate, and love orient subjects differently, Ahmed 
focuses on both the ways that emotions/affects impress themselves upon subjects and the 
ways they are directed towards an object.475 In this context, Ahmed stresses that emotions 
neither primarily dwell within a subject or solely emanated by an object of concern 
considered separately from each other, but rather are generated through a circulation in 
relation to its objects. Emotions are not merely properties of individuals, but also an 
affective social and political history of contact through which objects and others are 
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transformed into “objects of feeling.476” Ahmed writes, “...I suggest that it is the objects 
of emotion that circulate, rather than emotion as such...Such objects become sticky, or 
saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social Tension.“477 Emotions are thus ways 
in which objects are not only understood in reference to their social relationships with 
others, but also histories of these social and political relationships. 
 Ahmed refers to the manner through which objects are shaped by emotions as 
“stickiness,” noting that certain emotions are latched onto some objects and not onto 
others.478 Though Ahmed references “objects” here, she also considers the effects of 
emotions in contact with other (and “othered”) bodies. Discussing a passage by Audre 
Lorde on her experience of racism while riding a train, Ahmed writes,  
...the word ‘hate’ works by working on the surfaces of bodies. This bodily 
encounter, while ending with ‘The hate’, also ends with the reconstitution of 
bodily space. The bodies that come together, that almost touch and comingle, 
slide away from each other, becoming relived in their apartness. The particular 
bodies that move apart allow the redefinition of social as well as bodily 
integrity.479 
 
In this context, emotions such as hate both attach to particular bodies, and influence their 
social relationship in bodily space. This attachment of emotions to bodies is influenced 
by ongoing histories such as racism, resulting in negative emotions such as hate attaching 
to black people and circulating around their bodies in particular, rather than to white 
bodies. Ahmed continues, 
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The emotion of ‘hate’ aligns the particular white body with the bodily form of the 
community – the emotion functions to substantiate the threat of invasion and 
contamination in the body of a particular other, who comes to stand for and stand 
in for, a group of others. In other words, the hate encounter aligns, not only the ‘I’ 
with the ‘we’ (the white body, the white nation), but the ‘you’ with the ‘them’ 
(the black body, black people).480 
 
In this context, the resonance that hate takes up groups together white people as a favored 
and centered group while “sticking” a negative affect to black people, resulting in both a 
dynamic of “us vs. them” and an alignment of black people with “invasion and 
contamination.” Hatred and other negative emotions directed towards black people thus 
cannot be merely traced to the agent who holds these feelings or the people towards 
which they are directed and who experience resulting harm, but rather a larger field of 
meanings that are circulated unevenly across bodies in social space. 
In this context, if we follow Garza’s point that Black Lives Matter can be 
considered a movement of affirmation, affirmation is not only the motivation for 
individual Black Lives Matter activists, but also a way of contesting the racist affective 
life through which black people are socially encountered by white people with 
sedimented, circulating negative emotions. Activism and movements such Black Lives 
Matter are not only contesting the construction of institutions, but also the ideologies and 
affects that circulate, feed their power, and are appealed to when justifying violence.  
For example, while attempting to defend his actions in court, Darren Wilson 
attempted to justify killing Brown by deploying a heavily emotional description of 
Michael Brown and his body. Despite Wilson and Brown being around the same height, 
and both over 200 pounds at the time, and the fact that Wilson carried a gun while Brown 





was unarmed, Wilson likened himself to an innocent child trying to grapple with a 
professional wrestler during his initial struggle with Brown. Wilson, who was ten years 
older than Brown, reports, “When I grabbed him, the only way I can describe it is I felt 
like a five-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan.” Wilson continues with this portrayal of 
Brown as aggressive and impervious, stating that after getting shot and while the police 
car was full of his blood, Brown heightened his unrelenting, threatening stance to a 
supernatural degree. Wilson narrates, “He looked up at me and had the most intense 
aggressive face. The only way I can describe it, it looks like a demon, that’s how angry 
he looked.”  This framing of Brown as impervious and unrelenting continued past not 
only the first time he was shot but also the second, with Wilson stating, “He was almost 
bulking up to run through the shots, like it was making him mad that I’m shooting 
him...And the face that he had was looking straight through me, like I wasn’t even there, I 
wasn’t even anything in his way.” It is only when Wilson took the killing shot that he felt 
the otherworldly, insurmountable threat that he read into Brown’s body was contained. 
Wilson concludes, “I remember his feet coming up…and then they rested...When it [the 
bullet] went into him, the demeanor on his face went blank, the aggression was gone, it 
was gone, I mean I knew he stopped, the threat was stopped.”481 
In this example, Wilson is not a neutral reporter of his encounter with Brown, but 
rather is describing an intense array of emotions that have been “stuck” to Brown’s body, 
enabled by wider, racist negative emotions that circulate about black men and their 
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bodies in the US and beyond. Specifically, Wilson is expressing an encounter with 
Brown through an affect of fear which sticks to Brown as a sign of threat. Ahmed 
emphasizes that fear sticks objects together to signal threat through particular histories, 
including histories of racism. Ahmed writes (in conversation with Frantz Fanon) about 
the fear white people have of black people,  
The production of the black man as the object of fear depends on past histories of 
association: Negro, animal, bad, mean, ugly. The movement of fear between signs 
is what allows the object of fear to be generated in the present (the Negro is an 
animal, bad, mean, ugly). The movement between signs allows others to be 
attributed with emotional value, as “being fearsome.”482 
 
Through the history of fear and the bodies stuck to threat through fear, Brown’s body is 
described by Wilson as unrelentingly and even inhumanly threatening, a characterization 
that can appeal to both Wilson and the larger court through the affective life of racism. 
Ahmed emphasizes that fear not only links bodies to threat, but also envelops and 
contains them within fear, resulting in a misreading of black bodies as fearsome in 
comparison to white bodies.483 This misreading of black bodies as fearsome also links to 
the danger and threat that black bodies are stuck with through fear, to the extent that a 
white person may prioritize at all costs the threat to their life that has been misread and 
stuck onto a black person over a black person’s actual, continuing life. Ahmed writes, 
Such fantasies [of fear] construct the other as a danger not only to one’s self as 
self, but to one’s very life, to one’s very existence as a separate being with a life 
of its own. Such fantasies of the other hence work to justify violence against 
others, whose very existence comes to be felt as a threat to the life of the white 
body…484 
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For Wilson, Brown’s life ceases to matter in comparison to the threat that Brown poses to 
his white body, stuck with demonic, inhuman, and monstrous power in comparison to 
Wilson’s suddenly vulnerable and fragile body. Wilson even frames his gun, the weapon 
of murder, as fragile in comparison to Brown’s unarmed body, emphasizing the gun’s 
constant failure as it “clicked” instead of firing and constantly missed, in comparison to 
Brown’s “bulking up to run through the shots.” It is only in death that Wilson’s fear and 
the threat stuck to Brown ceases, with Wilson declaring not that a life was lost, but 
instead that “the threat was stopped.”485 
 Returning again to Garza’s emphasis on affirmation, Black Lives Matter stands 
against (among many other injustices) the continuing circulation of emotions such as fear 
and hate that link black people to threats needing containment in contrast to fragile and 
protectable white bodies. Instead, Black Lives Matters affirms that black people should 
have a larger social relationality that invokes vulnerability, care, and love rather than an 
unreflective perpetuation of racist negative emotions in circulation. “Hands up, don’t 
shoot” is part of this affirmation, linking Brown with vulnerability rather than Wilson’s 
appeal to threatening demonic near-invincibility. “Hands up, don’t shoot” presents Brown 
as a living, unarmed, fragile person who was encountering a police officer holding a 
lethal weapon and part of a racist U. S. police and incarceration system. It presents 
Brown with a life deserving of sympathy and value rather than death.  
In this context, the response by the subjects who practice counterameliorative 
humor such as “Pants up, don’t loot,” brings a heavily affective dimension to humorwork. 





While the reader may not find the phrase “Pants up, don’t loot” funny or humorous at all, 
and I find it repugnant rather than funny, the phrase nonetheless makes frequent 
appearances under the category “Funny” when posted and shared online. It is thus worth 
considering what the practice of this particular instance of counterameliorative humor 
might look like to the subjects who circulate and even enjoy its practice. 
The subjects who create and enjoy “Pants up, don’t loot” are not only shifting the 
phrase “Hands up, don’t shoot” by exploiting ambiguities in phonetics and language to 
invoke harmful stereotypes, but are also exploiting the “sticky” aspect of emotions from 
Ahmed’s account of emotional “stickiness.” Specifically, “Pants up, don’t loot” attempts 
to thwart the efforts of Black Lives Matter to resonate black male bodies with more 
positive affects such as affirmation, care, and love, as well as the more specific effect of 
“Hands up, don’t shoot” to emphasize vulnerability, by recirculating racist stereotypes 
and controlling images that have the weight of historical sedimentation behind them. 
“Pants up, don’t loot” thus takes glee in denying attempts to place more weight on 
affective associations between black people and mattering (in the sense of having an 
actual, intrinsically valuable life) back into the easier, sedimented world within which 
white people encounter black people primarily as threats to be hated, feared, dismissed, 
contained, and eliminated. Specifically, “Pants up, don’t loot” is able to evoke images of 
disorder (“pants up”) and the combination of disorder and threat (“don’t loot”) that is 
stuck to black people through a racist history, not only trying to counter the efforts of 
Black Lives Matter and Ferguson protestors, but also trivializing and deflating it by 
letting the weight of racist history do much of the work of “sticking.” In this way, 
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humorwork that is counterameliorative is also often counteraffective, as well as rooted in 
systematic injustices with large, complicated histories of interaction. 
“Pants up, don’t loot” also shifts the focus on Michael Brown’s death and the 
many killings of unarmed black people by police into a concern about disorderly conduct 
(in the form of fashion) as well as the threat of theft and property destruction.  Ahmed 
describes a different instance in which the rhetoric that “the law is ‘more interested in the 
right of criminals than the rights of people who are burgled” was used to affectively stick 
a 16-year old teenager who was murdered while stealing to the emotional resonance of 
“criminal,” prioritizing the person who was almost stolen from over the person who was 
shot and killed. Ahmed writes,  
The undeclared history sticks, and it positions [the burglar] as the victim rather 
than the criminal, as a person who was burgled, rather than a person who killed. 
The victim of the murder is now the criminal; the crime that did not happen 
because of the murder (the burglary) takes the place of the murder as the true 
crime, and as the real injustice.486 
 
“Pants up, don’t loot” is similarly undeclaring the history of Brown’s murder to instead 
position Brown and Ferguson protestors chanting “Hands up, don’t shoot” as criminals 
and a threat to society. However, rather than directly making a statement that Wilson, the 
police, and private property are the true vulnerable subjects in contrast to Brown and the 
protestors as “criminals,” the use of “Pants up, don’t loot” attempts to disrupt the context 
and aims of the protests by indirectly reappropriating and transforming their slogan, 
delighting in the attempt to take appeals for affirmation and vulnerability away from 
Brown and protestors without any engagement on Brown’s or the protestors’ own terms. 
                                               




It is also important to emphasize the role of racism in this particular attempt to 
stick Brown and protestors to “criminal,” since Ahmed’s example was about a white man 
killing another white man. In addition to the racist history within which black people 
have been characterized as general threats, there is also a racist history within which 
black protests and protestors have been stuck as a threat to order, property, and the rule of 
law. In 2018, for example, (mostly white) football fans destroyed property throughout the 
city after the Philadelphia Eagles won the Super Bowl. The following morning police 
reported that three people were arrested as a beaming, amused news reporter for NBC10 
told his audience that the aim of police “was all about striking that perfect balance, 
allowing fans to celebrate after decades of waiting for this Superbowl Title, and still 
keeping the city and those revelers safe.”487 Hawk Newsome, the President of Black 
Lives Matter of Greater New York, pointed out the stark difference between the police 
and media response to the Eagles win and the framing of black protestors against 
continued police violence as “thugs” and looters and criminals. Newsome asserted, 
“Somehow, it seems there's a line drawn in the sand where destruction of property 
because of a sports victory is OK and acceptable in America. However, if you have 
people who are fighting for their most basic human right, the right to live, they will be 
condemned.”488 
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In this context, the specter of inappropriate protest and unlawful riot linked with 
the more specific figures of the “thug,” the looter, and the criminal are more firmly stuck 
to black people and groups of black people in protest. This means that people creating 
and enjoying “Pants up, don’t loot” are not only attempting to shift away from affects of 
affirmation and vulnerability, but also centering sedimented racist emotions around black 
protest while trying to disrupt the legitimacy of black social movements. “Pants up, don’t 
loot” also shifts away from acknowledgments of black protesters’ First Amendment 
rights, protection from police overstepping the law, and the importance of challenging 
unjust laws to instead center concerns about (white) public order and property. And it 
does so without a single unpacked or clear statement of opposition or argument, instead 
relishing humorwork’s indirect recontextualization of sounds, language, meaning, and 
affective circulation. It binds its practitioners and fans, through enjoyment and mirth and 
play, to a horizon in which threatened abstract property and racist sentiment are valued 
over actual black lives. 
In addition to drawing from a sedimented racist affective past that continues into 
the racist present, counterameliorative humor also potentially impacts cultural and 
political senses of possibility. Gould links the emotions of activism to a sense of political 
possibilities for change, ranging from ameliorative to change for the worse. She writes,  
“...emotion, in the word’s fullest sense - sensations, feelings, passions, whether  
conscious or not - conditions the possibilities for oppositional activism. It does so  
by facilitating, and blocking, our political imaginations, our political horizons, our  
ideas about the politically (im)possible, (un)desirable, (un)necessary in a given  
moment. Our affective states can constrict our political imaginaries...as well as  
extend them in new, unexpected directions.”489 
 
                                               




In addition to a relationship with the past and the present, the role of affect in activism is 
also linked to a sense of possible futures. 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Bing and Scheibman emphasize that 
humor plays with projected possible worlds. In addition to their discussion of humor as a 
potential projection of utopias such as through the work of the Guerilla Girls and feminist 
graffiti, Bing and Scheibman also associate sexist humor with the ability to project “a 
hypothetical world” that can objectify women for the sake of men. In this context, Bing 
and Scheibman conceptualize humor with a potential for projecting possible “utopias and 
dystopias.”490 Similarly, Limor Shifman emphasizes that “…regardless of emotional 
keying, political memes are about making a point – participating in a normative debate 
about how the world should look and the best way to get there.”491 The reappropriation of 
the Black Lives Matter protest slogan into racist humor is thus also a redirection of 
normative possibilities in public life. If Gould is correct that emotions can be linked to a 
sense of political possibilities, then political humor is relevant in its ability to play with 
their projection, opening and closing various hypothetical worlds. 
Returning to the slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot,” it too projects a possible world, 
not through humorwork but through its call for social amelioration. In a conversation 
between George Yancy and Judith Butler for the New York Times’ The Stone forum for 
contemporary philosophers, Yancy and Butler discussed the vital role of slogans such as 
“Hands up, don’t shoot” in projecting and striving for an ameliorative future. Yancy 
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writes, “Posters reading ‘Black Lives Matter,’ Hands Up. Don’t Shoot,’ ‘I Can’t Breathe’ 
communicate the reality of a specific kind of racial vulnerability that black people 
experience on a daily basis.”492 A crucial part of the slogans is that they refuse to stay 
silent about features of anti-black racism when concerns have systematically remained 
unaddressed or met with hostility. Butler adds,  
One reason the chant ‘Black Lives Matter’ is so important is that it states the 
obvious [that black lives do matter] but the obvious has not yet been historically 
realized. So it is a statement of outrage and a demand for equality, for the right to 
live free of constraint, but also a chant that links the history of slavery, of debt 
peonage, segregation, and a prison system geared toward the containment, 
neutralization and degradation of black lives, but also a police system that more 
and more easily and often can take away a black life in a flash all because some 
officer perceives a threat.493 
 
Black Lives Matter thus also includes an emotional projection of a more just future 
rooted in an understanding of the past, with slogans such as “Hands up, don’t shoot” 
calling attention to the continued deferral of a just future in the present.  
 “Pants up, don’t loot,” however, latches onto the sounds and the association with 
blackness in “Hands up, don’t shoot,” as well as its various affective weights, to take 
away the projection of a just future and reassert the power of a racist present and past 
through which sedimented emotions stick and recirculate. The voices and struggles of 
black people calling for an end to societal anti-blackness are drowned out in favor of 
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flattened, racist controlling images and stereotypes to the delight of racist practitioners 
and their sticky emotional investments. The horizon of possible worlds projected by 
protestors, including a possible world where Michael Brown’s life and vulnerability was 
valued, is met with an attempt at constriction that brings pleasure to the saboteurs.  
 
Racist Humor, Affect, and Practice 
Returning to my goal of clarifying the role of looking at counterameliorative 
humorwork in the context of other philosophical discussions about racist humor, my 
humorwork approach centers the practice involved in the creation of racist humor while 
situating it within affective systems of power. Like Anderson, I am concerned about the 
harms caused by racist humor and the racist beliefs/attitudes of the agents who practice it. 
But centering the practices through which racist humor works, including the indirect 
ways of latching onto anti-racist slogans and attempting to shift them back towards racist 
ends, requires a consideration of cultural and political circulations of history, bodies, 
affect, and power. I have thus emphasized that humorwork and counterameliorative 
humorwork specifically happens beyond individual subject, target, and practice. More 
precisely, political humorwork navigates and shifts through complex systems of 
domination and the histories of their emotional circulations. 
It is important, however, that we do not act as if counterameliorative humor, or 
even “Pants up, don’t loot,” is inevitably or clearly successful. While humor’s capability 
for indirect reappropriation and transformation provides counterameliorative humorwork 
with powerful tools to disrupt ameliorative struggle against its own terms, this 
indirectness also serves as a site of instability. In the next (and final) chapter, I look at 
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HUMORWORK AS UNSTABLE POLITICS 
 
 
With Laughter on My Side: Revisited 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that political humorwork involves a 
transformation of speech, discourse, slogans, situations, and images from their original 
intentions and arrangements into a new form through an indirect reappropriation of their 
linguistic, conceptual, visual, and affective elements. This practice of reappropriation and 
transformation has the potential for feminist (or generally ameliorative) aims, or for 
counterameliorative purposes that work against social movements in favor of entrenched 
norms and the institutional status quo. Humorwork thus emerges as a creative and 
multivalent social and political practice that circulates across multiple levels of human 
interaction on a large scale to the extent that it is not a trivial, but rather a highly complex 
mode of social and political engagement. 
However, the analysis so far may risk imbuing humorwork with too much 
certainty and efficacy in its intentions and results. That is, by focusing on the concrete 
practice of humor, and looking at the effects of its practice, we may risk missing the ways 
humor is uniquely suited to failure, misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and 
unanticipated effects. As an indirect form of engagement that in Delia Chiaro’s words 
“plays unfair”494 and refuses many restrictions and cooperative terms of engagement, 
humor is also subject to the precarities and instabilities of its own mode of practice. 
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Additionally, so far the move from the subject of laughter to the practice of 
humorwork risks losing sight of the subject who not only practices but also takes up 
humor as a mantle. As I discussed in Chapter IV, Irigaray, Kristeva, and Cixous associate 
laughter with the embodied, speaking subject. In contrast, my analysis of humorwork 
turned away from a focus on laughter, which has been taken up by Anca Parvulescu as 
her primary focus,495 to instead consider humor as a more specific, concrete practice. 
Though I do not center laughter as my primary concern, ejecting the subject of humor’s 
practice risks reducing its practice to what Kristeva calls the dead, ejected products of 
language, presented without the living subject.496 By focusing on humor’s instabilities in 
this chapter, I return to the potential instability and excess of the speaking, embodied 
subject who might take up humorwork as practice and potentially experience the excess 
and instability of taking up language, images, and actions beyond straightforward norms 
of engagement.   
Finally, understanding the practice of social and political humorwork does not 
achieve an explanation of the overall effects political humorwork has on wider discourse, 
imagery, norms, and institutions. Without recognizing the instabilities contained within 
the work of humor, and the subjects who practice it, humorwork risks being presented as 
a straightforward technique of disruption, as if humorists could calculate and deploy 
humor according to some blueprint with a clear result. Instead of presenting a skewed 
overall description of the field of political humorwork, I will argue that the widespread 
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deployment of humorwork marks an unstable, constantly shifting and transforming mode 
of engagement in political life. 
In this final chapter, I will focus on the many ways in which engaging in 
humorwork falls into the ambiguities of, as discussed by Kierkegaard’s A, having humor 
on your side.497 In this context, humorwork is practiced across several levels of potential 
instability, impacting not only its practice but also its effects on social and political life. 
Specifically, I discuss instabilities that connect the subject of humorwork with the 
continued life of their humor beyond their intentions and expectations, humorwork that 
draws upon the instabilities of gendered embodiment, and humorwork that posits itself as 
stable but fails due to the emotions of the subject who practices humor and the 
possibilities that humor can be practiced against anyone or anything given the right 
conditions for reappropriation and transformation. To explain these dynamics, I will 
consider specific examples of humor, humorists, and humorous situations, including Pepe 
the Frog, Miss Piggy, Ricky Gervais, Roseanne, and the 2018 White House 
Correspondents Dinner. I conclude with the pronouncement that while the innumerable 
day-to-day practices of political humorwork have unclear effects, the reappropriation and 
transformation effected by humor in practice is a relevant and potentially powerful object 
of feminist social and political concern.  
 
The Joke’s on You: Pepe the Frog and the Subject of Unstable Humorwork 
                                               




In chapters IV and V, before discussing counterameliorative humorwork in 
Chapter VI, I discussed feminist approaches to humor and laughter that emphasize the 
importance of the subject who produces it. Feminist theorists and philosophers such as 
Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, and Julia Kristeva argue that language and laughter are not 
merely free-standing, lifeless products of a language that exists outside of people, but 
instead linked with their subjectivity and situated position in relation to power, including 
sex. Emphasizing the subject invested in humorwork continues to be useful to avoid 
tethering humor to lifeless words with no connection to people, as well as for continuing 
to recognize the importance of subject position for making humor.  
Moreover, this relationship between subjectivity, subject position, and laughter 
and humor is productive of instability, misunderstandings, and dangerous situations. Both 
Irigaray and Cixous attribute to laughter a position in which the feminine stands out in 
distinction to the reductive gaze of men.498 Cixous points out specifically that laughter 
from women while under the command of men can result in danger or even death.499 As 
discussed at length in Chapter V, Kristeva also points to the subject’s danger of falling 
into madness when disturbing ordinarily regulated speech and composure, the subject 
getting swallowed in her more unstable drives that always persist along with her more 
stable, ordered surface.500 Beyond its most banal practices (as discussed in Chapter V) 
laughter and humorwork are thus not mere tools that a subject can pick up, strategically 
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or haphazardly deploy, and then carry on unaffected. Rather, due to the practice of 
humorwork by a subject situated within a social and political world, its effects are often 
unstable and difficult to calculate ahead of time. 
In addition to considering the sexed position of the humorist, it is also important 
to pay attention to the connection between the humorist, the exertion of creation that goes 
into humorwork, and their creation. In this context, it is interesting to consider the “work” 
of humorwork. I have already introduced Kierkegaard into the fold, and I will evoke 
another 19th century spirit in the form of Karl Marx to consider the connection between 
the production and the subject of humorwork. Marx did not discuss humor beyond his 
famous insight into Hegel that “all facts and personages in history” occur twice, “the first 
time as tragedy, the second as farce.”501 However, if we consider humor as not only a 
practice of language but also one that involves the subject, it is useful to consider the 
relationship between a humorist and the unstable results of their efforts. Humor’s 
potential for transformation, while often related to a sociality of cooperation and positive 
affect, can also take a turn for the worse or the strange as a humorist’s work is taken up 
and reappropriated through the efforts of others.  
 One of Marx’s interventions in his critique of capitalism was to emphasize that 
the worker’s labor-power and the product of their work cannot be so cleanly separated 
from the worker when sold to the capitalist. The worker’s labor not only represents their 
life, capable of extraction from the worker through exertion for the exclusive owners of 
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the means of production under exploitative working conditions,502 but also a scission 
between the worker and the result of their labors through alienation.503 Exertion under a 
capitalist system, and working as an act of creation, thus cannot be simplistically 
considered apart from the subject doing this work, even as exploitative conditions can 
take the worker’s products away to confront their creator in an adversarial relationship. 
Emphasizing the connection between the subject and the results of their 
humorwork is useful for considering the social and political implications of the ways in 
which a humorist may have an unstable relationship to the results of their humor practice. 
Humor is tied to the person who made it and their social world not only due to the fabric 
of shared understanding and affects through which a humorist creates socially embedded 
work, but also because humor comes about through an exertion that continues to link the 
humorist to the results of their creation. Feminist theorists have emphasized that this 
connection between the subject and their creation is sexed and frequently volatile, but it 
is also useful to consider through Marx that the creation of humor is a significant 
investment on the part of its creator. Thus, the ways that humor might be taken up or 
even transformed by others is also a continued concern for the subject who produces it, 
indicating the instability of humor not only as a political act but also in general. This 
relationship too is not easily paired away in purified form from a relationship with 
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capitalist production, especially as humorists may write, act, and stand up to be 
compensated with their daily bread. 
To illustrate the unstable relationship between humorist and humorwork creations, 
it is useful to consider a specific example of a humorist becoming alienated from their 
creation, which is helpfully demonstrated through the example of Pepe the Frog. To 
understand the particular instabilities in this example, I will first establish that the 
sociality of humorwork as a practice results in potentially collaborative, alienating, and 
generally transformative practices that may iterate upon the humorist’s work over time. 
Humorwork, like other practices, is susceptible to reappropriation and transformation 
through continuing humorwork. In the previous two chapters, I discussed practices of 
humorwork as reappropriation and transformation for both ameliorative and 
counterameliorative purposes. It is perhaps no surprise that the products of humorwork 
themselves do not have a distinct immunity to transformation, and there is reason to 
believe that humorwork may be more susceptible to continuing humorous (and non-
humorous) transformations because of its unstable mode of practice. 
 Consider, for example, H. P. Grice’s distinction between bona-fide and non-bona-
fide speech discussed in Chapter III. Entering into a humorous mode of engagement 
signals to attentive interlocutors that discourse is no longer functioning according to its 
usual norms, instead taking another course.504 Delia Chiaro emphasizes that the lines 
between serious discourse and jest are not so clearly defined as one mode of discourse 
can easily transform into another through the latent capacities of wordplay. However, 
                                               




Chiaro also emphasizes that humor can often result in a cascade of jest in the form of 
“joke capping” wherein interlocutors continue to build off the themes embedded within 
each other’s jokes.505 The production of a joke is thus also often related to the production 
of more, as each joke takes upon and reworks elements of each other among a social 
group. 
 One of Chiaro’s main examples of wordplay that builds upon other instances of 
wordplay is graffiti. Chiaro writes, “...[D]ozens of joke types, particularly written graffiti, 
are structured in terms of a single sentence of utterance. This normally acts as a matrix 
and serves as a blueprint from which other jokes are generated.”506 For example, one 
series of graffiti wordplay that Chiaro discusses originated from a mid-1970s advertising 
campaign by Smirnoff featuring “escapist photographs accompanied by slogans such as I 
thought the Kama Sutra was an Indian restaurant until I discovered Smirnoff.” Shortly 
after graffiti showed up that played with elements of this phrase, for example: 
 “I thought innuendo was an Italian suppository until I discovered Smirnoff. 
 I thought cirrhosis was a type of cloud until I discovered Smirnoff.”507 
This process represents a by-now-familiar process of humorwork: the slogan in the 
advertisement has been reworked into a new “discovery” that plays upon the phonetics of 
“innuendo” (sounding like “in your end-o” and linking with suppositories, for the reader 
lacking pun imagination). 
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 However, the graffiti joke based on the ad is also part of a larger field reworking 
the jokes beyond Smirnoff while still retaining links to the form: 
 “I thought Nausea was a novel by Jean-Paul Sartre until I discovered  
Scrumpy.”508  
Interestingly, eventually the graffiti left a humorous mode and returned to a more 
straightforward assertion of an idea or a “semi-idiom” in Chiaro’s description: 
 “I used to think I was an atheist until I discovered I was God. 
 I used to talk in clichés but now I avoid them like the plague.509 
In these examples of humorwork, the phrase is brought from an ad into a humorous 
reworking through graffiti, including further developments upon existing humorous 
graffitos playing with the phrase. Eventually, these reworkings find themselves back into 
a more serious mode of directly conveying information, the entrance into a humorous 
mode itself capable of being corralled back into more straightforward (albeit cloudy) 
ideas. 
 Chiaro’s discussion of jokes in graffiti is also relevant to the constantly remixed 
and transformed field of Internet memes. While the word meme is traceable to Richard 
Dawkins and refers more broadly to “non-genetic behaviour and cultural ideas that are 
passed on from person to person,” the word “meme” is more commonly associated with 
influential, viral Internet jokes, as (academically) defined by Patrick Davison in 2009.510 
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Since memes are constantly spread and remixed into new forms, they can also be 
understood as humorwork and likely share a kinship with the older practice of graffiti, as 
images and discourse are remixed by various agents in public space. 
 A highly politicized recent example of a joke that was subject to transformation 
by continuing humorwork is the comics character Pepe the Frog. Pepe the Frog was 
originally created by artist Matt Furie in the 2000s for his comic book Boy’s Club. Furie 
writes of the character,  
...he’s just kind of an everyman frog, he lives with his three roommates, a dog, a 
bear and a wolf. It just kind of expresses early 20-something hedonistic lifestyle, 
of just hanging out, playing pranks on each other, eating pizza, partying, that kind 
of thing. A lot of bodily humor.511 
 
Pepe the Frog was originally intended as a humorous character representing a messy and 
weird early-20s roommate living situation. But in the 2000s a specific page from Furie’s 
comic went viral through Furie’s intended bodily humor (here, focused on peeing). Furie 
recounts, 
There was a six-panel comic page of Pepe taking a leak with his pants all the way 
down, and one of his roommates walks in on him. Later on they’re playing video 
games, and his buddy Landwolf says “I heard you pull your pants all the way 
down to go pee,” and Pepe responds by saying “feels good man,” he looks happy. 
So that was kind of cut out from there, and used in a viral way, people would say 
things like “I just finished my final exam” and they’d post the happy frog saying 
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Figure 9. Commonly shared page of Pepe the Frog from the comic Boy’s Club by Matt 
Furie featuring “feels good man.” Matt Furie, Boy’s Club (Seattle: Fantagraphics, 2016), 
42. 
 
As memes that show up on humor-focused online message boards tend to operate, the 
Pepe character’s face and statement of “feels good man” was removed from its context 
and continuously remixed. Pepe himself was reworked into various forms with various 
moods, including a “sad Pepe” and a more smug variation, transforming the original body 
humor into an ongoing humorous engagement with the character. Worth noting here is 
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that the Pepe character maintained the weird, grotesque, qualities built into him through 
Furie’s more light-hearted humorwork, including his stylization as a specifically male 
gross roommate with a questionable sense of consequences and boundaries, letting his 
pee fly in the wind and recounting his delight to his gamer roommate. Pepe is thus not 
quite the “everyman” that Furie envisioned, but a specific kind of slimy man-frog, 
dipping farther into his origins in the swamp than a more composed and less freewheeling 
character like Jim Henson’s anxiety-ridden Kermit the Frog for whom it is less easy 
being green. 
 While the character was originally intended for body humor, which in Chapter IV 
I would have placed on a spectrum between banal and absurd humor, Pepe’s gradual 
transformation online brought the character into a more intensely political register where 
he remains today. During the 2016 elections Trump supporters on politically right-
spectrum humorous message boards such as 4chan remixed the smug recreation of Pepe 
into a hybridization between Donald Trump and Pepe the Frog. Following the fusion 
between Pepe and Trump, Trump supporters online started adopting Pepe as a meme 
associated with Trump and revitalized nationalist and fascist movements such as the “alt-
right.” Eventually this transformed version of Pepe reached Trump himself, as he and his 
son shared remixed images of Pepe online, while Hillary Clinton’s campaign responded 
that it was “horrifying” that Trump would share images of Pepe after his transformation 
in the public eye into a white supremacist meme. 513 
                                               
513 Rachael Revesz, “Hillary Clinton attacks Donald Trump for posting Pepe the Frog 






Pepe was not only transformed from his more banal or absurd humorous origins 
into a source of humorous political memes, but also specifically into various multiplying 
counterameliorative political memes. In September 2016 The Anti-Defamation League, 
which hosts a database of hate speech and hate symbols, officially added Pepe the Frog 
alongside other hate symbols such as the swastika and the iron cross.514 
 Initially, Furie was concerned with the transformation of Pepe into a reactionary 
character but assumed that this possibility was par for the course of Internet meme culture 
and expressed hope that the proliferating white supremacist reappropriations of Pepe 
were a passing phase. He also associated Pepe’s transformation again with his status as 
an “everyman” or “blank slate” character, distancing his role in creating the character and 
the character as originally created from its racist, sexist, and homophobic Internet 
iterations. Furie explained in a September 2016 interview,  
...I just think that people reinvent him in all these different ways, it’s kind of a 
blank slate. It’s just out of my control, what people are doing with it, and my 
thoughts on it, are more of amusement...I think that’s it’s just a phase, and come 
November, it’s just gonna go on to the next phase, obviously that political agenda 
is exactly the opposite of my own personal feelings, but in terms of meme culture, 
it’s people reapproppriating things for their own agenda. That’s just a product of 
the internet. And I think people in whatever dark corners of the internet are just 
trying to one up each other on how shocking they can make Pepe appear.515  
 
Pepe continued to be featured online in his reappropriated white supremacist form despite 
Furie’s hopes. When white supremacist media personality Richard Spencer was punched 
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on video in January 2017 on Trump’s Inauguration Day, he was in the middle of 
explaining to the reporter why he was wearing a pin of Pepe on his jacket. The video of 
Richard Spencer was then remixed with music and other effects through video editing for 
the sake of humorous ridicule against his alt-right, white supremacist ideology.516 
 
 
Figure 10. Alt-right personality Richard Spencer getting punched in the face while 
describing his Pepe pin to Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Washington 
bureau chief Zoe Daniel. “Far-Right Activist Richard Spencer Punched During 
Interview,” ABC News, last updated October 23, 2018, 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-21/far-right-activist-punched-on-camera/8200316/. 
 
 Eventually, Furie gave up hope that constant Internet reappropriation would run 
its course, and officially killed Pepe the Frog in a comic strip posted in May 2017.517 This 
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did nothing to stop Pepe’s continued use by others, and in August 2017 Furie started a 
fundraising campaign on Kickstarter that reached $34,757 of its planned $10,000 goal to 
“Save Pepe” from reappropriation by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, the alt-right, and 
other fascists. Furie’s goal was to reclaim the character through resurrection by 
reintroducing Pepe in his original humorous comic strip form. The fundraiser details,  
We understand there's no way to fully control the internet or how people decide to 
use Pepe the Frog. Trying to control that would be a completely unreasonable 
goal. That said, the aim of this project is to positively resurrect Pepe through the 
creation of a brand new comic in the spirit of the original BOY'S CLUB.518 
 
Furie recognized that he cannot control reappropriations of Pepe but hoped that his 
original take on the character could be reintroduced among the main uses of the 
character. 
 Furie’s attempt to revitalize Pepe coincided with a new campaign against 
reappropriations of his character through copyright law including Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) demands for takedown of his copyrighted content and lawsuits. 
In August, for example, Furie won a suit against a man who wrote an Islamophobic book 
called The Adventures of Pepe and Pede, donating the money from the settlement to the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations, and has since then brought a lawsuit against 
Alex Jones and his popular reactionary conspiracy theory website InfoWars.519  
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  As of now it is uncertain whether Furie’s combined resurrection attempts and 
copyright claims will have an effect on separating Pepe from his current association with 
hate groups. Despite the serious political impact of the symbol in its reappropriated form, 
Pepe’s link with his humorous origin also persists in many of the spaces where he is 
deployed. Pressed about posing with a Pepe banner and other white supremacist symbols 
in a January 2018 interview, psychologist and conservative social media personality 
Jordan Peterson played up this continued link between Pepe and humor, explaining,  
Most of the people who are using this sort of symbol are using it in a deeply 
satirical way. Now the fact that the far right has decided that it’s a radical 
indicator of the validity of their particular view doesn’t mean that that’s what it is, 
so it’s something that we haven’t seen before. There’s a lot of game-playing going 
on online, a lot.520  
 
Reflecting on the subjectivity of people who participate in the subcultures that 
transformed and celebrate the new Pepe, Peterson adds, “I’m trying to call them forth as 
individuals out of the chaos that they’re ensconced in.”521 
 The transformation of Pepe the frog from his origins as a source of absurd, banal 
humor to his various humorous reappropriations in the 2000s and to his now potentially 
stabilized reappropriation into a symbol of white supremacy and fascism illustrates the 
instability of humorwork as it works upon humorwork across several levels. Just as Furie 
placed Pepe into the absurd position of being discovered standing while peeing with his 
pants pulled down by his roommate, the character’s likeness was removed from the panel 
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and changed over time to stand for hatred and a counterameliorative backlash against 
social justice in the 2010s. In an essay on the death of memes, English professor Lauren 
Michele Jackson reflects on the specific transformation of Pepe’s humor, writing,  
In Pepe’s case, the otherwise chill and harmless character created by artist Matt  
Furie in the early 2000s was on the decline [in use] until he got a new context  
when the alt-right reappropriated him leading into the election. Pepe was 
resurrected from obscurity when internet culture found a new need for the 
cartoon’s special brand of male millennial grotesquerie.522 
 
Here Jackson emphasizes that Pepe’s original association with grotesque, bodily humor 
among men is part of its enduring resonance as a character of the alt-right, passed on 
from banal absurdity to national politics in a way that often moves between and beyond 
its humor. Practices and results of humorwork are open to continuing practices of 
humorwork in ways that may vastly exceed the intentions of its practice. 
 Jackson does not go further into this interesting point about Pepe’s original 
grotesque characterization, but considering it in more detail implicates Furie more in 
Pepe’s conversion into an alt-right symbol of hatred than he acknowledges. Specifically, 
emphasizing the continuing connection between the subject of humorwork and their 
humor rather than allowing Pepe to float free of his origins highlights a dynamic of 
alienation between a humorist and their transformed creation. I do not mean to blame 
Furie for the uptake of Pepe by the alt-right, but instead point to a continuing 
confrontation between Furie and the now alienated alt-right Pepe. Building upon my 
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earlier discussion of humorwork and Marx, it is useful to emphasize how Furie’s 
transformed creation also continues to confront him in the form of alienation. 
For Marx, alienation turns the tables on the relationship between the worker and 
the product of their labor. Instead of seeing themselves in the object they have produced 
through activity, and connecting with others through this recognition, the alienated object 
instead stands against the worker who produced it. What the worker now sees in this 
object is instead alien and external to the productive activity they exerted upon the world 
to create it, confronting rather than confirming their life and power in relation to the other 
people who take away the worker’s product to serve their pleasure and fulfill their 
“satisfaction and pleasure.”523 Though I do not want to suggest that Furie has experienced 
the same alienation that Marx described in the relationship between wage-labor, the 
worker, and the capitalist, he nonetheless has become alienated from Pepe through a 
process of reappropriation that not only takes the production of Pepe memes beyond 
Furie’s control but also leads to a confrontation between Furie and the continuing 
meaning of his creation. 
If we consider humorwork to be a process through which the humorist continues 
to be tied to the meaning of their work, then the instability of reappropriation latent 
within continuing activities of wordplay also admit to unstable possibilities of 
humorwork alienation. Furie put effort into realizing his character of Pepe and achieving 
the comic effect of weird, gross roommate that was not intended to reach a national 
political stage, let alone be used to bolster a conservative figure like Trump and the host 
                                               




of alt-right humorists who continue to pin Pepe to their causes of hatred. Though Furie 
did not predict this outcome, his humorwork always contained the instability that his 
work could be transformed in ways he may not have expected, and his continuing 
relationship with Pepe is likely to be combative and fraught. Rather than transforming 
into a monster totally outside Furie’s orbit Pepe thus continues to confront him through 
the instability of his reappropriation possibilities, leading to Furie’s continuing efforts to 
reclaim, kill, and ultimately legislate the character he created who confronts him and 
thwarts him through unstable humorous reappropriation and a crowd of humorists that 
Furie must continue to contend with. 
 One potential difficulty with evoking Marx is that his lack of a sexed analysis of 
the subject in relation to work fails to account for embodied and gendered524 relationships 
between a subject undertaking humorwork and their creation, failing to adequately 
include insights from feminist theorists and philosophers about humor. However, the 
production of Pepe, the instability of humorwork, and the resulting alienation is heavily 
gendered. Though Furie portrays Pepe as an “everyman,” Pepe’s character and actions, as 
I mentioned earlier, paint him specifically as a gross, care-free, male roommate who 
pisses in the wind and likes to talk about it. It is thus not surprising that Pepe was taken 
up by Internet message boards consisting predominantly of gross anti-social men who 
lack proper hygiene and like to play video games while associating with other gross anti-
social men (even if only from an ironized distance). As I have emphasized in this 
dissertation, and as emphasized in much of the literature on humor studies, the 
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reappropriations and transformations effected by humor frequently are catalyzed by a 
latent element of the phrase, image, or situation that results in humor. It is thus not 
surprising that Pepe might specifically be hybridized with Trump, a man who takes 
Pepe’s carefree, reckless, and slimy masculine enthusiasm to new heights of 
politicization and profit. It is notable in this regard that though one of Trump’s frequent 
campaign slogans during the election was “Drain the swamp,” the alt-right would choose 
to associate him with a grotesque frog-man as he proceeded to enter office and elect a 
host of unqualified profiteers and surround himself with shady characters who 
participated in questionable election tactics.  
 In addition to the confrontation with others and the alienated meaning of his work, 
the instability of humorwork also brings Furie into a gendered confrontation with 
himself. The transformation of Pepe into Trump is also the transformation of a humorous 
masculinity that Furie considers harmless and reflective of the “everyman” into a style of 
masculinity that Furie considers grotesque and hateful, proceeding through a process of 
collective online reappropriation that Furie did not anticipate but nonetheless brought out 
latent elements of his character and humorous imagery to lead Pepe into the political 
spotlight. The instability of humorwork thus reveals that Pepe may have been closer to 
his transformation into hate symbol than comfortable for Furie to consider, indicating the 
need for reevaluating not only the continued use of Pepe post-reappropriation but also the 
style of gross masculinity that was manipulable into his current form. Though the 
instability of humorwork and its gendered connection with the humorist subject can have 
disastrous results, it can also potentially lead to reevaluation and a critical sense of 
unseen political possibilities latent within even the most seemingly neutral and banal 
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humor. Returning to the parable of Kierkegaard’s gods from the Introduction, if the 
meaning of having laughter on your side is unclear and unstable, then the revelation of 
laughter’s effects can result in a reinterrogation of the conditions upon which this 
laughter was formed. 
 
It Ain’t over ‘Til the Unruly Woman Sings: Humorwork, Instability, and Gender 
Though gender and an unreflective gendered style informs Furie’s encounter with 
the transformed Pepe the Frog, it is useful to consider not only the relationships between 
gender and the unstable political transformations of humorwork but also specific unstable 
gendered practices of humor that are embodied. Irigaray, Cixous, and Kristeva 
importantly point out that language cannot be totally separated from gendered 
embodiment, but it is also important to look beyond language and consider stylized 
performances of the gendered body undertaking humorwork and resulting instabilities. 
One example of unstable, embodied humorwork is the figure of the unruly woman 
as discussed by Kathleen Rowe. Following the film A Question of Silence, feminist 
theorists of laughter such as Cixous, and carnivalesque, Rowe is interested in the ways 
that women transform their position as spectacle of the masculine gaze into a disruption 
of control through humorous, embodied, and unstable performances of exaggeration, 
hyperbole, and excess against the positions of rationality that are associated with men at 
the expense of women.525 In this context, Rowe looks at the history of humorous women 
in film to introduce the figure of “the unruly woman.” Citing Medusa as one of the 
                                               




earliest examples of the unruly woman, Rowe describes the unruly woman as “an 
ambivalent figure of female outrageousness and transgression with roots in the narrative 
forms of comedy and the social practices of carnival,” associated with excess, offense, 
and the grotesque through an oscillation between beauty and monstrosity.526 The unruly 
woman takes up the excess, visibility, and spectacle placed upon them by men as a source 
of power, redirecting it back against a social and political order that would rather women 
be seen than heard.527 But in doing this, women are brought into an unstable position 
through taking up visibility as a form of power that still harbors possibilities for negative 
exposure and vulnerability.528 Taking up humorous unruliness thus simultaneously serves 
as a reappropriated source of power that was intended to put women in their place but 
also an instability that this power can be reasserted. 
In the previous section I discussed a particularly grotesque man-frog, and in this 
section it is useful to consider one of Rowe’s paradigm examples of an unruly woman, 
Miss Piggy from The Muppets. In contrast to the anxious and controlling Kermit the 
Frog, Miss Piggy is often portrayed as a large, loud, obnoxious, and abrasive diva voiced 
by a man, simultaneously more human and more animal than any of the other Muppets, 
and constantly disrupting Kermit and his plans by calling attention to herself and 
expressing jealousy when not receiving her due. She also is one of the Muppets that kicks 
the most ass. Though she is often portrayed as narcissistic, inappropriately flirtatious, and 
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generally too much for the other Muppets to handle, when they enter a moment of trouble 
she is the character who proclaims “Hi-ya!,” beats up the opposition, and saves the day, 
although she is equally likely to use her karate chops against anyone she perceives as 
standing in her way. The effect of the character and her performance as part of the 
Muppets is one of laughter and comedy formed from her various excesses and her 
gendered pushing of boundaries against the other (almost always) masculine Muppets in 
the cast.529 
It is important to note that Miss Piggy’s unstable source of humor as feminine 
excess bordering on grotesque is distinct from Pepe the Frog’s masculine grotesqueness 
as care-free, slimy roommate that eventually helped him plunge into the swamp of 
entitled, hateful Trumpian hybridity. The Miss Piggy character either achieves or is 
bordering on a hurtful stereotype of women, especially women who do not fit beauty 
norms based on weight, women who have been accused of being narcissistic when trying 
to meet their needs, and women who do not meet the strictures of “behaving like a lady.” 
At the same time, however, this characterization of Miss Piggy is also one that makes her 
visible as acting against precisely these norms and the (mostly male) cast of the Muppets, 
not giving in to their expectations of her behavior (as if they could reign her in if they 
tried), and also evading punishment for acting out of line. Miss Piggy’s excess is thus one 
of expanding outside of boundaries that are set up to keep her controlled, shattering 
expectation, and generally living large in a society where regimented norms work 
together to shrink women down and confine their movements. 
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Pepe, on the other hand, is enacting a humorous grotesqueness that plays into a 
style of masculinity as free-wheeling, uncontained, and unpleasantly out-there without 
any expectations that he reign his behavior in. Attempting to direct the fiat of “act like a 
man” towards Pepe would not achieve the same effect as demanding Miss Piggy “act like 
a lady,” since society endorses acting like a man in the form of self-direction, expansion, 
and taking up space, peeing in the wind all he pleases with his pants down as far as 
possible. Due to power structures, Pepe’s most popular slogan “Feels good, man” is 
untranslatable in “the feminine,” thus denying any analogue like “Feels good, woman.” 
Whereas Pepe is transformable into Trump, Miss Piggy does not get reappropriated in a 
similar manner, and if reshaped in the hands of the alt-right she may be more likely to be 
evoked as a woman who has misstepped her place and needs to be pressed back into it 
rather than a man who brings delight to his followers as he pisses upon the entire United 
States. Miss Piggy would also most certainly beat up Pepe the Frog in any fight. 
Through Miss Piggy, Rowe creates a blueprint of characteristics that the figure of 
the unruly woman may have, linking her to the figure of the “woman on top” who 
disrupts the social hierarchy of men over women: 
1) The unruly woman creates disorder by dominating, or attempting to dominate, 
men. She is unable or unwilling to confine herself to her proper place. 
 
2) Her body is excessive or fat, suggesting her unwillingness or inability to 
control her physical appetite. 
 
3) Her speech is excessive, in quantity, content, or tone. 
 
4) She makes jokes, or laughs herself. 
 
5) She may be androgynous or hermaphroditic, drawing attention to the social 




6) She may be old or a masculinized crone. For old women who refuse to become 
invisible in our culture are often considered grotesque. 
 
7) Her behavior is associated with looseness, and occasionally whorishness. But 
her sexuality is less narrowly and negatively defined than is that of the femme 
fatale. She may be pregnant. 
 
8) She is associated with dirt, liminality (thresholds, borders, or margins), and 
taboo, rendering her above all a figure of ambivalence.530 
 
“The unruly woman” is thus capable of taking the form of many unruly women, 
especially as they humorously take up the subject position of being subjected to visibility 
when exceeding the constraints of sexist norms, and then taking advantage of this 
spectacle by using it to magnify her transgression of norms. 
 The instability of this humorous, embodied, gendered position is also dangerous. 
After all, on account of being a puppet voiced by a man, Miss Piggy is insulated from any 
real backlash that may result from her unstable position. Living women are not. To 
highlight the dangerous side of taking up the mantle of the unruly woman, Rowe refers to 
Roseanne’s practice of humor during Roseanne’s initial run from 1988 to 1997. Rowe 
attributes to Roseanne an unruly woman persona amplified by her unapologetic weight 
that did not fit the norms of feminine thinness typically enshrined on television, her 
position as a non-idealized working woman, and her ease in her authority, her body, and 
her constant ability to break and laugh at expectations.531 However, in 1990, when she 
brought her persona into a San Diego Padres game while singing the National Anthem, 
Roseanne’s humor as an unruly woman backfired with dangerous results for her career 
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and public life. She purposefully began to sing the National Anthem too high to mock 
advice given to her by Johnny Carson, began singing loudly and brashly and off-key 
when hitting this higher register and the word “Freeeeee,” then grabbed her crotch and 
spat on the ground in front of a thunderously booing crowd.532 
Rowe argues that the backlash that Roseanne received, including from the mouth 
of President George H. W. Bush, was tied to her humorous performance as unruly 
woman. Roseanne took her transgression too far against the convergence of masculinity 
and nationalism represented in the ideology of baseball, and her backlash reinvoked 
unruliness as a source for swift, harsh, and overwhelming societal correction.533 Bergson, 
as discussed in Chapter III, considered laughter to be the societal correction of the overly 
mechanical and rigid,534 but in this instance Roseanne was punished by mass media for 
precisely the opposite. This punishment also coincided with cruel tabloid coverage of 
Roseanne’s personal life, with Rowe concluding that the backlash against Roseanne was 
an attempt to pry away her humorous position and turn the humor back against her, 
making her a laughingstock for her unruly behavior.535 Rowe traces this to a gradual shift 
of Roseanne’s unruly humorous persona to a more serious mode and explanation for her 
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behavior, including cosmetic surgery to reduce her weight, which was shifted from a 
source of humor to the narrative of a tragic health problem resulting in a new, harder to 
place humorous persona.536 This “new” Roseanne briefly reemerged in the 2018 reboot of 
Roseanne as a Trump supporter, before Roseanne herself was fired for a racist tweet 
comparing the former senior advisor of President Barack Obama to an ape,537 proving 
that even an unruly woman can sometimes practice humorwork that is 
counterameliorative. 
Beyond the unstable gendered confrontation between the humorist and the 
creation of their humorwork is also a potential gendered instability between the humorist 
and their own embodied performance, granting the subject both power through humorous 
transgression and the possibility of this humorous position getting twisted back as a form 
of punishment. Returning to Kierkegaard’s parables of the clown in the theater and the 
laughter of the gods I began with in the Introduction, taking up humorwork both 
destabilizes its potential uptake by others, and having laughter on one’s side may be the 
very cause of having laughter taken away or redirected as a form of punishment. The 
gendered, embodied, social, and affective dimensions of humor in practice thus indicate a 
need for thoughtful care and social and political awareness, lest their effects go horribly 
awry. And even then, humorists aware of humorwork’s instabilities must accept that 
despite any intentions and predictions their creations and practices of humorwork could 
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work against their intentions, requiring a sense of practice as powerful but also not 
amenable to full control. 
However, pointing out humor’s instabilities in these contexts does not quite go far 
enough. As I discussed in Chapter II of this dissertation, several common views of humor 
hold that it is distinctly separable from politics and its potential instabilities, instead 
fundamentally grounded in technique and a free expression of ideas that should not be 
primarily tethered to social and political considerations. It thus falls upon me, the 
humorless feminist millennial, to return to the subject of political humor that attempts to 
establish itself beyond politics. 
 
The Last Laugh: The “Threat” to Humor Revisited 
I began my discussion of humor and politics in Chapter II by reflecting on popular 
discussions, including quotes from comedians Bill Burr and Jerry Seinfeld, President 
Donald Trump, and articles by journalists covering humorless college students that call 
for the depoliticization of humor in contrast to a tide of “political correctness” that 
threatens to throw the free expression of humor into peril. Now that I have explained 
social and political humorwork as an affective, embodied practice that brings its subject 
in contact with instabilities, it is worth considering if this approach is truly applicable to 
social and political humor that claims a home in stable, depoliticized space.  
Earlier, I pointed out that comedians made a distinction between focusing on the 
operations and ideas of humor in contrast to needless politicization. Bill Burr focuses on 
the technical skill of a domestic violence joke, emphasizing that it has no sway over 
convincing someone to actually commit domestic violence, and instead unpacking it as “a 
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great fuckin’ joke.”538 Jerry Seinfeld focuses on his craft and topics “he can make 
funny,”539 while journalism about college students insists that jokes are primarily 
intended to be funny rather than a lesson about politics.540 The practice of humor is thus 
viewed primarily as a craft, with any political critique tangential or even irrelevant to 
fully understanding and appreciating a joke. 
I have instead stressed that humorwork is socially and politically situated, and 
connected with the embodied subject who practices it. As I argued in Chapter VI, humor 
such as the racist “Pants up, don’t loot” is tied to a political practice of humorwork that 
transforms a centering of black lives into an affective reassertion of racist controlling 
images. While humorwork can be placed on a continuum between banal, absurd, and 
political, as I stressed in Chapter V, this does not free most political jokes by comedians 
from social and political critique. Bill Burr, for example, attempts to liberate a restaurant 
sign reading “We like our beer the way we like our violence: domestic” from criticism 
because he claims it is a technically skilled joke that will not directly impact anyone’s 
decisions about committing domestic violence.541 In my account, however, the 
expectation that a specific instance of a joke will have a direct cause on another 
individual person’s decisions to commit harm is too narrow a scope for restricting the 
political field of a joke. Regardless of any potential direct causal link the joke is still 











reappropriating the “I like my women like I like my [object]” formula, itself suggesting 
the possession of women by the speaker, into a link with domestic violence, which is 
systematically targeted against women. If the politics of humor is understood to 
encompass the link between subjects and their social and political world, and how they 
choose to engage with that world through reappropriation and transformation, Burr’s 
overly limited understanding of the political arbitrarily brackets out its larger scope. 
However, it is not only a focus on craft that influences the understanding that 
humor should not count as political, but also an emphasis on the effect or potential effect 
that humor might have on others. Specifically, the problem for many humorists is not 
only the attempted politicization of their work but also the inability of others to “take” the 
joke, instead losing the free thread of comedy due to their over-sensitivity and feelings. 
It’s in this context that certain subterranean corners of the Internet, such as those that 
delight in the transformed Pepe, have turned to the mantra “Fuck your feelings.” 
President Trump himself represents this political callousness against feelings and 
receptivity, decrying political correctness and sensitivity in favor of pursuing policies that 
will be less fit for “losers.”542 Any sensitivity to people and politics thus amounts to an 
over-sensitivity, unable to keep on rolling along in delight and potential victory. 
One of the more nuanced followers of the “Fuck your feelings” mentality is not 
someone who particularly likes Trump at all, but rather British comedian Ricky Gervais, 
indicating that this stance is held by political “conservatives” and “liberals” alike. After 





attending a performance of Ricky Gervais’s 2017 Humanity world tour, television news 
personality Piers Morgan reported, 
It IS truly shocking: a 90-minute fusillade of savagely uncompromising comedy, 
with no taboo subject off limits – from Aids, cancer and rape to paedophilia, 
terrorism, transgenderism. (‘I’m identifying as a chimp,’ he declared. ‘Much 
easier than having everything cut off to be a woman.’)...But at its heart, 
Humanity’s theme is one of my own bêtes noires: the modern malaise of absurdly 
over-sensitive snowflakes that wallow in permanent offence and victimhood, 
fuelled by PC-crazed social media. Gervais tests his audiences with gags so near 
the knuckle that everyone around me repeatedly gasped in genuine horror before 
exploding with laughter; though, with delicious irony, two women in front of me 
sat grim-faced throughout the whole show.543 
 
Through this analysis of the performance Piers Morgan lauds Gervais’s constant, 
unapologetic edginess and transgression of conversational norms through humor, 
representing a transcendence against limits, in contrast to a rising threat of sensitivity, 
feelings, receptivity, and offense that threaten speech with constraint. The audience is 
beset with a “test,” a ride full of “genuine horror” rewarded with an explosion of laughter 
if tolerated and understood in contrast to the “delicious irony” of two “grim-faced” 
women. Why this is an irony is unclear, but nonetheless related to the grim, heavy 
affectedness of the two women who are unable to laugh and thus fail to follow along with 
the free play of humor, doomed to an association with Morgan’s hated “snowflakes” who 
too easily melt at the first sign of heat. The proper reception for Morgan, exemplified 
through Gervais, is thus an emphasis on the boundlessness of humor in contrast to people 
who are too weighted down to “take” the joke and the delight of freedom that it offers. 
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 Looking at Gervais’s own understanding of his humor leads to more nuance than 
Morgan reports. In his 2018 Netflix comedy special Humanity Ricky Gervais asserts with 
frustration, “A joke about a bad thing isn’t as bad as the bad thing, or necessarily 
condoning the bad thing. It could be anti the bad thing. It depends on the actual joke.” 
Gervais goes beyond Burr to assert that jokes can be bad, reassuring that he does not 
approve of rape jokes that directly mock survivors, instead emphasizing a more 
situational understanding of jokes on a case-by-case basis.544 In a 2018 interview 
responding directly to Morgan’s assessment of Gervais’s comedy routine as anti-political 
correctness, Gervais instead countered,  
“That is a part of it, and I’ve always been a champion of free speech. But I don’t 
want to be lumped in with those people that say it’s PC gone mad. Political 
correctness, per se, is a good thing. I would say I am a lefty, liberal, snowflake, 
politically correct person. I don’t like the fact that the right [wing] have been the 
champions of free speech for the last couple of years.”545 
 
It is thus important to qualify Gervais’s understanding of his humorwork and how he 
navigates the tension between “champion of free speech” and his self-description as 
“lefty, liberal, snowflake, politically correct person.” 
 At times, Gervais accurately describes a way in which someone misinterpreted his 
humorwork, and expresses views on humor that are socially conscious or even altruistic. 
Clarifying his intent during Humanity’s final encore, Gervais says to his crowd, “I hope 
                                               
544 Ricky Gervais, Humanity (Los Gatos, CA: Netflix Studios, 2018), Netflix video 
streaming, https://www.netflix.com/title/80189653/. 
 
545 Ricky Gervais, “We Had a Long Chat with Ricky Gervais About Controversy, 
‘Humanity’ and What He Would Have Said at the Golden Globes,” New Musical Express 





you enjoyed the show. I hope no-one was offended. [crowd cheering and laughing]. No, I 
really do, because that’s never the point! I’ve always wanted people to know they can 
laugh at bad things without being bad people.” Gervais thus seems to double-down on his 
focus on the context of humor rather than just a blanket focus on offense. He goes on to 
reflect on what he learned about growing up in poverty from his brother: “That’s what 
comedy’s for, that’s what humor’s for. It gets us over bad stuff.”546 Gervais’ focus on 
humor’s better nature is consistent with older interviews, such as a 2014 interview about 
his 2013-2014 show Derek about a “childlike” man with a big heart who says funny 
things because he has “no filter” and has not been crushed by society. Gervais says of his 
use of comedy on the show, “I think that’s fundamental in comedy. We try jokes, and 
certainly jokes, we try to undermine societal norms. There’s something odd about the 
joke. We flip it, and we look at life from a slightly different angle.”547 It is thus important 
to note that Gervais’s views on humor are often complex, situational, and even altruistic 
in comparison to the caricature of edgy, uncaring humorwork painted by even fans like 
Morgan. While the show was controversial because Gervais wrote and starred as a 
neurodivergent character, and he did play opposite to a character that has a more cynical 
and edgy perspective, for the sake of this argument I will consider Gervais’s self-
understanding of his humorwork on his own terms. 
 Despite Gervais’s nuances, his navigation of the free play of comedy in contrast 
to offense still lands the humorwork of Humanity firmly in the ballpark of a “Fuck your 
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feelings” mindset about humor. Alongside his appeals to a more caring and healing 
approach to humor, Gervais also often invokes a contradictory framework of free humor 
in contrast to offensiveness that brackets out most complaints about the political aspects 
of his jokes. That is, often his complaints about erroneous uptakes of his humor are 
legitimate, but he uses this to paint a broad brush against many compelling critiques 
against some of his more edgy jokes and bits for entrenching oppressive social norms 
rather than undermining them. Rather than remain consistent with his contextual analysis 
of humor and specific people who criticize his humor, Gervais uses this to create a large 
claim about human nature, and specifically the human nature of his detractors: 
But that’s what the world’s like. People see something they don’t like, they expect 
it to stop, as opposed to deal with their emotions. They want us to care about their 
thing as much as they do. It’s why the world is getting worse, and the world is 
getting worse.548 
 
Instead of considering that some claims against his humor may be justified, Gervais 
instead attributes the failure of everyone to take his jokes properly to their personal issues 
with emotions, echoing Burr’s complaints about “all these goddamn groups” that are 
ruining humor, although Gervais tends to trace the issue back to social media making 
people take humor and ideas in an overly personal way. Despite Gervais’s professed 
contextualism, he subjects all potential humor detractors to the court of feelings and 
oversensitivity.  
 Gervais’s focus on the proper understanding of a joke, combined with his dislike 
of people who take them up through feelings as opposed to understanding or tolerance, 
causes him to miss (intentionally or not) the entrenchment of social norms by many of his 
                                               




jokes. His emphasis that rape jokes are not necessarily bad leads to him telling a joke he 
claims is solely a play of words and punnery: “A woman goes running into a police 
station. She says, ‘Help, I’ve been graped!’ The policeman says, ‘Do you mean raped?’ 
She says, “No, there was a bunch of them.”549 Gervais presumably cites this is an 
example of an acceptable rape joke because it relies on a pun: “graped” is tied to rape by 
more than one person because “raped” is phonetically reappropriable into “graped” and 
grapes are tied to bunches when plural (a bunch of grapes). Through the pun, it also 
becomes unclear if the woman in the joke was graped (in the sense of, say, having a 
bunch of grapes thrown at her) or sexually assaulted by several people.  
Even taking Gervais on his own terms, his position that potential critics (or 
random passersby on social media) are incorrect when sensing a potential political 
reentrenchment of norms in this joke dips too far into the false assumption that wordplay 
jokes are trivial in contrast to bad, direct anti-victim humor or Rousseau’s “laughter of 
mockers” discussed in Chapter III. Given the feminist understanding of rape culture as a 
trivialization and normalization of rape within a society through social norms,550 playing 
with the phonetics of “rape” and “grape” that also juxtaposes gang rape with the name for 
a plurality of grapes (the “bunch”) serves as yet another instance where rape becomes 
totally trivialized and thrown about as if it was as apolitical as a pun about ghosts (The 
ghost enjoyed ice scream) or other fruit jokes that do not evoke rape (Orange you glad I 
didn’t say banana?). The joke may involve wordplay and puns, but it also brings in a 
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transformation related to rape that fails to shift a serious but often trivialized topic fully 
into the realm of banal humor (as discussed in Chapter V). Gervais’s failure to see any 
negative potential behind the “graped” rape joke is thus another part of the problem. 
Gervais’s continuing tension in the contradiction between his attempts at positive 
norm-challenging humor and his emphasis on free humor in contrast to emotions is 
indicated by a motto that serves as one of his main approaches to humor, following in the 
footsteps of his funny brother: “...[I]f you think of something funny you’ve got to say it. 
Win, lose, or draw. It might go well, it might go badly, but you’ve got to say it.” Gervais 
juxtaposes this with the upshot of saying every bit of humor that comes to mind: “We’re 
all gonna die, so we should have a laugh because if you can laugh in the face of adversity, 
you’re bullet-proof.”551 Gervais’s insistence on humor as a way of healing from “bad 
stuff” combined with his insistence on invulnerability through laughter and saying every 
funny thing he thinks of whittles away his own emphasis on contextualizing a joke for the 
sake of healing humor. While he thinks Morgan goes too far in his analysis of Gervais’s 
stand-up comedy set as a total send-up of political correctness and sensitive snowflakes, 
Morgan is correct when he reports that Gervais’s stand-up bit frequently haphazardly 
deploys humor about subjects “from Aids, cancer and rape to paedophilia, terrorism, 
transgenderism.”552 The joke in Humanity comparing trans people to Gervais 
transitioning into a chimpanzee named “Bobo” is clearly a way of ridiculing trans people, 
which does not go against long-standing anti-trans social and political norms. Gervais’s 
focus on “the bad” in contrast to laughter thus begins to unravel when he aims far beyond 
                                               





matters that affect him directly to laugh about diseases such as AIDS that are trivialized 
and affect other people, or other groups of people he considers bad or incoherent such as 
trans people, to the extent that the upheaval of social norms for the sake of flipping them 
flies totally out the window. Here we are met with the frustrated Ricky Gervais, 
attempting to freely joke about anything funny that comes to mind but then tormented 
when his humor is brought back to him through unrecognizable interpretations by over-
sensitive others full of feelings who will never satisfy his self-assured broad bush of 
contextual humor and its non-harmful practice. This is the Ricky Gervais who, despite his 
attempts at nuance, nonetheless lapses into the humorwork position of “Fuck your 
feelings.” 
 Already, there is a destabilization in Gervais’s continued emphasis on edgy humor 
in contrast to feelings. As noted with Furie, despite Gervais expressing (and even 
enacting) more positive and even caring views of humor, the effects of his humor and its 
uptake by others against his intentions and understanding constantly haunts his work and 
turns it against him. A large part of his bit in Humanity is his continued frustration that 
his work impacts people beyond his intentions. He spends a lengthy period haranguing 
about the evils of people on social media encountering his humor in ways that clearly 
bother him despite the boosted voice he enjoys from fame and the lavish lifestyle he 
braggingly mocks throughout the entirety of the special. Despite the contrast between 
Gervais as free humorworker and the people who can’t take his jokes through over-
sensitivity, Gervais suffers a similar indigestion of humor through his constant sensitivity 
to his jokes when they are taken back to him. The association of freedom with 
humorwork and sensitivity with the receivers of the joke is thus liable to be inverted, the 
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instability of humorwork’s continued relationship with the subject constantly thwarting 
any potential for total control of humor’s public and private life. 
 Looking at his current projects, Gervais’s sensitivity and feelings appear to be an 
important influence on his appeal to the sensitivity of others in contrast to the freedom of 
humor. Derek represents Gervais when he is closest to seeing humor as a force for good 
against social norms that constrain people who are different and vulnerable. In 
comparison to Gervais’s other massively popular series The Office, which was met with 
universal acclaim and was rebooted with great success in the United States with another 
reboot forthcoming in India, Derek was met with mixed reviews and lower ratings 
without the promise of becoming another massive hit. It is thus not surprising that 
Humanity finds Gervais holding onto some of his sense that humor can be healing but 
also sliding into the cynicism that the irritating uptake of his jokes is unrelenting and his 
attempts at positivity are not met with success. Although I will withhold full judgment 
until it is released, it thus seems unsurprising that Gervais’s next project, commissioned 
by Netflix, completes his attempt to be Derek with his constant affective slide into edgy 
“fuck your feelings” humor. Titled After Life, the show’s pitch reads, 
Tony had a perfect life. But after his wife Lisa suddenly dies, Tony changes. After 
contemplating taking his own life, he decides instead to live long enough to 
punish the world by saying and doing whatever he likes from now on. He thinks 
it’s like a Super Power - not caring about himself or anyone else - but it turns out 
to be tricky when everyone is trying to save the nice guy they used to know.553 
 
                                               
553 Netflix, “After Life, A New Comedy Series Coming to Netflix Starring Ricky 






It remains to be seen if this show will involve Gervais fully doubling down on his 
mission against offense, if it will serve as a self-critique, or (more likely) a confusing mix 
of both. Regardless, as a subject who practices humorwork, Gervais is also heavily 
invested in and emotionally impacted by his work and the instabilities of its potential 
uptake over time. 
 Beyond more (surprisingly) nuanced cases like Gervais, humor’s capacity to be 
taken up by anyone against anyone else, given the right conditions for reappropriation, 
thwarts even the crudest detractors of political correctness and feelings. At the 2018 
White House Correspondents dinner, traditionally conducted as a roast attended by the 
President and his administration, comedian Michelle Wolf shifted the frequent rhetorical 
alignment between the Trump administration, unwavering callousness in the face of over-
sensitive “political correctness,” and nonreceptivity. Whereas earlier Trump had declared 
“I have no time for political correctness,” casting a focus on correct speech and action as 
only fit for “losers,” now an obsession with correct speech and decorum suddenly pushed 
members of the Trump administration and supportive sites of mass media into a 
defensive mode claiming that humor was a source of unjust harm and calling for 
protection from a comedian conducting the roast they were hired to perform. 
Trump himself decided to break tradition and not attend the roast with the press, 
who he constantly rails against for mistreatment and the unfairness of “fake news,” but 
White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders still attended, and became the 
focus of a lot of claims that Wolf’s humor went too far. At the podium, Wolf remarked, 
And of course, we have Sarah Huckabee Sanders. We are graced with Sarah’s 
presence tonight. I have to say I’m a little star-struck. I love you as Aunt Lydia in 
'The Handmaid’s Tale.' Mike Pence, if you haven’t seen it, you would love it..."I 
actually really like Sarah. I think she’s very resourceful. Like she burns facts, and 
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then she uses that ash to create a perfect smoky eye. Like maybe she’s born with 
it, maybe it’s lies. It’s probably lies. And I’m never really sure what to call Sarah 
Huckabee Sanders, you know? Is it Sarah Sanders, is it Sarah Huckabee Sanders, 
is it Cousin Huckabee, is it Auntie Huckabee Sanders? Like, what’s Uncle Tom 
but for white women who disappoint other white women? Oh, I know. Ann 
Coulter.554 
 
These jokes focus on Sanders’s appearance and role in the Trump administration in three 
ways. First, they focus on her role as a Press Secretary known for stretching the truth by 
shifting her image into the stern figure of indoctrination in the 2017 Hulu show based on 
Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale. Second, they depict Sanders as a weaver of 
lies that are so abundant and useful that she uses them to adorn her face. Finally, they 
reflect on her role as a betrayer and disappointment to other white women through a twist 
of the knife shifting from wondering about her three-part name to wondering about what 
such a traitor should be called. Through this roast Wolf thus reveals the contemporary lie 
to the old feminist adage, “Well-behaved women seldom make history.” Sanders is not 
only well-behaved in the sense of serving the Trump administration and attempting to 
smooth over its PR goals at any cost to truth, but also in the sense of “making history” 
through the act of cobbling together convenient truths to serve as the story about the 
continued success of the Trump administration, facts and reflective thought and ethical 
considerations be damned. If I am forgiven for making a pun that even Mary Daly may 
have rolled her eyes at, in the service of Trump well-behaved women frequently make his 
story. 
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 The response to Wolf’s performance indicated a shift by the Trump 
administration and supportive mass media to a concern about the effects of words and the 
importance of feelings and respect. MSNBC Morning Joe co-host Mika Brzezinski 
flipped the word deplorable, previously used by Hilary Clinton in reference to Trump 
supporters, onto Wolf, writing, “Watching a wife and mother be humiliated on national 
television for her looks is deplorable...I have experienced insults about my appearance 
from the president. All women have a duty to unite when these attacks happen and the 
WHCA owes Sarah an apology." Wolf responded with a defense of her joke as not 
predominantly about mocking Sanders’s appearance, responding, “Why are you guys 
making this about Sarah’s looks? I said she burns facts and uses the ash to create a 
*perfect* smoky eye. I complimented her eye makeup and her ingenuity of materials."555 
 This shift is perhaps best noted by the change in rhetoric by former Governor of 
Arkansas and Fox News talk show host Mike Huckabee. Prior to his show on April 28th, 
Huckabee advertised on Twitter,  
If you lack sense of humor, get ‘offended’ by slights you create, or just can’t 
bring yourself to tolerate those you disagree with the [sic] DO NOT watch my 
show 2nite! You will be triggered and will need a pony, popsicle, and Playdough 
to cope!556 
 
This advertisement is framing the freedom of humor against people who won’t tolerate it 
by taking offense, to the extent that their affectedness by humor is simultaneously 
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feminized and infantilized through the language of “pony, popsicle, and Playdough,” also 
with a tinge of ableism by pointing to a lack of intellectual development past childhood 
and the inability to “cope” with the adult, established civil world. 
In a contrast that is real but so perfect for illustrating the shift I am describing that 
it is almost hard to believe, Huckabee totally shifted his analysis of humor, freedom, and 
affectedness that very night after the Dinner when time had rolled past midnight to April 
29th:  
The WHCD was supposed to celebrate the 1st Amendment.  Instead they 
celebrated bullying, vulgarity, and hate. They got all dressed up so they would 
look nicer when they had a hired gun savagely attack their guests. Do they really 
wonder why America has no respect for them? Sad!557 
 
Offensive humor is no longer civil here, it is no longer adult, and it is no longer to be 
tolerated in spite of its consequences for others. Through a turn of inconvenience and 
target humor becomes framed as “savage,” the hired humorworker performing the job she 
was paid for no longer a figure of free and tolerant discourse but instead an entirely 
weaponized “hired gun.” The ability to take a slight becomes no longer one of the most 
prized virtues, but instead is totally discounted next to the respect due to people in fancy 
dress. Here the contrast between free humor and the over-sensitive target of humor (or 
politically correct loser), in comparison to uncivil (and therefore unfree) harmful humor 
and an undeserving subject of civil decorum, unravels the entire framework of “free 
speech” upon which discussions about humor lie. Claiming humor on the side of free 
speech and deploying the faulty contrast between humor and affectivity is not about the 
                                               





substance and epistemology of humor, but rather a masked matter of social and political 
relationships. This framework should thus be met with suspicion, as it is often more 
politically rhetorical rather than a true statement about the world and people in it. 
 Wolf’s humorwork in the style of a roast and its potential harm also resulted in a 
challenge to the continued existence of the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, a 
tradition started in 1921, opened to women in addition to men in 1962, and featuring a 
comedian in roast style since 1983 during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. On Twitter the 
White House Correspondents’ Association released an official statement by outgoing 
president Margaret Talev that refused to back up Wolf or their decision to hire her for the 
roast, instead apologizing for the incivility of her humor and in this context explicitly 
contrasting the roast Wolf was hired to conduct with the goals of a proper free press:  
Last night’s message was supposed to offer a unifying message about our 
common commitment to a vigorous and free press while honoring civility, great 
reporting and scholarship winners, not to divide people. Unfortunately, the 
entertainer’s monologue was not in the spirit of that mission.558 
 
President Trump, of course, also used Twitter to denounce the roast that he refused to 
attend. Initially, he laid out a rocky future for the event, writing,  
The White House Correspondents’ Dinner was a failure last year, but this year 
was an embarrassment to everyone associated with it. The filthy “comedian” 
totally bombed (couldn’t even deliver her lines-much like the Seth Meyers weak 
performance). Put Dinner to rest, or start over!559 
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Of note is not only his critique of Wolf’s comedic skill but also declaration of her as 
“filthy,” in close proximity to calling Hillary Clinton a “nasty woman” during the 
presidential race in 2016. He continued the next day, now with more of an emphasis on 
the death of the event, writing, 
The White House Correspondents’ Dinner is DEAD as we know it. This was a 
total disaster and an embarrassment to our great Country and all that it stands for. 
FAKE NEWS is alive and well and beautifully represented on Saturday night!560 
 
With the Trump administration having thrown the critique of politically correct losers out 
the window, the White House Correspondents’ Dinner as a venue for the expression of 
comedy remains under threat in the effort to ease hurt feelings about a roast being 
performed as a roast. During an interview in late April 2018 after the event, incoming 
White House Correspondents’ Association president Olivier Knox weighed several 
suggestions he is considering for the future: “No entertainer. No comic. A serious 
speaker. Maybe a musician. Maybe don’t televise it.”561 Perhaps, however, it is Michelle 
Wolf who has the last laugh, having mirthfully exclaimed during her Dinner comedy set, 
“Yeah, shoulda done more research before you got me to do this.”562 
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 In this context the rebooted Roseanne, now a Trump supporter along with the 
reappropriated Pepe, returned not to a baseball diamond with an unruly song and a spit 
and a crotch-grab in the face of patriotism but instead a set of rules for comedy as love in 
the form of facile non-conflict, especially towards people who are more powerful. 
Roseanne tweeted on April 29th, “first rule of comedy: NEVER target someone more 
famous than U who is in the audience. U will lose the entire crowd.”563 She followed this 
discouragement against speaking against power with: “second rule of comedy: comedy 
comes from LOVE, not from HATE! If u feel hate, you won't get laughs.”564 Then her 
third rule of comedy, “...the comic has to be the ‘asshole,’ not the audience!”565 leaves the 
entire possibility of a comedian conducting a roast in doubt. Finally, Roseanne revisited 
her rules for comedy a few days later on May 1st: “4th rule of comedy: get big laughs 
close together.”566 Through a spineless inversion of Cynthia Willet’s theory of comedy as 
Eros,567 Roseanne posed the opposite set of rules to Rowe’s emphasis on Roseanne as a 
figure of unruliness, casting comedy as a critique of power aside in favor of comedy as a 
method for pleasing and currying favor.  
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 The onslaught of the humorless, over-sensitive, and politically correct against the 
humor of free-speaking envelope-pushers is thus revealed to be a puppet show of power. 
Not only humor, but also discourse around humor, is political and should not be removed 
from its social world. Contrary to Morreall,568 the joke-teller does not retreat into their 
intellect at the expense of the potentially harmed emotional other, but rather remains 
emotionally invested and engaged with the affect of the joke and its continued 
relationship to jesting subject. This connection is revealed most explicitly when humor 
becomes unstable, working differently or even against the humorist’s best calculations, 
humor’s social and political life constantly overshadowing the attempt to contain it within 
the isolated head or the realm of abstract, disconnected, free expression. 
 
Feminist Philosophy and Unstable Politics 
 In this chapter, I began by fulfilling my promise to honor more deeply the 
contributions of feminist philosophers who connect laughter to embodiment, subjectivity, 
and potential instability. I first traced the instability of humorwork to the continuing 
connection between the subject of humorwork and their reappropriated or misunderstood 
humor, referring to Matt Furie and the transformation of Pepe the Frog to argue that the 
humorworking subject and the life of the humor-product often cannot be easily separated. 
I then argued this instability takes upon a gendered and embodied register by discussing 
the example of the unruly woman, who practices humorwork at the excess of gender, 
embodiment, and visibility. Finally, I showed that the popular framework of humor as 
free practice in contrast to overly politicized and overly sensitive reactions to humor is a 
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political rhetoric easily defeated by examining the instabilities that emotionally connect 
even the freest and most edgy humorists with the continued uptake of their work. All 
humorists are subject to the possibility that their humor can be reappropriated and 
deployed against anyone or anything given the right conditions. I have thus argued that 
humor involves an unstable politics, and the practice of humor cannot be totally captured 
by rigid control or rules. The practice of humorwork by gendered, embodied, emotional 
subjects with complex relationships to others in a social and political power-laden world 
entails that the ongoing social and political life of humor is often messy.  
I began Chapter II and ended this chapter with a discussion of humor that 
disavows its connection with affect, bodies, subjects, and a social and political world. 
Over the course of my dissertation I have argued that it is important to foreground the 
role of power in humor, and to do so it is important to foreground the social location of 
the people who make humor, the affects they bring into play during humor’s work of 
reappropriation and transformation, and the continued instability of practicing humor that 
thwarts rigid calculation. In the context of feminist politics, I take this distinction 
between politicized humor and falsely depoliticized humor to not only be descriptive but 
also practical and normative.  
These two different frameworks of humor also carry very different views on the 
politics of humor, the role of humorwork for resistance and social change, and the 
responsibilities humorists have in relation to others. The depoliticized view, considered in 
its political dimensions, separates the practice of humor from its potential effects, and 
from the nuance and self-humility of considering one’s social location and how this 
might inform the practice of humor. It separates humor from affect, from both oneself 
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and others, and brackets it outside the sphere of the body, let alone a body that is 
gendered. It also fails to account for the instability of humor, losing a sense that potential 
misinterpretations and reappropriations of humor may continue to implicate a subject, to 
the extent they remain in connection and may even be responsible for the range of ways 
humor can be taken up. This view of humor is one that disconnects the humorist from 
their world, perhaps offering a cocoon of safety with which to defensively push away 
ethics and politics or rip the skeleton of humor from its more complex holistic body for 
study, but losing the rich connection between humorists and the world and discounting 
humor’s potential role in social change. Due to the instabilities of humor, this approach to 
humorwork also inevitably fails in practice even if it lacks self-responsibility or tries to 
mask this failure. 
Feminist humorwork can be envisioned in a different voice. In contrast to a 
practice of humor that is closed-off and insular while trying (and failing) to distance itself 
from the world and feelings and others and bodies, feminist humorwork can do better and 
serve as a political, engaged, and embodied practice embracing instability and the 
connection between practice, sociality, and affect. In refusing to distance itself from 
others and the world, feminist humorwork can also be potentially transformative, both 
attentive to ways in which existing and entrenched discourse, images, ideas, and 
situations can be changed against their intentions and expectations, while attempting to 
project a world through unstable practice that could be better. Feminist humorwork can 
also be a potential site for humility, as the instability of humor informs the possibility that 
our words and deeds, ideas and actions, and artistic endeavors can often be taken up 
against our intentions and recast anew. The feminist humorworker can use this 
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understanding of potential misunderstanding not only to bend what is too rigid, but also 
to take care and responsibility with the potential unanticipated effects when practicing 
humor with others. 
An investigation into the relationship between feminist philosophy and unstable 
humorwork is also a helpful consideration of the relationship between feminist 
philosophy and unstable politics more broadly. While it is often helpful to engage in 
action and direct speech, I hope I have made the case for a feminist politics of indirection 
and misdirection, a feminist trickery that may very well serve as an eternal irony of the 
social and political community. Such a consideration is also a matter of community and 
connection, as no one feminist philosopher will be able to master a topic such as humor 
that involves so many complex interactions between politics, language, epistemology, 
aesthetics, ethics, and subjectivity, and feminist philosophers as a group will be lost 
without considering the insights of broader interdisciplinary scholarship and practitioners 
of feminist activism, art, and comedy, inclusive of everyday words and deeds. I also hope 
this points towards a feminist scholarship beyond the lack of complexity often given to 
work in applied philosophy as a one-directional arc from ideas to action that instead 
simultaneously brings action to bear on thought, and thought to bear in action, in a 
continued dialectic that clarifies the importance of both thought and action when thinking 
about a specific practice, and especially a practice so complex as humor. 
If understanding humorwork, and unstable politics, is also a matter between 
subject, practice, and world, then I also want to suggest it is important to take up this 
position and tinker with it yourself, as I have done with humor in public for the past few 
years. Taking up this instability myself has given me a renewed appreciation for the ways 
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in which humor can lead to misinterpretations I never would have expected and a life 
beyond me that I may have not even been aware of as it is taken out of my hands and 
remolded across time. I have learned first-hand how humor can be shared as part of the 
thought process and dialogue of an open community, and how I can try to be more 
effective and responsible with the effects of my humor on others. I have made jokes I was 
unsure about that resonated with a lot of people, and I have made jokes that hurt people 
through uptakes against my expectations that I did not anticipate and still do not 
understand. I have also encountered moments where my attempt at reappropriating and 
transforming language and images has been used against me. By taking up the indirect 
practice of humor, my attempts to make a humorous political point sometimes shifted 
back into a regressive form I no longer controlled even as I retained a connection with 
this humor through bad feelings. Finally, writing on the politics of humor has caused me 
to reflect more on rhetoric about humor as a free, unburdened expression that would be 
fundamentally threatened by relating humor to politics, emotions, affectivity, and bodies. 
This depoliticization of humor, along with broader rhetoric that depoliticizes “free 
speech” in opposition to over-sensitive affectivity, is often unreflected upon in an effort 
to silence people with less power. 
Despite the difficulties of writing about and practicing humor that has 
accompanied many of its triumphs, I am grateful to have chosen this strange subject of 
humor, to have practiced what I preach, and to have sharpened both my ideas and my 
practice of humor in conversation with each other. I am a funnier and wiser person than 
when I started, and ready to accept a more refined subject position as feminist 








Politics, Revolution, and Instability in Humorwork 
Throughout this dissertation I have worked through the complexities of claiming 
to have humor on one’s side. I have focused on the practice of humorwork and its 
instabilities, emphasizing that humorwork involves a complex field of indirect politics 
occurring across the everyday landscapes of social and political life. This unstable field 
of humor politics is enabled by the subject and their relationship with language, 
especially as it is connected with an emotional and social world conductive of political 
speech linked with power and oppression. In this conclusion I will explain the role that 
each chapter of this dissertation had in drawing out the relationship between humor, 
politics, resistance, and instability. I will then explain the specific features of my feminist 
account of humorwork for future approaches to humor in social and political philosophy. 
I began this dissertation by discussing the claim of comedians, mostly men of the 
baby boomer generation, that the fate of humor is threatened by the rise of over-sensitive 
and over-emotional social justice-minded people, usually of the millennial generation, 
who overly politicize jokes. From the outset this dissertation has thus focused on the 
compatibility between centering the politics of humor and understanding how humor 
works. To that end, in Chapter II argued that scholarship in humor studies often brackets 
out the role of the subject and power in the practice of humor, instead focusing on humor 
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as primarily a study of depoliticized language. In Chapter III, I took this argument further 
by pointing out that the popular scholarly approach of dividing humor theories into 
essentialist categories decenters the relationship between humor, power, and oppression. 
When the history of philosophical work centering the social and political role of humor is 
dismissed for failing to account for all the essential features of humor, this leads to the 
relationship between power and humor getting hastily cast aside in mainstream humor 
theory, resulting in individualist frameworks of humor ethics that decenter larger social 
and political relationships between humor, power, and oppression. 
 I also began this dissertation by considering the relationship between women and 
humor, discussing both the claim by Christopher Hitchens that women naturally have less 
of an affinity for humor than men and Naomi Weisstein’s argument that women should 
develop a new way of practicing humor beyond its systematic use against women under 
patriarchy. Juxtaposed with popular claims mentioned in the previous paragraph that the 
free, proper practice of humor is threatened by people who center aims of social justice, I 
move from the topic of women and humor to considering the potential use of humor as a 
practice of social amelioration against oppression. In Chapter IV, I reviewed feminist 
film, theory, and philosophy about women’s laughter as a revolutionary act of opening 
space for laughter’s possibilities. I argued that while it is important to focus on 
connections between women, laughter, and revolution, this does not shed light on many 
specific political practices of humor by women and the ways they may or may not resist 
oppression. In Chapter V I thus discussed the specific practices of feminist humorists, 
drawing from humor studies and especially the work of Delia Chiaro to argue feminist 
humorists are able to experience the world and its patriarchal structures as fundamentally 
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manipulable at both subtle and overt levels of humor practice. In describing this practice, 
I introduced the concept of humorwork, through which people practice humor to 
indirectly reappropriate and transform words, phrases, images, and situations against their 
own terms for political ends. Humorwork thus serves as a concrete practice through 
which humor can be used to generate possible situations of liberation through indirect 
manipulation rather than direct engagement on the terms of an oppressive status quo. 
The third insight that jump-started my dissertation was the realization that I am 
often unable to predict or control the outcome of my political humorwork experiments on 
the Internet, even in the rare event that my jokes are met with enthusiasm by thousands 
and achieve “viral” status. Despite my interest and hopes for a connection between humor 
and practices of feminist resistance, my dissertation has also focused on ways in which 
humor can be used against liberation in the form of counterameliorative humor, as well as 
the instability of humor as a practice more broadly, to capture the more limited and 
unpredictable contours of humorwork. In Chapter VI, I referred to racist movements 
against Black Lives Matter to discuss what I call counterameliorative humorwork, which 
reentrenches an oppressive status quo through humor that is antifeminist, sexist, racist, or 
homophobic (among many other counterameliorative possibilities and combinations). I 
conclude that humorwork should not be considered only as a practice that aims for 
liberation and amelioration, but also as a practice that often invokes racist circulations of 
emotion to undermine activism and slogans against oppression. In addition to the use of 
humor for resistance, counterameliorative humorwork must be considered as a similar 
practice that aims to shut down or wear out movements for social liberation. 
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Continuing from the more complex field of humorwork’s potential use for 
politics, Chapter VII concludes the dissertation by highlighting a larger instability that 
undergirds all potential political practices of humorwork. Refocusing on the embodied 
subject who produces humor, I emphasize that products of humorwork often take on a 
continued life of creative reappropriation beyond the intentions of their creator, capable 
of transformations that the humorist may not have expected. The field of indirect 
reappropriation and transformation available through the practice of humorwork thus 
frequently denies attempts to calculate ahead of time the social and political effects that 
humor will have in broader circulation. This field of instability also relates to embodied 
gendered performance, as taking up a subject position of comic gendered unruliness can 
grant the power of exploiting visibility but also result in distinct punishments as this 
visibility is turned against the subject who wields it. I drew upon these insights about the 
instability of humorwork to focus on comedians who claim access to the true practice of 
humor as free, unemotional, and edgy in contrast to tropes of humorless feminists and 
over-emotional people (usually feminist millennials) oriented towards social justice. 
Specifically, I focused on Ricky Gervais’ emotional attachment to his critics and the 
immediate shift by the Trump administration and Trump-allied media from framing 
liberals and other politically left-leaning people as overly sensitive to chastising political 
humor as unacceptable and abusive following the 2018 White House Correspondents 
Dinner. 
The instability of humorwork indicates that the indirect manipulations available 
through the practice of political humor cannot be fully calculated ahead of time, as it is 
possible to have the products of humor transformed against original intentions, it is 
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possible to be chastised as unruly and punished for using humor, and people who think 
they are immune to humor’s politics are often undermined by their own emotional 
responses to its uptake. I conclude from this that engaging in humorwork provides a 
distinctly powerful practice of indirectly reappropriating and transforming existing 
speech, images, and situations without accepting their direct and straightforward terms. 
While this practice of humorwork can open political possibilities and visions that may 
have been impossible within the terms of oppressive systems, the indirect mode of 
engagement also opens the practice of humor up to continued reappropriation and 
transformation against original intentions, as well as distinct possibilities of punishment 
for taking up an unruly practice and subject position. Humorwork is thus an unstable 
practice of politics that can be taken up for both feminist and counterameliorative aims as 
part of a larger field of political discourse moving beyond direct, propositional political 
engagement. 
 
Implications of Humorwork as Unstable Politics 
Now that I have brought feminist philosophy to bear on humor studies and 
emphasized the importance of considering humorwork as unstable politics, I will point to 
several implications of this view. First, I have argued that social and political theories of 
humor should be welcomed as part of the rich pluralism of humor studies as a field. 
Though I have pointed out limitations of humor studies, the philosophy of humor, the 
ethics of humor, and feminist theories of laughter for adequately describing humor as a 
social and political practice, I have endeavored throughout not to entirely dismiss any of 
these wide approaches to studying humor. For example, I have critiqued the decentering 
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of social and political analysis in humor studies and the limitations of feminist theories of 
laughter for considering humor in practice, and then brought insights from humor studies 
together with feminist philosophy to make these approaches stronger. By approaching 
humor through the lens of feminist philosophy I am thus hoping to maintain a rich, wide 
pluralism in humor scholarship, while also endeavoring to have feminist philosophy, 
feminist theory, and social and political theory more broadly taken seriously in the 
interdisciplinary pluralism of humor studies. 
Second, as part of this pluralism, and especially in Chapter III, I have embraced 
humor as a term historically carrying different meanings for different scholars over a long 
period of time. Following contemporary approaches in humor studies and philosophy of 
humor, I take “humor” to signify an umbrella term for various practices, mental states, 
operations of language, performances, and cultural productions that are in some sense 
funny or amusing in intention or result569 while taking care to not distort non-general or 
historically specific uses of “humor.” I thus embrace a broad use of the term “humor” in 
conversation with other approaches to humor that I have given more precision in my 
analysis by focusing on humorwork specifically. Because approaching humor through the 
lens of continental feminist philosophy involves connecting the speaking subject, their 
gendered embodiment, their language, their emotions, and their social and political 
world, I take the pluralism of humor to invoke relationships between social and political 
philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of language, as well as politics, language, and 
embodiment. 
                                               




Third, I have argued for a practice-focused approach to studying humor. I am not 
suggesting that a social and political philosophy of humor must always center specific 
examples of humor in practice. However, I do take considering the practice of humor to 
be key for gathering specific evidence for a political analysis of how humor operates and 
what it can potentially accomplish. I thus recommend that a social and political 
philosophy of humor should at least consider the practice of humor, even if focusing 
instead on related phenomena such as laughter, to keep the conversation grounded. 
Fourth, and related to the subject of grounding conversations about the politics of 
humor in practice, I have built skepticism and limitations about the political effects of 
humorwork into my approach. In contrast to feminist theories of laughter that consider its 
abstract revolutionary potential or promise for women, I have decided instead to focus on 
practice to consider what specifically humorwork is able to accomplish when indirectly 
engaging with specific language, images, and situations. I have also considered the 
instability of humor to further limit the extent to which humor can accomplish its best 
intentions. While I do not intend to totally rob humor of any revolutionary potential, I 
also want to avoid exaggerating the potential of humorwork for changing the world in 
ways that can be calculated ahead of its practice. I also intend this limitation as an insight 
into planning actions of political humor, since it is important to not only focus on the 
execution of humorwork but also potential ways any practice of humor can misfire. 
Beyond specific practitioners, a social and political philosophy of humor must also be 
careful to avoid erroneously associating humorwork solely with the aims of liberation or 
the aims of oppression. 
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Fifth, by considering popular discussions about the allegiance of humor, such as 
the historical assertion that women have less of an affinity for humor and the 
contemporary assertion that humor is threatened by humorless people who are 
overemotional and concerned with the cause of social justice, I take the study of 
humorwork to also involve a critical study of how frameworks such as humorfulness and 
humorlessness often operate for political ends. For example, at the end of Chapter VII, I 
concluded that comedians such as Ricky Gervais often consider their comedy to involve 
an authentic, free practice of humor that is primarily depoliticized, removed from 
emotion, and separate from potential social effects, even while ignoring their intense 
emotional investment in its political uptake. This assumption is often used to assert an 
ideal response to humor from others, specifically that the hearer should be able to “take a 
joke” and not be too sensitive regardless of the joke’s context or content. Focusing on the 
practice of humorwork by a subject in a social and political world can also assist with 
considering the ways their humor or perceived lack of humor is framed politically, 
functioning as a resource to critique assumptions about humor that excuse or diminish its 
potential negative effects on people in the world.  
Moving forward, I hope to continue filling in some of the features that I have 
indicated serve an important role in humorwork as a political practice. While I have spent 
much time in this dissertation emphasizing that discussions and theories about humor 
have left it depoliticized, I would also like to focus on other elements of humor that can 
get left behind by accounts of the necessary and sufficient operations of humor, such as 
emotions and play. While I have indicated that the circulation of emotions plays an 
important role in the political life of humorwork, I hope that more work will be done to 
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examine the decentering of emotions and affectivity from humor by theories focusing on 
its linguistic operations and by popular discussions about the ability or inability to “take” 
a joke. If humor has a rich political life, then it also has a rich emotional life that must not 
be left out of a fully developed social and political philosophy of humorwork. 
Relatedly, I hope to see more work on the subject of play in relation to 
humorwork, especially as it connects the rich and social emotional life of humor to 
complicated operations of reappropriation and transformation. Though I have endeavored 
throughout this dissertation to include amusing and playful examples of feminist and 
ameliorative humorwork in action, one risk of focusing on the political weight of humor 
is that fun, silliness, and playfulness can end up decentered in relation to humor as a 
series of political operations. I thus hope future work will focus on the fun, playfulness, 
and surprise of humor, and how this can be centered without dismissing the role of 
humorwork as a political practice. Accomplishing this would better assist the study of 
humorwork in fulfilling its pluralist goals. 
Going beyond this, though I returned to the gendered body as promised in Chapter 
VI, more can be said about the humorwork of embodied performance than I could 
manage in this dissertation without stretching the account of humorwork too much 
beyond its origin in linguistic manipulations. I am interested in not only the use of 
humorwork in language and graffiti, but also its embodied performance by feminist 
comedians, performance artists, dancers, mimes, and clowns. Focusing on instances of 
humorwork that depend more on embodied movement would go farther towards 
providing a fully fleshed out philosophy of humor as practiced by an embodied subject in 
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